




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Guest editor
Anna Dąbrowska

Honorary editor
Ronald W. Langacker

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Language, Cognition and Socio-Physical Experience

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Introduction: Within Semantic-Conceptual Structure and Beyond

1. Lexicon and grammar continuum

Modern linguistics has long been believed to have grown out of Ferdinand de Saussure's concept of the *linguistic sign*, which consists of an idea or meaning (the signified) and its expression or form (the signifier) (Saussure, 1968, 1971, 1915/1981, p. 99). The nature of language seems to resemble, but never be identical to, the Saussurean form-meaning pair in that semantics occupies one pole of the unit, while the other is taken by its phonological and/or morphological shape. Nonetheless, the existing division between syntax and semantics is not so sharp (Langacker, 1976, p. 315). For Ronald W. Langacker (2010, p. 1), commonly considered one of the pioneers of the Cognitive Linguistics movement and the father of Cognitive Grammar, "[l]anguage necessarily comprises semantic structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between the two." Being symbolic in nature, language "makes available to the speaker – for either personal or communicative use – an open-ended set of linguistic *signs* or *expressions*, each of which associates a semantic representation of some kind with a phonological representation" (Langacker, 1987, p. 11; cf. Taylor, 2002, p. 39). In other words, in a given linguistic item, called 'unit' within Cognitive Grammar, the so-called semantic pole "reflects meaning in a number of ways and for all kinds of units, and not solely defined as the external referent of single words" (Winters, 2015, p. 152).

Yet, regardless of the dual nature of linguistic units, both the precursors and followers of Cognitive Linguistics, and of Cognitive Grammar in particular, maintain that "lexicon and grammar form a continuum, and that only symbolic structures – each residing in the symbolic linkage of a semantic and a phonological structure – figure in their proper characterization" (Langacker, 2010, p. 1). Henceforth, lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a gradation consisting of assemblies

Anna Dąbrowska, Katedra Lingwistyki Stosowanej, Instytut Językoznawstwa i Literaturoznawstwa, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, ul. Sowińskiego 17, 20-040 Lublin, anna.dabrowska@mail.umcs.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7170-4070>

of symbolic structures (form-meaning pairings). In fact, in all cognitivist models of language, as elucidated by Henryk Kardela (2020, p. 21), linguistic units seem to form a continuum within semantic-conceptual structure.

Based on these central assumptions and tenets which constitute the fundamentals of the Cognitive Linguistics framework, this volume brings together nine chapters which present an elaboration of theoretical issues as well as empirical case studies that rely on various kinds of experimental data and corpus data or a combination of both. The chapters are perspicuously linked to the main characteristic feature of Cognitive Linguistics, namely, “investigating the relationship between human language, the mind and socio-physical experience” (Evans, Bergen, & Zinken, 2007, p. 1). This common element is what motivates the title of the volume, i.e., *Language, Cognition and Socio-physical Experience*. The nine chapters of this volume refer to the two basic areas of research carried out within the Cognitive Linguistics perspective, i.e., (i) Cognitive (approaches to) Grammar, and (ii) Cognitive Semantics – most of which are usage-based approaches. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, all the contributions are briefly introduced. The division of the volume into the Cognitive Grammar research (section 2) and Cognitive Semantics studies (section 3) is rather conventional because it is difficult to draw a clear boundary as to the field in which a given author conducts his/her research. There are undoubtedly some issues that overlap and may also occur in other areas of research.

2. A Cognitive Grammar perspective

In the cognitivist view of grammar, contrary to the generativist approach, grammar is meaningful, which results from the fact that the elements of grammar, such as single vocabulary items or complex expressions (like phrases, clauses, and sentences), have their own meaning. In addition, grammar enables us to construct and symbolise more elaborate meanings of linguistic units. Hence, far from being a separate and self-contained cognitive system, grammar functions as an integral part of cognition and a key to understanding it (Kardela, 2020, p. 21; Langacker, 2008, pp. 3–4).

Being subject to refinement and elaboration over four decades, Cognitive Grammar has not changed in any fundamental way, dealing with the structure, and meaning in grammar. In its general outline, the Cognitive Grammar framework is realised within two different approaches (lines) to language study. The first one, pursued by such scholars as Ronald W. Langacker (1987, 1991), focuses on the study of the cognitive principles which give rise to linguistic structure. These researchers try to delineate the principles that organise grammar and relate them to the aspects of general cognition. The second line of investigation, represented by Paul Kay and Charles Fillmore (1999), George Lakoff (1987), Adele Goldberg (1995) and Benjamin Bergen and Nancy Chang (2005), among others, tend to provide a more descriptive account of the linguistic units (from morphemes to words, idioms, and phrasal patterns) within a particular language.

The first chapter of this volume, written Langacker, contributes to the latest developments in the field of Cognitive Grammar. His study builds from fundamentals and the background required for comprehension. The main concern of the researcher is to investigate conceptual and linguistic structure in terms of their relation to one another. The two aspects to be examined include a general feature of cognition (B/E organization, cf. Langacker, 2016), and a cognitive model representing our conception of reality, both of which form a persuasive explanation of central features of English clause structure. As assumed by the scientist, linguistic structure tends to be systematised in successive levels (or strata), each being elaborated (E) on the ground of a baseline (B). The higher level a clause unfolds at, the more incorporated additional resources, the richer reality conception, and the wider array of structural options. Reality conception contains the established course of events, which a given conceptualizer accepts as real. Based on these essentials, Langacker (this volume) proposes implementing the reality model into English clause structure. The clause structure is not only built on different levels, but it can gradually reveal the fundamental cognitive aspects of pre-linguistic experience (cf. Langacker, 2013, p. 15). Henceforth, clause structures involve different conceptual layers, the so-called levels of reality. Interestingly, even though the researcher's reference to one-clause expressions in English does not allow him to make a universal claim, his innovative account does prove some schematic organisations which reveal the abstract character of clausal grounding. This observation makes Langacker state that "linguistic structure is revealingly characterised in terms of a notion of reality, comprising multiple dimensions and levels of organization" (Langacker, this volume).

In their chapter, Henryk Kardela, Anna Kędra-Kardela and Andrzej Sławomir Kowalczyk, driven from Langacker's (1991) conception of grouping, adjust Roman Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art to the Cognitive Grammar paradigm. By means of the gestalt-based mechanism of grouping, combined with Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's (2002) conceptual integration theory, the multi-strata nature of the literary work (as proposed by Ingarden (1973, 2000)), is meant to be holistically analysed within Cognitive Poetics, developed by Peter Stockwell (2020). The elaborations on the 'places of indeterminacy' in Adam Mickiewicz's sonnet entitled "The Ackerman Steppe" are genuinely performed by Kardela et al. Their results reveal that; indeed, the cognitive process of grouping is a promising methodological tool that seems to transcend, in a gestalt-like manner, all 'levels' of conceptual organization. The researchers are convinced that within the Cognitive Grammar framework, a cognitive-poetic study of literary texts can be plausibly and effectively applied, by taking advantage of the valuable 'old' literary theories like Ingarden's and placing them into the modern literary discourse (Kardela et al., this volume).

3. A Cognitive Semantics perspective

The area of study known as Cognitive Semantics deals with investigating the relationship between experience, the conceptual system, and the semantic structure encoded by language. To be precise, scholars working in this cognitive area account for knowledge representation (conceptual structure) and meaning construction (conceptualization). Language for cognitive semanticists is recognized as the lens through which these cognitive phenomena can be scrutinised. While Cognitive Grammar is concerned with modelling the language system (the mental ‘grammar’), Cognitive Semantics focuses on modelling and examining the nature of the human mind. It is human conceptualization thanks to which linguistic meaning is revealed. Accordingly, the thesis that ‘meaning is conceptualization’, is what specifies Cognitive Semantics most (Evans, 2012; Geeraerts, 2006).

The first valuable contribution which belongs to the scope of Cognitive Semantics is the one made by Zoltán Kövecses, who investigates the interrelations among the notions of metaphor, discourse, and creativity. Defining conceptual metaphor as a set of mappings between the source and the target domains, the researcher clarifies that metaphorical creativity from a discourse perspective can involve source-induced creativity, target-induced creativity, and context-induced creativity. Taking context into consideration, Kövecses claims that conceptualizers (both hearers and speakers) seem to depend on a number of contextual factors when using metaphors in discourse. This article refers to a few context types, such as the immediate linguistic context, the knowledge of conceptualizers about themselves and the topic, the immediate cultural context, the social context, and the physical setting. One of the most frequently studied type of context in which metaphors appear is *linguistic context*, which, as summarised by Kövecses (this volume), is established on the ground of different conceptual frames (together with temporary mental spaces) and symbolic units (form-meaning pairs, and words), which represent and activate the frames. Metaphorically used expressions, that is the so-called metaphoric symbolic units, are embedded into this flow of frames and words, hence into the flow of discourse. In fact, metaphors can be evoked not only on the level of frames but they can be also realised on more individualised and less schematic levels, e.g., the level of domains and mental spaces (Kövecses, 2017b, p. 323; Kövecses, 2020, p. 52). What is of great importance is the researcher’s observation, based on an informal collection of data from a variety of newspapers, that the already-mentioned contextual factors motivate, to a great extent, the use of many novel metaphors, which appear to have a unique status, since they are grounded in the context in which metaphorical conceptualization occurs. These contextual factors not only prime the use of particular metaphors but also “facilitate the development and mutual understanding of the discourse” (Kövecses, this volume).

Furthermore, the claim, rooted in the Saussurean view of meaning, that the same meaning or idea can be expressed through various forms, including lan-

guage, dance, music, or art (St. Clair, 2002, p. 2), is expertly supported by another contributor of this volume, Joanna Pędzisz, who makes an attempt to name the unspeakable, that is to verbalise the knowledge about movement qualities in contemporary dance, by means of Rudolf Laban's conceptual apparatus for movement analysis (Wojnicka 2010/2011). In her paper, Pędzisz notes that the specific knowledge of a dance instructor is expressed by means of their specialised and highly metaphorical language. The metaphoricity of the dance teacher's commands is expressed by the linguistic metaphors concerning the required components of movement (space, weight, time, flow). These metaphors are reliant on the skills, education and experience of dance participants. Dance learners take these metaphorical instructions of the teacher as an auditory and visual metaphorical stimulus (Frydrysiak, 2017, p. 172; Pędzisz, this volume). Importantly, this mutual relationship created between the two conceptualizers (a teacher and a learner) is what reconstructs the meaning of the instructions.

Viewing metaphor and metonymy as important conceptual mechanisms which motivate meaning construction and semantic change (cf. Traugott, 2012), Robert Kiełtyka, in his chapter, suggests that a lexical item may develop several metaphorical and metonymic senses over time. In his study, the researcher thoroughly investigates the semantics of the "top" ten English terms of Germanic, Romance and Arabic origin, i.e., trivia, hazard, muscle, avocado, handicap, fiasco, slapstick, bedlam, eavesdrop, and phon(e)y, in their figurative senses. Kiełtyka clarifies that most of the terms under scrutiny seem to have received a figurative reading as a result of activating the mechanism of metonymization between senses. Since the mental process of metonymization entails "the use of a lexical item to evoke the sense of something that is not conventionally linked to that particular item" (Paradis, 2011, p. 2), it is recognised as a powerful methodological tool to account for the semantic change of the investigated terms. In addition to their universal popularity, the words subject to analysis appear to be deeply entrenched and culture-bound, which makes them influential enough to exert a strong impact on social cognition (Kiełtyka, this volume).

The role of metonymy, viewed as one of the basic construals shaping and conditioning the use of language, is also recognised by Elżbieta Muskat-Tabakowska, who addresses the incident of the seizing of a tank from the Russian army by Ukrainian civilians, which occurred in the battle zone soon after the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Using the pragmatic aspects of the interactive (online) messages, the author of the chapter skilfully presents the evolution of Polish social response to this episode. By means of the mechanism of conceptual integration and her in-depth analysis of the inherently metonymic language expressions extracted from Internet websites, Muskat-Tabakowska effectively processes the extralinguistic contextual information to help us understand the hidden linguistic messages. Undeniably, to make communication between senders and

receivers of the message productive, and to shape Internet users' attitudes towards ethnic stereotypes, the Russian aggressors and political correctness, the conceptualizers need to share the worldview, embedded in a particular social and cultural context (Muskat-Tabakowska, this volume).

In the next chapter of this volume, Yakiv Bystrov, Olha Bilyk, Nataliia Ivanotchak, Iryna Malyshivska, and Nataliia Pyliachyk account for another incident that occurred in Ukraine, namely the Chornobyl disaster (Ukrainian spelling 'Chornobyl' is here purposefully used, instead of the Russian spelling 'Chernobyl'). Despite having been distorted in USSR and Post-Soviet media discourse and disconnected from the mainstream culture, the catastrophe incessantly occupies its multidimensional space within social cognition around the world (Zabuzhko, 2020). By investigating the multimodal metaphors in the five episodes of the miniseries "Chornobyl," the issue of Chornobyl can be actualised. In their identification and selection of the multimodal metaphors, the researchers make use of the Filmic Metaphor Identification Procedure. Multimodal metaphor, represented by various modes (i.e., visual, written, or auditory), is chosen to update the world's perception of the Chornobyl catastrophe. Indeed, thanks to the researchers' in-depth analysis of modes and received amalgamations (dynamic and vivid cinematic images, enhanced with sonic and verbal manifestations that construe the multimodal metaphors), the Chornobyl concept seems to be objectified and elaborated, which certainly will enrich the social cognition, by deepening the understanding of the Chornobyl tragedy, still featured with such strong emotions.

Another multi-part aspect of meaning construction can be brought into light through our understanding of what Fauconnier and Turner (2002) call *cognitive blends*. For Langacker (1987, p. 63), meaning resides in domains ("space", "colour"), which are constructed into mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994), defined as small conceptual packets whose purpose entails local understanding and action. By overlapping, these spaces create new conceptualizations through the process of blending or conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Winters, 2015, pp. 157–158). This process is clearly referred to by a few contributors to this volume, e.g., Kardela et al. and Muskat-Tabakowska, introduced so far. The next chapter to refer to this mechanism is written by Aleksandra Majdzińska-Koczorowicz and Julia Ostanina-Olszewska, who relate to the 2022 Russian attack on Ukraine. In their study of some chosen pro-Ukrainian memes against the Russian invasion, Majdzińska-Koczorowicz and Ostanina-Olszewska discuss the cognitive mechanisms in terms of their bimodal construal, as delineated in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), and the view of construal by Langacker (2008, 2019). Regarded as multimodal constructions that reveal "networked creativity and a mechanism of political participation" (Majdzińska-Koczorowicz

& Ostanina-Olszewska, this volume), memes are meant to generate new frames and meanings. This function of memes is motivated by the humorous and satirical nature of memes. The online meaning construction of memes results from frameshifting and convergence of different mental spaces. The researchers believe that, by means of blending and frame substitution, the humorous incongruity revealed in pro-Ukrainian memes will draw the world's attention to the Ukrainian issue and communicate their piercing cry for help.

Finally, the significance of multimodality, presented in a more usage-based model, is also recognised by Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos, who conducts a cognitive analysis of a TV commercial for *Momester®Nasal*, in which three modes (visual, linguistic and aural) coexist in varying degrees. The researcher distinguishes both the emphasised and concealed elements in the three disparate modes, proving successfully that this highlighting and hiding cognitive mechanism, “contributes to greater cross-resonance among the modes, which in turn reinforces the creative potential of the message” (Mierzwińska-Hajnos, this volume; cf. Pérez Sobrino, 2017). Indeed, the co-occurrence of multiple modes naturally forces some elements or/and modes to be highlighted and others to be hidden. This mechanism seems to refer to Leonard Talmy's (1975) figure-ground relation, Langacker's (1987) profile-landmark distinction, or Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) conceptual blending, the last of which dynamically projects the selected elements of the given input spaces to form a novel blended space with emergent structure (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003, p. 57). Finally, as noticed by the author of this paper, the plethora of available modes is not only a characteristic feature of human messages and communication but also a purposeful technique chosen by contemporary advertising companies and TV commercials (Forceville, 1996, p. 104; Forceville, 2008; Winiarska & Załazińska, 2018, p. 7; Mierzwińska-Hajnos, this volume).

4. Final remarks

As a final note, it is really crucial to emphasise the mutual interdependence and overlapping of the two cognitive approaches, i.e., Cognitive Grammar and the study of Cognitive Semantics, which may be occasionally separate in practice, but, in fact, their domains of enquiry are tightly linked.

This volume is to prove that both of the approaches in Cognitive Linguistics seem to correlate and overlap in several issues. Langacker's detailed analysis of the levels of reality derived from the descriptive dimensions of Cognitive Grammar and Kardela et al.'s elaborations on the “places of indeterminacy” in Mickiewicz's sonnet “The Ackerman Steppe” rely on the gestalt-based mechanism of grouping. The other papers in this volume (by Kövecses, Pędzisz, Kiełtyka, Muskat-Tabakowska, Bystrov et al., Majdzińska-Koczorowicz & Ostanina-Olszewska, and by Mierzwińska-Hajnos) focus more specifically on semantically-driven meaning reconstruction, meaning shifts and meaning change. Specifically, the analyses

in these chapters stem from the well-known general cognitive mapping abilities, such as metaphor, metonymy and conceptual blending. The analyses aim to explain the ways in which linguistic expressions, gestures, sound, images or movement are used and extended to new contexts and new meanings.

As observed by the authors of this volume, the potential of conceptual metaphor and metonymy may be demonstrated at all levels of linguistic description, and their “important contribution to connecting mind with the body, language with culture, body with culture, and language with the brain” (Kövecses, 2017a, p. 215) certainly cannot be undervalued. Owing to Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Conceptual Blending Theory, complex networks of semantic connections, supporting the mental imagery, encoded in the elements and modes under scrutiny, and primed contextually, can be unveiled. Expectedly, all the cognitive theories applied in the research discussed in this volume may help us appreciate human vivid imagination and mental capacities, often “giving rise to surprising, unexpected, and fanciful associations between various entities and phenomena” (Kowalewski, 2022, p. 93).

Eventually, it is usage-based models, constructed within a cognitive approach to language and grammar, which recognises language investigation as “an instrument used in dynamically changing acts of interpersonal communication rather than as an abstract system of signs” (Muskat-Tabakowska, this volume).

Lastly, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to all the authors for their contributions to this volume. We would also like to thank those who reviewed the papers for their thorough study, great commitment and appreciated advice given to the authors, which was subsequently accomplished.

Lublin, March 2023

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Ronald W. Langacker, University of California, United States

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Levels of Reality¹

ABSTRACT

Two fundamental aspects of conceptual and linguistic structure are examined in relation to one another: organization into *strata*, each a *baseline* giving rise to the next by *elaboration*; and the conceptions of *reality* implicated at successive levels of English clause structure. A clause profiles an *occurrence* (event or state) and *grounds* it by assessing its epistemic status (location vis-à-vis reality). Three levels are distinguished in which different notions of reality correlate with particular structural features. In *baseline clauses*, grounded by 'tense', the profiled occurrence belongs to *baseline reality* (the established history of occurrences). *Basic clauses* incorporate perspective (passive, progressive, and perfect), and since grounding includes the grammaticized modals as well as negation, *basic reality* is more elaborate. A basic clause expresses a *proposition*, comprising the grounded structure and the epistemic status specified by basic grounding. At higher strata, propositions are themselves subject to epistemic assessment, in which conceptualizers negotiate their validity; propositions accepted as valid constitute *propositional reality*. Propositions are assessed through *interactive grounding*, in the form of questioning and polarity focusing, and by *complementation*, in which the matrix clause indicates the status of the complement.

Keywords: complementation, disjunction, finite verb, focusing, grounding, modal, negation, negotiation, proposition, speech act

1. Introduction

I will be examining two fundamental aspects of conceptual and linguistic structure in relation to one another: a general feature of cognition I refer to as *B/E organization* (Langacker, 2016); and a cognitive model representing our conception of *reality*. Together they allow a cogent description of central features of English clause structure.

Linguistic structure tends to be organized in successive *levels* (or *strata*), each a *baseline* (B) giving rise to the next by *elaboration* (E). The higher stratum incorporates additional resources affording a wider array of structural options. For instance, from a baseline vowel system [i e a o u], representing one stratum (S₀),

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the added resource of nasalization yields the elaborated system [[i e a o u] ɪ ẽ ã ð ũ] at a higher stratum (S₁). A noun and its corresponding plural belong to different strata: conceptually and formally, *dogs* elaborates the baseline expression *dog*. The conception of one represents the default and the point of departure for conceiving of more than one.

What I mean by *reality* is not based on physics or philosophy, but on human experience as reflected in language structure. It is not limited to what we call the ‘real world’, nor to physical or observable entities. For example, all of the following count as being ‘real’ for present linguistic purposes: fictive worlds (Santa Claus is fat); abstract entities (Pi is an irrational number); social and cultural notions (Religious freedom is guaranteed by the constitution); products of metaphor and blending (We’re drowning in red ink); generalizations (A tiger has stripes).

I suggest that relevant aspects of English clause structure are revealingly described in terms of a cognitive model reflecting fundamental aspects of pre-linguistic experience (Langacker, 2013, p. 15):

According to the *reality model*, affairs in our world have unfolded in a particular way, out of all the ways conceivable. There has been a certain course of events, whereby certain events and situations have occurred, while countless others have not. *Reality* (R) is the history of occurrences, up through the present moment. This history cannot be changed; what has happened has happened. Reality is thus the *established* course of events. Future events are excluded from reality (so defined) because they have not yet occurred and thus have not been either established or fully determined. Moreover, our knowledge of reality is only partial and imperfect. Each of us has our own ‘take’ on it, our own *reality conception* (RC). For a given conceptualizer (C), RC comprises what C accepts as *real* – i.e. as having occurred, or having been *realized*. This conception is always incomplete, and C is bound to be mistaken in many respects. But rightly or wrongly, RC is what C knows.

Specific linguistic properties motivate the assignment of clauses to three main strata involving different levels of reality: *baseline* clauses and reality (e.g. Alice resembles her mother, Sam broke a cup); *basic* clauses and reality (She may have been followed, He didn’t graduate on time); *interactive* clauses and *propositional* reality (He did graduate, Have they left?). These will be considered in turn.

2. Baseline Level

The description is based on Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008), which holds that grammar is inherently meaningful, residing in assemblies of *symbolic structures* (form-meaning pairings). For basic universal categories, like noun and verb, the framework posits both a schematic meaning, valid for all members, and a prototype corresponding to central members (Langacker, 2015c). The prototypes are experientially grounded *conceptual archetypes*: *objects* in the case of nouns, and *events* for verbs. The schemas reside in *basic cognitive abilities* inherent in the

conception of objects and events: for nouns, the grouping of entities into one; for verbs, tracking a relationship through time. Conceptual archetypes – notions like object, event, substance, force, time, space, location – serve as a *baseline* for cognitive and linguistic development. The conceptual motivation of grammatical structure is thus most evident at this level.

2.1. Existence

We say that objects *exist*, whereas events *occur*, but I view these as manifestations of the same abstract notion: just as objects reside in the *spatial existence of substance*, events reside in the *temporal existence of relationships*. Also existing in space, and coded by nouns, are entities such as people, substances, and features of the spatial surroundings. Existing through time, and coded by verbs, are not only events but also *states* – stable relationships conceived as extending through time without inherent limit.

Just for sake of discussion, we can identify *baseline reality* with entities that exist in space and time. What counts here as reality (R) is conceived reality as reflected in language. R is a structure: an immense assembly of entities connected via relationships. This structure is *dynamic*, continually evolving through time; notably, it “grows” as the passage of time brings new events. These events unfold within a relatively stable framework comprising those facets of R which endure through time. This includes both *states and objects* (for which endurance is the default expectation). An object’s persistence through time is itself a kind of state. Thus reality, characterized above as the established history of occurrences, can also be described as the *totality of what has existed*.

Objects are coded by nouns, events and states by verbs. An expression’s category depends on its *profile*: the entity it designates (refers to), hence the focus of attention within the conceptual content invoked. A noun refers to a *thing*, prototypically an object (it is characterized schematically as a grouping conceived as a single entity). Its profile is the object per se, whose existence through time is merely presupposed. With verbs, on the other hand, evolution through time is an essential feature. A verb profiles an *occurrence* (or *process*), i.e. a *relationship* followed through time. Occurrences include both events and states. It is important in what follows that the *existence of a relationship* – its evolution through time – represents the schematic meaning of a verb.

2.2. Substrate and Structure

An expression’s meaning is never self-contained. It emerges from an elaborate conceptual substrate, including background knowledge, the object of discussion, the speech situation, and the ongoing discourse. We can recognize different *strata* (levels of organization) based on the complexity of expressions and the conceptual resources *they* demand. The *initial stratum* corresponds to *baseline clauses*

(Alice resembles her mother or Sam broke a cup). Their structure reflects an implicit *scenario* for language use in its simplest, most canonical form.

In this scenario, there are two *interlocutors*, a speaker (S) and a hearer (H). The interlocutors and their immediate circumstances constitute the *ground* (G). In the baseline *viewing arrangement*, S and H are together in a fixed location, from which they observe and describe actual occurrences in the world around them. Their interaction consists in baseline *speech acts*: statements presumed to be valid. A baseline *usage event* is one such instance of language use; the expression produced is a single baseline *clause*, which describes some aspect of baseline *reality*.

A baseline clause has just a few essential elements: a verb, which profiles an occurrence; one or more nominals, describing its participants; and tense to indicate location in R. It is minimal because the substrate incorporates default values for numerous features. Among the things that are absent are modals, negation, indications of speech act, multiclausal expressions, and connected discourse. Departures from the baseline, being conceptually more complex, come about through structural elaboration at higher strata.

A full clause represents the structural implementation of two basic semantic functions: *description* of the profiled occurrence; and *grounding* (how it relates to the ground). Description starts with a lexical verb (like *see*, *resemble*, *run*, or *break*), which specifies a *basic type* of occurrence—one schematic in regard to its participants. Their specification by means of nominals produces an *elaborated type* (Alice resemble her mother, Sam break a cup). Grounding by tense then yields a clause: Alice resembles her mother; Sam broke a cup. Due to grounding, the profiled occurrence is conceived as an *instance* of the higher-order type, distinguished from other instances by its temporal location.

Grounding pertains to the *epistemic status* of the profiled thing or occurrence: how it relates to what the interlocutors purport to know. For nominals, the main epistemic concern is *identification* of the referent. For clauses, the main concern is *existence*, or the referent's status vis-à-vis reality. Since the baseline scenario specifies that the interlocutors observe and describe actual occurrences in the world around them, their reality is presupposed.

So as shown in Figure 1(a), the baseline scenario locates *p*, the profiled occurrence, in reality (where G is also found). In diagram (b), R is depicted as a cylinder that “grows” through time (t). The ‘face’ of this cylinder, representing R’s manifestation at the current moment, is referred to as *immediate reality* (IR). The remainder of R is *non-immediate reality* (N-IR). Thus *p* can either be immediate to G (in IR) or non-immediate (in N-IR), as in diagram (c). Since reality is taken for granted at this stratum, and the time of speaking is a facet of G, immediacy vs. non-immediacy to G translates into *present* vs. *past* in time – the prototypical value of the so-called ‘tense’ markers (*resembles* vs. *broke*). This correlates with the experiential factor of

whether the occurrence can be observed directly or only via memory. Accordingly, the arrow in diagram (d) indicates that prior occurrences lie at a certain *distance* (DIST) from G both temporally and experientially. And memory being an additional conceptual resource, they also represent a higher stratum. Thus grounding at the baseline level (a main stratum) can itself be differentiated into substrata, with S_1 representing an elaboration vis-à-vis S_0 .




Figure 1: Grounding in baseline reality

3. Basic Level

Basic clauses elaborate the baseline in regard to both *description* and *grounding*: for description, by means of *perspectival adjustments*; and for grounding, in the form of grammaticized **modals**.

3.1. Perspective

The perspectival adjustments are effected by the *passive*, *progressive*, and *perfect* constructions. The passive affects the choice of subject by conferring that status on the participant that would otherwise be the object: *expect* > *be expected*. The progressive restricts the profiled occurrence to an internal portion of the occurrence profiled by the verb: *cry* > *be crying*. The perfect describes a state in which the verbal occurrence is apprehended from a reference point later in time: *finish* > *have finished*. Each construction is complex, involving two levels of composition. At the first level, a verb is elaborated morphologically to derive a *participle*: a so-called ‘present participle’ (*crying*) or a ‘past participle’ (*expected*, *finished*). Though derived from a verb, a participle does not itself function as such; grammatically it is more like an adjective (cf. *crying baby*, *expected outcome*). At the higher level, the participle combines with a schematic verb, *be* or *have*. They function as *heads* in these constructions by imposing their verbal nature on

the content supplied by the participle. The result in each case is a *complex verb* describing an occurrence apprehended from a certain perspective, as determined by the participial element.

Reflecting their common perspectival function, these constructions are parallel in formation and mutually exclusive, in that only one can be used with a given verb; they constitute a system of opposing elements. When they co-occur, it is only because the ‘output’ of one construction – being a complex verb – can itself participate in another. The conventionally established combinations are listed in (1). Each construction elaborates a verbal expression to form a more complex verbal expression at a higher level of organization. The lower-level expression is either the lexical verb (like *watch*) or a complex verb resulting from prior elaboration (e.g. *be watched*). The higher-level expression comprises *be* or *have* followed by a simple or complex participle (e.g. *watching*, *being watched*) that incorporates perspective.

- (1)
- a. PASSIVE > PROGRESSIVE: *watch* > *be* watched > *be* being watched
 - b. PASSIVE > PERFECT: *watch* > *be* watched > *have* been watched
 - c. PROGRESSIVE > PERFECT: *watch* > *be* watching > *have* been watching
 - d. PASSIVE > PROGRESSIVE > PERFECT: *watch* > *be* watched > *be* being watched
> *have* been being watched

As *schematic* verbs, *be* and *have* profile the *existence of a relationship* – its evolution through time – but do nothing to specify its nature. They serve to convert the participial expression into a complex, higher-order verb in which the relationship followed through time is the one coded by the participle. The profiled occurrence is thus distinct from that of the lexical verb. For example, *watch* and *be watching* have the same descriptive content but profile different occurrences: the full event vs. an internal portion of it. At each stratum, one verb functions as *head* in the sense that the occurrence it profiles is profiled by the full verbal expression. In (1), boldface indicates the head at each level: the lexical verb, *be*, or *have*. The occurrence profiled by the highest-level head is the one whose epistemic status is specified by grounding – the one labeled *p* in Figure 1. The highest-level head is thus the *grounded verb*, and the full verbal expression represents the *grounded structure*. In baseline clauses, the grounded verb is just the lexical verb: She *watched* him. But in basic clauses with perspectival adjustments, these functions are differentiated: She *had* been *watching* him.

Not every basic clause has a lexical verb. A frequent alternative is the combination of *be* with an adjective or a prepositional phrase: The cat *is* {ugly / on the mat}. Adjectives and prepositions profile relationships, but they are not verbs because they do not focus on its evolution through time; the situation they describe

is fully manifested at a single instant (and can thus be observed in a photograph). Their combination with *be* reflects the conceptual characterization of a verb: that it profiles a relationship followed through time. It differs from a lexical verb only in that the relationship and its tracking through time are expressed by separate elements. It can also be recognized as a variant of the perspectival constructions. The difference is that it *creates* the functional equivalent of a lexical verb, whereas a perspectival construction *starts* with such a verb.

3.2. Modality

Perspectival constructions represent one dimension of elaboration leading from baseline clauses to basic clauses. Another dimension is the elaboration of grounding to include modality. This introduces a higher level of reality.

At issue are the grammaticized modals *may*, *will*, *can*, *shall*, *must*, *might*, *would*, *could*, and *should*. These function as *grounding elements*, occurring in lieu of tense (e.g. likes/liked vs. *will* like/*would* like). The modals exhibit B/E organization. In terms of both form and meaning, the basic forms *may*, *will*, *can*, and *shall* constitute the baseline, being elaborated by the distal forms *might*, *would*, *could*, and *should*. We will not be concerned with their many idiosyncrasies, focusing instead on what they have in common.

I follow Talmy (1988) and Sweetser (1990) in viewing modals as *force-dynamic* in nature (Langacker, 2013). With an *effective* (or ‘root’) modal use, the force (\Rightarrow) has a potential *effect* on the evolution of reality. It is often a matter of permission, obligation, or ability. Here we will consider only *epistemic* modal uses, which pertain to speaker *knowledge*. The force is internal to the conceptualizer (C): the *mental effort* involved in *projecting* the growth of R along a path that results in *p*’s incorporation. It reflects C’s assessment of the likelihood of *p* being *realized*. This ranges from mere potential (He may be angry) to virtual certainty (He must be angry).

The basic modals (M) elaborate the baseline grounding system as shown in Figure 2(a). They afford a wider range of options, allowing both *real* occurrences and those whose realization can be *projected* (with varying degrees of confidence). In contrast to baseline grounding, where *p* is limited to R, a modal specifically removes it from R. Reality is still at issue, however, since the modal projection envisages *p* as part of an *updated* reality conception. We can therefore recognize a higher, more inclusive level of reality that encompasses not only baseline reality (R) but also *projected reality* (PROJ R). At this higher stratum reality comprises both the *established* course of events and the *projected* course of events.

In a finer-grained description, represented in Figure 2(b), projected reality can be differentiated into substrata in just the same way that baseline reality is. The notion of distance (DIST) divides projected reality (PROJ R) into *immediate projected reality* (I PROJ R) and *non-immediate projected reality* (N-I PROJ R).




Figure 2: The grounding system with basic and elaborated modals

This distinction reflects the semantic contrast between the basic modals *may*, *will*, *can*, and *shall* and their elaborated (distal) forms *might*, *would*, *could*, and *should*. Despite their semantic idiosyncrasies, the latter consistently specify a greater epistemic distance from G – a longer *epistemic path* – than their basic counterparts. Note the examples in (2): *would* and *could* contrast with *will* and *can* by being counterfactual; *might* contrasts with *may* by indicating a more tenuous possibility; and while *shall* represents a command, *should* just describes an obligation.

(2)

- a. I *will* if I *can* vs. I *would* if I *could*.
- b. He *may* be home – the lights are on. vs. He *might* be home, but the lights aren't on.
- c. You *shall* do that. vs. You *should* do that.

The distal modals invoke an additional conceptual resource: *imagination* (IMAG). The modal projection is not made from the actual ground (G) in immediate reality (IR). Rather, the speaker imagines a somewhat different situation, G' (as part of IR'), from which the projection indicated by the basic modal form would be appropriate. There is thus a longer epistemic path from G to p. As seen in (3)(a), a basic modal locates p in a single step; starting from *immediate reality* (IR), where he is not poor, *will* directly places p in *immediate projected reality* (I PROJ R). By contrast, a distal modal proceeds indirectly by first invoking an imagined situation, IR', distinct from IR in some respect. In (3)(b), the actual situation (in IR) is that he is poor. From there, the path to p proceeds in two steps reflecting the status of *would* as the distal form of *will*. First, imaginative distancing (--->) induces the fictive conception (IR') of his not being poor. And from that situation, the modal projection of *will* leads to p, placing it in *non-immediate projected reality* (N-I PROJ R).

- (3)
- a. Since he is not poor, she *will* marry him.
[he is not poor (G/IR)] \Rightarrow [she marry him (I PROJ R)]
 - b. If he were not poor, she *would* marry him.
[he is poor (G/IR)] \dashrightarrow [he is not poor (G'/IR')] \Rightarrow [she marry him (N-I PROJ R)]

3.3. Finite Verb

Figure 3 summarizes the grounding options discussed so far. p is the profiled occurrence whose epistemic status is specified by tense and modality. We can take this to be the grounded structure as a whole, or more specifically its head, the verb which imposes its profile on that structure. Dashed arrows represent the epistemic path leading from G to p , each step residing in either distancing (DIST) or projection by a basic modal (M). Strata are labeled based on the length and nature of the path: at S_0 , immediacy to G amounts to a path of zero length; S_1 and S_2 involve alternate one-step paths; and in S_3 we have the two-step path of a distal modal. The options in S_1 constitute the *baseline* grounding system, and those in S_3 , the *basic* grounding system.




Figure 3: Summary of the basic grounding system

In baseline clauses, the lexical verb functions as head (p). It is therefore the *grounded verb*, the one on which epistemic status (immediacy) is registered (She *watched* him). In basic clauses the functions of lexical verb and grounded verb are differentiated (She *had been watching* him), since the highest-level head is a schematic verb: *have*, *be*, or *do*. A key to the verbal organization of English clauses is a further, subtle distinction between the grounded verb and what is traditionally called the *finite verb* (Langacker, 2015b). The finite verb is the one marked for ‘tense’. More specifically, it is the *verb word* which registers *immediacy* – whether the profiled occurrence is immediate or non-immediate to the ground. (Why a word? Because word order plays a role in grounding at higher strata.) When

there is no modal, the finite verb is the tense-marked form of the grounded verb, e.g. *had* in the clause ‘He *had* finished’. In this case *have* is the grounded verb by virtue of being the highest-level head in the grounded structure (he *have* finished). Grounding is marked on this verb, resulting in *had*, which is the finite verb because it is a word specifying the non-immediacy of the occurrence it profiles.

A modal changes this picture because it qualifies simultaneously as a word, a grounding element, and a head. Forms like *may*, *will*, *could*, and *should* are clearly words. They belong to the grounding system because their function is not to describe an occurrence but to indicate its epistemic status. And they qualify as heads because they profile an occurrence that is also profiled by the clause as a whole.

As characterized in Cognitive Grammar, highly grammaticized grounding elements profile the grounded entity, rather than the ground or the grounding relation (Langacker, 2002). The conceptual structure of a modal is thus as follows, where p is a fully schematic occurrence related to G by the modal projection: $[G \Rightarrow p]$. Because it profiles an occurrence, a modal is itself a verb. When it combines with a grounded structure, the schematic occurrence it profiles is identified with the specific occurrence profiled by the latter. So in the clause *He may work*, the modal and the lexical verb refer to the same event, providing schematic and specific descriptions of it. A modal is thus a head because it profiles the same occurrence as the clause. It is in fact the *overall head*, being introduced at the highest level of organization.

It follows that a modal, when it occurs, functions as the *finite verb* in its clause. In addition to being the highest-level head, it is the *word* that registers *immediacy* or *distance* (e.g. *may* vs. *might*). When there is no modal, the grounded verb functions as the finite verb, e.g. *had* in ‘He *had* been working’. But a modal comes in at a higher level of organization, so when one occurs, it takes over this function: ‘He *might* have been working’. In this case the roles of grounded verb and finite verb are *differentiated*: whereas *have* is still the *grounded* verb (and *work* the *lexical* verb), the *finite* verb is now the grounding modal.

In Figure 4 I summarize the basic options for the *finite verb* in an English clause. The finite verb is given in bold, with *he work* as the type of occurrence, and *can* representing the modals. In 4(a), the simplest case, S_0 , is that of a *baseline* clause, where the finite verb is just the lexical verb (LEX). The other two strata correspond to *basic* clauses. At S_1 , involving perspectival constructions, the finite verb is *be* or *have*. At S_2 a modal (M) serves in this capacity. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) are the same apart from S_0 , where *do* replaces *work* as the finite verb. This constitutes an elaboration, since *do* adds another level of formal and conceptual complexity (e.g. ‘he *does* work’ instead of just ‘he *works*’). But it also simplifies matters in that 4(b) represents a neat paradigm exhibiting a basic regularity: in each case the finite verb is highly schematic. Within 4(b), S_0 is still the initial stratum, since *do* is conceptually simpler than *be*, *have*, or M, which incorporate aspectual, perspectival, or modal import.

	LEX	BE	HAVE	M
IMM	he works	<i>he is working</i>	<i>he has worked</i>	<i>he can work</i>
DIST	he worked S ₀	<i>he was working</i>	<i>he had worked</i>	<i>he could work</i>
			S ₁	S ₂

	DO	BE	HAVE	M
IMM	he does work	<i>he is working</i>	<i>he has worked</i>	<i>he can work</i>
DIST	he did work S ₀	<i>he was working</i>	<i>he had worked</i>	<i>he could work</i>
			S ₁	S ₂

Figure 4: Summary of options for the finite verb

The ‘auxiliary’ verb *do* is maximally schematic: it merely profiles an occurrence (a relationship followed through time), making no specification concerning its nature. Its schematic meaning is inherent in every lexical verb, so when they combine, the composite meaning is equivalent to that of the lexeme (e.g. *do* + *work* = *work*). Equivalent but not identical. Since the two verbs profile the same occurrence, characterized in schematic and specific terms, *do* reinforces the notion of existence, making it more salient than when the lexical verb is used alone. *Do* is thus employed in just those cases where existence is not simply taken for granted but is considered in relation to other options (e.g. Either he did work or he didn’t work).

4. Negation

Negation is an obvious case where existence is considered in relation to other options. So instead of the lexical verb, it is marked on a schematic finite verb whose function is to impose or reinforce the notion of existence. When present, *be*, *have*, or a modal serves this function. Otherwise *do* is invoked. That negation combines with these verbs, usually in the form of contractions, attests to their basically existential import. Formally and conceptually, the examples in Figure 5 elaborate the expressions in Figure 4(b). Negative clauses of this sort can thus be regarded as a higher-level *stratum* within the stratum of basic clauses.

4.1. Dynamic Characterization

Negation nicely illustrates a basic notion of Cognitive Grammar: that language structure consists in *activity*, occurring at different levels and on different *time scales*. On the smallest time scale, it consists in patterns of *neural activation*.

	DO	BE	HAVE	M
IMM	he doesn't work	he isn't working	he hasn't worked	he can't work
DIST	he didn't work	he wasn't working	he hadn't worked	he couldn't work
	S ₀		S ₁	S ₂

Figure 5: The finite verb elaborated by negation

On a much larger time scale, it consists in the *interactive activity* of interlocutors. Structure thus has a *time course*, unfolding through time in a certain manner. Obvious at the phonological pole, this is no less true of the conceptual structures constituting linguistic meaning. Though complex and sometimes variable, the time course of conception always contributes to an expression's meaning and is often essential to its value. It is essential to negation, which resides in the *sequenced evocation* of conceptions.

It is often observed that a negative expression *presupposes* its positive counterpart. Since it conveys the *absence* of some entity, it can only be apprehended *in relation to* a conception where it is present (which serves to indicate what is missing). Negation can thus be thought of as an *operation* which evokes one conception as the basis for arriving at another by *suppressing* one of its elements (Langacker, 2016). Negation is thus a case of B/E organization (suppression being one kind of elaboration).

Negation has many possible targets, e.g. quantity (no water), property (uneven), type of thing (non-argument), and existence (lack, missing, empty). I start in Figure 6 with a general characterization based on fundamental aspects of cognition. Let's say that a particular conception, at a given moment, constitutes a *domain* (D). Any facet of D can be the *locus* (L) of processing activity serving to *update* it in some respect. This constitutes *elaboration* (L being the baseline). From this initial stratum (S₀), alternate paths of elaboration – referred to here as *eventualities* (e) – define a higher stratum (S₁) comprising a wider range of options. For instance, D might be the conception of a table, and L the specification of its shape. The eventualities are then an array of conceivable shapes (e.g. round, square, rectangular, octagonal). When alternatives are incompatible (e.g. round vs. square), their relation is one of *opposition*, indicated by the notation in 6(b). In processing terms, they consist in patterns of activity that *inhibit* one another. And as shown in 6(c), there is always an implicit opposition between a given eventuality and its absence (so that L is the same at S₀ and S₁).

Viewed in *dynamic* terms, the elaboration of L serves to *update* D in some fashion. Updating consists in the transition (mental progression) from D_i to D_{i+1}. In 6(d), a solid (as opposed to a dashed) arrow represents the elaborative option




Figure 6: Negation as conceptual elaboration

actually chosen, e.g. table > round table. As shown in 6(e), a positive alternative is the basis for the corresponding *negative alternative*. This involves an additional elaborative operation resulting in a higher stratum (S_2). Its effect is to override (or suppress) the positive alternative evoked at S_1 . L is thus the same at S_0 and S_2 , but in D_i it is accessed directly, whereas its apprehension in D_{i+1} includes an elaborative path invoking the positive alternative.

4.2. Clausal Negation

Clausal negation is a special case of the general characterization in Figure 6(e). As seen in 7(a), the *domain* (D) is some level of *reality* (R), the positive eventuality (e) being the occurrence profiled by the finite verb (p). Because it pertains to p, negation is marked on that verb; as an indication of p's epistemic status, it is an aspect of clausal grounding. A positive statement updates a conception of reality (R_i) in such a way that the updated version (R_{i+1}) includes the profiled occurrence (p).




Figure 7: Clausal polarity options

5.1. Propositional Reality

A finite clause grounds the profiled occurrence (p) by placing it in some region of basic reality, e.g. non-immediate projected reality (N-I PROJ R) for *it might rain*. An essential point is that *reality* is always a *reality conception*, as entertained by some conceptualizer (C). But who is this conceptualizer? The default assumption is that C is the current speaker, and that the clause reflects her actual view. This is not, however, an inherent or necessary feature of the clause itself, but depends on the *conceptual substrate* it presupposes. Instead of the baseline substrate, many uses invoke an alternative in which the clause does not reflect the speaker's actual view. It might, for instance, be a lie (such as most any statement by Donald Trump). Or intended ironically (e.g. *That was brilliant* to describe a stupid mistake). It can represent a quotation or a paraphrase of someone else's opinion, as in (4)(a). In a subordinate clause, the status of p depends on the structure it is embedded in, as in (4)(b) – (d).

(4)

- a. *Climate change is a hoax*, according to Trump.
- b. It's just not true that *Trump is brilliant*.
- c. Pence believes that *Trump is brilliant*.
- d. If *Trump is brilliant*, he hides it well.

I will say that a finite clause expresses a *proposition* (P), defined as consisting in a profiled occurrence together with its basic grounding: $P = [\text{Basic Grounding} + p]$. The identity of C, who makes the grounding assessment, depends on the substrate. In and of itself, a proposition is independent of any particular conceptualizer. It can thus be apprehended by different conceptualizers, each with their own reality conception and their own assessment of p 's epistemic status. Their assessment need not conform to C's (the one indicated by basic grounding).

For propositions we have to recognize a higher level of epistemic assessment involving a higher level of reality. The issue at this stratum is not the *realization* of p (whether an event occurs), but rather the *validity* of the proposition P: whether the assessment of p (as conveyed by basic grounding) is accepted as being accurate by the conceptualizer who entertains the proposition. For example, in (4)(b) the subordinated proposition (Trump is brilliant) is judged by the speaker to be invalid. On the other hand, in (4)(c) Pence is responsible for that proposition and thus accepts it as being valid.

For a given conceptualizer, the set of propositions accepted as valid constitute *propositional reality* (PR). One proposition we can all agree to is that PR is different for every individual. A proposition's validity is thus *negotiable*, this higher level of assessment being a primary function of discourse. To the extent that P's status is actively negotiated by the interlocutors (not just passively accepted), we can speak of *interactive grounding*, two dimensions of which are polarity and speech act.

5.2. Polarity

Polarity (positive vs. negative) has so far been treated as part of basic grounding (Figure 8). There is of course an asymmetry, the baseline for clauses being a simple positive statement (e.g. He won). With respect to this, negative clauses (He didn't win) represent a higher stratum affording a wider array of grounding options. Due to its fundamental nature, polarity is commonly treated as a routine feature of clausal description, hence discursively non-prominent (Boye & Harder, 2012). In English this is marked accentually, so a negative form like *didn't* remains unstressed: Hĕ dĭdn't wĭn. But being both important and subject to disagreement, polarity can also be put in focus as something to be negotiated by the interlocutors. In that case it constitutes interactive grounding. Focused polarity, both positive and negative, is marked in English by a certain amount of accent on the finite verb, as indicated by the SMALL CAPS in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Polarity organized in strata

While negotiation (broadly conceived) is always a factor in language use, it is minimal in a simple positive statement (He won) whose validity is not at issue. In Figure 10(a), dotted lines indicate features of the substrate – reality and the negative alternative to *p* – that are taken for granted and left implicit (cf. Figure 6(c)). On the other hand, a negative statement necessarily invokes the positive alternative, for without it there is no indication of what is being negated (cf. Figure 6(e)). Accordingly, the notation in Figure 10(b) indicates that both alternatives are active, with a solid (rather than a dashed) arrow indicating the option actually chosen. Although a negative statement chooses the option of *p* being absent from R, its absence is conceived in relation to its presence. This evocation of alternatives (raising the issue of choosing between them) correlates with *do* – instead of the lexical verb – assuming the role of finite verb: ‘He didn’t win’ (rather than ‘*He won not’).

Diagrams (a') and (b') are adopted as notational variants of 10(a) – (b). They further indicate that the status of the clause as a proposition (P) is not exploited at this level (dotted line box). Status as a proposition is however relevant when we turn to focused polarity. Polarity focusing represents a transition between clause structure and the organization of connected discourse. It belongs to the interactive level, being an overt manifestation of the *negotiation* through which interlocutors seek to align their reality conceptions.




Figure 10: Polarity at the basic level

The prominence of polarity focusing depends on awareness of alternatives, engagement with an actual interlocutor, and the degree of force required to overcome the divergence of views. Its force-dynamic nature is reflected iconically by accentual prominence: ‘He’ll win vs. He **WILL** win’. At the extreme, heavy (‘contrastive’) stress marks the strong contradiction of a prior statement, as in (5)(a). Polarity is focused to a lesser degree for a variety of reasons. This is natural in the context of answering a ‘yes-no’ question, or in simply negating what has just been said, as in (5)(b) – (c). It is often just a matter of bringing the proposition to mind, making sure it is known and not overlooked, or overcoming a suspected inclination toward the polar opposite, as in (6).

(5)

- a. You’re just wrong – he **WILL** win.
- b. A: Should I reject the offer? B: Yes, you **SHOULD** reject it.
- c. A: He has finished the report. B: No, he **HASN’T** finished it.

(6)

- a. He **MIGHT** win, after all.
- b. Bear in mind that he **DIDN’T** win the popular vote.
- c. Even so, you can’t deny that he **DID** win.
- d. He may be winning the election, but he **IS** making a fool of himself.

We need to consider in more specific terms how negotiation enters the picture. Polarity focusing indicates that – in some way, to some degree – the potential for negotiation is realized: the *negotiable* proposition expressed by P is *being negotiated*. To the extent that the interlocutors are actively engaged in negotiation, we can speak of *interactive grounding*. This is a kind of grounding because it pertains to the status vis-à-vis reality of the profiled occurrence (*p*). But only indirectly.

Though related to basic grounding (Figure 8), it constitutes a *second level of epistemic assessment* serving to elaborate it. Basic grounding conveys the epistemic status of the *profiled occurrence* (p) as assessed by a single conceptualizer. By contrast, interactive grounding involves the view of another conceptualizer and concerns the validity of the *clausal proposition* (P). The proposition comprises both p and its basic grounding (which is thus included in the scope of assessment).

These levels of assessment correspond to different levels of reality. Basic grounding locates p with respect to *basic* reality (R). It includes polarity, which represents the choice between two options, positive vs. negative. On the other hand, interactive grounding locates P with respect to *propositional* reality (PR). It includes polarity focusing, which indicates that the option chosen is the *correct* one, i.e. it specifies the *validity* of the resulting proposition. So in negotiating the status of P , the interlocutors are also negotiating the status of p .

Propositions are subject to negotiation because they are apprehended by different conceptualizers with different versions of PR . With polarity focus, the issue being negotiated is whether to accept as valid the overtly expressed proposition, P , or else the one with opposite polarity. Three versions of PR are thus involved: that of the speaker (PR_S), that of the hearer (PR_H), and an *intersubjective* version (PR_I) comprising what they presumably share. As shown in Figure 11(a), P is accepted by the speaker (hence included in PR_S), but may not be by the hearer (and is then excluded from PR_H). Their interaction is aimed at determining which of two eventualities – P or its absence – should be adopted in the updated version of PR_I . At this higher level of assessment the negotiation is one-sided: the speaker is always advocating her own position (heavy-line box and arrow). A double arrow represents the *force* of her advocacy.

It bears repeating, however, that there are two levels of epistemic assessment with different semantic functions: *polarity* – positive or negative – is a matter of existence (whether p is realized); its *focusing* is a matter of affirming, and thereby reinforcing, the chosen polarity option (the one reflected in P). Figure 11(a) is neutral as to whether the proposition (P) is positive (He did win) or negative (He didn't win). The difference is made explicit in 11(b) – (c). The proposition (P) is positive when the occurrence (p) is part of basic reality (R). It is negative when the occurrence is excluded from R . Whether positive or negative, P belongs to PR_S , the speaker's conception of propositional reality. In either case, by affirming the polarity option overtly expressed, the speaker indicates that P is to be included in PR_I . This is done based on the supposition that the hearer might be inclined toward its exclusion.

5.3. Questions

Along with statements and commands, questions are a basic speech act (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) representing a fundamental kind of human interaction. Questions qualify as interactive grounding because the interlocutors are actively




Figure 11: Propositional reality and polarity focusing

negotiating the epistemic status of propositions. (I will ignore commands, which are also a kind of interactive grounding. They are effective rather than epistemic, pertaining to the realization of occurrences rather than the validity of propositions.) They perform this speech act by enacting the question *scenario*, which is part of the conceptual substrate, hence included in a question's meaning even when implicit.

In English, questioning correlates (albeit imperfectly) with the subject following the finite verb rather than preceding it: *did he?*, *was she?*, *should I?* (cf. Figure 4(b)). The details of this so-called 'inversion' do not concern us (cf. Langacker, 2015b). What matters here is that this characteristic feature of questions involves the finite verb, which registers the epistemic status of the profiled occurrence. Since coming first is a kind of focusing, preposing the finite verb highlights the role of epistemic assessment, focusing on the very *existence* of *p*. (I will only be considering polarity ('yes-no') questions. Content questions – with *who?*, *what?*, etc. – focus instead on the information needed for *P* to be valid.)

Polarity questions are closely related to disjunction: coordinate structures marked by (*either*) *or* in English. When the conjuncts happen to be clauses, one possibility is for the second clause to be the *polar opposite* of the first. In that case the negative clause is subject to ellipsis, repeated elements being left unexpressed.

The parallelism between (7) and (8) suggests that polarity questions be analyzed as *disjunctive questions* in which the negative alternative is wholly implicit. The conceptual characterization of disjunction is thus a point of departure for their analysis.

(7)

- a. Either he won, or the election was rigged.
- b. Either he won, or he didn't (win).
- c. Either he won, or not.

(8)

- a. Did he win, or was the election rigged?
- b. Did he win, or didn't he (win)?
- c. Did he win, or not?
- d. Did he win?

As a general characterization, sketched in Figure 12(a), disjunction consists in an unresolved choice among alternatives, labeled X and Y (cf. Figure 6(a)). X and Y are competing candidates for the privilege of elaborating a conceptual domain (D) at some locus (small box). While the diagram shows just two, there can be any number of candidates, of any sort. Normally X and Y are taken as being inconsistent, hence mutually exclusive. By its very nature, disjunction incorporates a fictive element (Langacker, 2005; Talmy, 1996): an imagined situation in which the choice has been made. In this updated structure (D_{i+1}), one eventuality (X or Y) serves as the locus. But since its identity is not actually known, X and Y both correspond to the locus. So given that X and Y are mutually exclusive, a single, consistent conception fails to emerge. Having two incompatible versions, the updated structure is inherently unstable; the imagined situation can only be apprehended by flipping back and forth between the alternatives, as in the perception of an ambiguous figure. This is nonetheless a coherent conception perfectly capable of being invoked as a linguistic meaning. It is unproblematic granted the dynamicity of conceptual structure.

As seen in 12(b), disjunctive questions represent a special case of disjunction. First, the alternatives are propositions (P_1 and P_2); for (8)(a), these propositions are *he won* and *the election was rigged*. So the relevant conceptual domain is propositional reality (PR). A question is a request for information, so two versions of PR come into play: that of the speaker (PR_S) and that of the hearer (PR_H). At least canonically, the requested information is absent from PR_S , whereas PR_H is thought to contain it. (A more complete diagram would also show PR_I the intersubjective version – as well as the anticipated updating of PR_S and PR_I .) A double arrow represents the *interactive force* of questioning. It is aimed at eliciting an appropriate

response: a proposition representing the correct alternative, to be incorporated in an updated version of PR_S . Because it concerns the epistemic status of propositions, this negotiation constitutes *interactive grounding*. If successful, it results in the negotiated proposition being shared by PR_S and PR_H , hence included in PR_I .




Figure 12: Polarity questions as a kind of disjunction

Simple polarity questions (e.g. Did he win?) are like disjunctive questions except that only one option is made explicit, as indicated by the solid-line box and arrow in Figure 12(c). One is enough because the two eventualities are polar opposites: just P vs. its absence, rather than distinct propositions requiring separate specification. The explicit alternative presents the proposition (P) whose validity is being *queried*, calling on the hearer to either confirm or deny its presence in PR_H . Usually P is positive (Did he win?), that being the baseline. Negative questions (Didn't he win?) are not uncommon, but they often invoke a more elaborate interactive substrate (beyond the scope of this discussion).

Figures 13(a) – (b) show explicitly that there are two levels of assessment. One level pertains to the internal structure of P . P itself is positive or negative depending on whether the profiled occurrence (p) is realized; at issue, then, is whether p is included in R . The higher level of assessment pertains to the status of P . One outcome, for either (a) or (b), is *acceptance*: P is judged to be valid (part of PR_H), and is thus included in the updating of PR_S and PR_I . Another possibility is *rejection*: being judged invalid (not part of PR_H), P is excluded from the updating of PR_S and PR_I . More elaborate diagrams would indicate the response and the updating that results.

Both positive and negative questions are subject to elaboration by means of *polarity focusing*, as in 13(c)-(d). In both cases this is marked by accentuation of the finite verb in the overtly specified alternative (DID he win? vs. DIDN'T he

win?). Polarity focusing has the same basic effect in statements and in questions: it reinforces the idea that the chosen alternative is the one whose status is being negotiated. In so doing, it renders the other alternative a bit more salient by underscoring the fact that a choice is involved.

At the same time, its effect is slightly different because statements and questions differ in the arrangement of their key elements: PR_S , PR_H , P , and its implicit alternative. In a statement, polarity focusing implies the arrangement in Figure 11, where P belongs to PR_S , and the opposing alternative to PR_H . What this amounts to is that P represents *the speaker's own view*, in contrast to that of the hearer. In questions, on the other hand, focusing underscores the role of P as the *queried proposition*, the one whose status the speaker is trying to ascertain. Pending the hearer's response, it is not ascribed to either PR_S or PR_H .




Figure 13: Polarity questions and polarity focusing

6. Conclusion

Based on specific structural considerations, I have outlined an account of clause structure involving conceptual layering. The key notions – *grounding* and *reality* – are characterized in terms of strata, in which the elaboration of a baseline gives rise to higher levels of organization. A finite clause profiles an occurrence (p) and specifies its epistemic status by means of grammaticized grounding elements. Included (at successive strata) are *basic* grounding by “tense”, modals, and negation as well as *interactive* grounding in the form of polarity focusing and speech act. Basic grounding situates p with respect to *basic* reality (Figure 8), resulting in a proposition (P), while interactive grounding situates P with respect to *propo-*

sitional reality (Figures 11 and 13). Because *p* and its grounding are part of P, interlocutors who negotiate the status of P are ultimately concerned with that of *p*.

Being confined to one-clause expressions in English, the account does not – in its specifics – have any claim to universality. It does however reflect schematic characterizations which do have that status, e.g. the abstract notion of clausal grounding. If broadly defined as indicating the epistemic status of occurrences, clausal grounding represents a fundamental semantic function whose structural implementation varies greatly from language to language. The system just described represents a particular strategy of implementation, one involving highly grammaticized grounding elements manifested on the finite verb; from the standpoint of English, this constitutes clausal grounding in the narrow sense. But with a broader definition, numerous other phenomena fall under this rubric. Just a few will be mentioned here by way of conclusion.

The modals discussed above comprise the core of a system that also includes more peripheral members, notably *need*, *dare*, and *ought*. Semantically, these verbs convey a kind of effective modality (note that *need* is similar to *must*, and *ought* is quite comparable to *should*). Grammatically, they function like the core modals in some respects, e.g. negation: {need / dare / ought}’ not (cf. {must / would / should} not).

Various kinds of adverbial expressions serve the function of grounding in the broad sense of indicating epistemic status. For instance, the adverbs *perhaps* and *possibly* specify potentiality, making them similar to modals, whereas *certainly* and *undoubtedly* specify reality, as does the absence of a modal. But unlike basic grounding, these specifications pertain to propositions (rather than occurrences) and their status in regard to propositional reality. Thus a clause like ‘Perhaps he lied’ involves two levels of epistemic assessment: at the lower level, basic grounding (past tense) marks the occurrence *he lie* is as being real (included in R); while at the higher level, *perhaps* qualifies that assessment by indicating that the validity of the resulting proposition, *he lied*, is merely potential (it is not yet included in PR). The speaker thereby indicates, indirectly, that the inclusion of *p* in R is also just potential.

Speech acts are an aspect of linguistic meaning, inhering in the conceptual substrate even when left implicit. The basic speech acts of statement, ordering, and questioning represent grounding (in the broad sense) in that epistemic status is central to their import. The statement scenario reflects the canonical situation in which the speaker accepts and presents the profiled occurrence (*p*) as having the reality status indicated by basic grounding (Figure 8): ‘He {lied / didn’t lie / might lie}’. The reality status of *p* is also at issue in the case of ordering, which is aimed at effecting its realization (or non-realization): ‘Lie!; Don’t lie!’. Resembling a main use of modals in this respect, it is an interactive alternative to basic grounding. Questioning represents interactive grounding at a higher level

of organization, where the validity of a proposition is being negotiated. Whether marked by intonation alone (He lied?) or by word order (Did he lie?), a polarity question evokes the proposition –comprising p and its basic grounding – expressed by the corresponding statement (He lied). In the former case, the speaker indicates her tentative acceptance of P (its inclusion in her own version of PR) and is seeking confirmation from the hearer. In the latter case, she is considering alternatives (hence the use of *do*) but frames the query in terms of P (Figure 13). Either way, determining the validity of P is a means of assessing the status of p .

The above grounding options are all observed in expressions comprising just a single clause. More elaborate expressions provide a much wider array of possibilities. Certain constructions with grounding import are intermediate between single- and multi-clause expressions. These consist of a full, finite clause which in isolation would be interpreted as stating a proposition, together with an adjunct (or ‘satellite’) that in some way pertains to its validity. Thus they offer a complex, multi-level assessment more varied and more nuanced than grounding in the narrow sense. For example, *clause-external adverbs* qualify the assessment that P is valid, indicating that it is merely a candidate for inclusion in PR: ‘{Possibly / conceivably / certainly / undoubtedly}, he is lying’. Another option is a *tag question*, which weakens the assessment by requesting confirmation: ‘He lied, didn’t he?’.

Lastly, *complementation* makes available an open-ended array of propositional assessments. In a large proportion of cases where the complement clause is finite (e.g. She believes he lied), the matrix grounds the complement proposition (P) by indicating its status with respect to PR. Though more substantive and far more varied than grammaticized grounding elements, the matrix predicates in question (commonly referred to as ‘predicates of propositional attitude’) are directly concerned with epistemic assessment. They focus on different facets of it: validity as such (true, false, evident, inaccurate); inclination toward acceptance in PR (likely, possible, appear, doubtful); stages in the assessment process (suspect, believe, learn, know); negotiation through communicative interaction (claim, argue, inform, deny); speech acts involving propositions (say, tell, ask, promise).

The grounding of the complement by the matrix differs from its basic (clause-internal) grounding in several ways: it pertains to P rather than p ; the assessment is put onstage as an overt object of description (the occurrence profiled by the matrix); the responsible conceptualizer, instead of its default identification as the speaker, can be anyone evident from the context (often being specified by the matrix subject); and its more elaborate conceptual content provides an open-ended array of grounding options. Of course, the matrix may itself be a finite clause that profiles an occurrence (p') whose grounding results in a higher-level proposition (P'). In that case the full expression describes a complex situation where one propositional assessment figures in another. Hence the matrix has a dual function:

it grounds the complement proposition (P) by indicating its status vis-à-vis PR; and it treats that assessment as a grounded occurrence (p) in its own right, yielding a higher-level proposition (P') whose validity can in turn be negotiated (e.g. DOES she believe that he lied?). Complex situations of this sort comprise much of the mental world we think and talk about.

The grounding function of the matrix underlies the recognition that, instead of being the 'main clause', it is often better characterized as a formulaic stance marker with epistemic import (Boye & Harder, 2007; Diessel & Tomasello, 2005; Langacker, 2015c; Thompson, 2002). Even when it clearly is a clause, its relation to the complement proposition (P) resembles the clause-internal relation between a grounding element and the profiled occurrence (p). The roles of P and p are analogous, in that each – at its own level of organization – is the focus of attention: p by virtue of being the intended clausal referent, and P because its content is the main point of interest. Usually, one's primary concern in making the statement '*She believes he lied* is whether he lied' (not that she believes it). Even in a much longer expression, e.g. 'I know Kim believes that it's possible that he's lying', the ultimate concern is still whether he is lying.

A chain of complements can be of any length. Typically, at least, the main point of interest is the occurrence profiled at the lowest level of organization, in that it corresponds most closely to the objective reality being negotiated through linguistic interaction. Each successive clause involves two kinds of epistemic assessment: one situating the profiled occurrence (p) with respect to basic reality, and the other assessing the resulting proposition (P) with respect to propositional reality. However many clauses there may be, collectively they effect the grounding of the lowest-level occurrence, in the broad sense of indicating its epistemic status.

That brings us to the main point of interest for this paper: linguistic structure is revealingly characterized in terms of a notion of reality comprising multiple dimensions and levels of organization; and since a complement chain can have any number of clauses, what counts as reality for this purpose can have any number of levels.

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Henryk Kardela, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland
Anna Kędra-Kardela, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland
Andrzej Sławomir Kowalczyk, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland

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Roman Ingarden's Theory of the Literary Work of Art: A Cognitive Grammar Reassessment

ABSTRACT

Based on Langacker's conception of *grouping*, the paper reformulates the basic assumptions of Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art in terms of the Cognitive Grammar approach. The claim is made that, given a gestalt-based approach to the multi-stratal nature of the literary work as envisioned by Ingarden, the idea of grouping is a perfect methodological tool to apply in a holistic analysis as developed within *cognitive poetics* (*sensu* Stockwell). An incremental cognitive process, grouping "transcends" – in a gestalt-like fashion – all "levels" of conceptual organization. For illustrative purposes, the paper recasts Ingarden's analysis of Mickiewicz's "The Ackerman Steppe" in terms of Cognitive Grammar.

Keywords: literary work of art, phenomenological analysis, cognitive grammar, places of indeterminacy, grouping

1. Introduction

This paper makes an attempt to provide a cognitive poetics perspective on Roman Ingarden's phenomenological analysis of the literature reading process based on Ronald Langacker's conception of *grouping* – an incremental cognitive process which holds across all levels of conceptual organization. We believe that Ingarden's intellectual legacy has not lost its originality today, its currency and appeal. His works have proved inspirational for many contemporary scholars who appreciate the adaptability of Ingarden's theory to the demands of our times, acknowledging its applicability not only to philosophy and literature but also to many fields of artistic expression. In Section 2 we present Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art. Section 3 offers a brief presentation of Langacker's theory of grouping. The conception of grouping combined with Gilles Fauconnier and Mark

Henryk Kardela, Independent Scholar, henryk.kardela@gmail.com, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0145-5659>

Anna Kędra-Kardela, Katedra Anglistyki i Amerykanistyki, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Pl. Marii-Curii-Skłodowskiej 4a, 20-031 Lublin, Phone: 0048815372647, anna.kedra-kardela@mail.umcs.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5534-8691>

Andrzej Sławomir Kowalczyk, Katedra Anglistyki i Amerykanistyki, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Pl. Marii-Curii-Skłodowskiej 4a, 20-031 Lublin, andrzej.kowalczyk@mail.umcs.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0623-0117>



Turner's (2002) conceptual integration theory will be applied in Section 4 to our re-analysis of Ingarden's conception of the *places of indeterminacy* emerging in Adam Mickiewicz's poem "The Ackerman Steppe."

2. Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art

According to Ingarden (1973a, 1973b), literary works of art are *intentional* objects which enter with the cognising subject (in this case, the reader) into a *transcendental relationship*. This relationship presupposes the immersion of the reader in a literary work's fictional world and their adoption of an *empathetic stance* vis-à-vis the events, characters, things, locations, etc. as portrayed in that world. The term *intentionality* is defined by *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as follows:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual's mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. [...] [T]he meaning of the word 'intentionality' should not be confused with the ordinary meaning of the word 'intention.' As indicated by the meaning of the Latin word *tendere*, which is the etymology of 'intentionality,' the relevant idea behind intentionality is that of mental directedness towards (or attending to) objects, as if the mind were construed as a mental bow whose arrows could be properly aimed at different targets. (Pierre 2019)

Works of fiction such as a literary work of art are intentional because they presuppose the subject's/reader's "mental directness" towards them; literary works are "about something" – about things to which the "mind as a mental bow" aims in its *intentional acts*.

According to Edmund Husserl, there is an intimate relationship between consciousness and perception. A perceived object may, but need not exist in reality. Nor does it need to be unequivocally recognized, so to speak, as is the case, for instance, with Wittgenstein's famous Duck-Rabbit figure. What is important in this case is that "the correlate of an act of perception [or its meaning or appearance]" – the perceived duck or the perceived rabbit – "is the perceived object exactly as it is being perceived, i.e. [according to Husserl], as a perceptual noema" (Chojna, 2018, p. 7). This means that in the case of the duck-rabbit figure, during the act of perception of this hybrid category, the same sensory data can appear in our consciousness (or are interpreted) as a rabbit noema or a duck noema.

All these appearances of the duck-rabbit figure as perceived from different perspectives form a *set of noemas*, called by Husserl *noemata*, i.e. an open-ended *gestalt* of a particular thing or category as perceived (and experienced). The act of perception which leads to the emergence (or, in Husserl's parlance, *constitution*) in our consciousness, of a noema, or a set of noemas (*noemata*), is referred to as *noesis*.

Noesis is a ubiquitous process; it affects all spheres of human experience, including the human experience of objects of culture such as literary works of art

written by particular authors and read by their readers. Thus, in some sense, Mrs Dalloway is an object: it is a book with written pages, containing sentences, paragraphs, chapters, etc.; in some other sense, however, it is not: it is neither a solid object nor an idealistic, "purely imagined" entity. It is, in Ingarden's parlance, a purely intentional object. As such, in contrast to solid objects like chairs or tables, a purely intentional object such as a literary work contains places of indeterminacy, to be filled by the reader during the reading process. While filling the places of indeterminacy, the reader experiences the aesthetic quality of a given literary work.

But what exactly is the nature of the purely intentional object of the literary work which gives rise to the aesthetic experience of the reader? According to Ingarden, a literary work of art has a multi-stratal structure. It consists of four strata:

- (1) the stratum of *word sounds* and the *phonetic formations* of higher order built on them;
- (2) the stratum of *meaning units* of various orders;
- (3) the stratum of manifold schematized *aspects* and aspect continua and series [...];
- (4) the stratum of *represented objectivities* and their vicissitudes (1973b, p. 30)¹.

Each stratum is characterized as being to some extent *indeterminate* or *schematic* (as all *gestalts* are), achieving, during the aesthetic experience of the reading process, its full realization or *concretization*. The emergent *polyphonic* correlate of this experience becomes an *aesthetic object*, with the material properties of each of its stratum leading "to the constitution of its own aesthetic characters, which correspond to the nature of the material" (Ingarden 1973b, p. 58).

Consider first the stratum of *word sounds* and *phonetic formations*. This stratum is naturally connected with meaning; it is the carrier of meaning². Associated with this stratum is, for instance, the melodic quality of the language used by the author in the process of constitution of the literary work's meaning. The sound of the word, says Ingarden:

can [...] contain qualities that are aesthetically relevant. Thus one often distinguishes, e.g., "beautiful" and "ugly" sounding words (or, more precisely, word sounds). There are, in addition, "light" and "heavy" words, words which sound "funny" or "serious," or "solemn" or "pathetic," and those which are "simple" and "straightforward." (p. 45)

Certainly, not only words themselves but also the sounds of units larger than words – phrases and sentences which are associated with the melodic qualities of the text: rhythm and tempo – markedly contribute to the aesthetic qualities of the

¹ Elsewhere, Ingarden (1947/2000, p. 36) admits the possibility of a literary work having more than four strata.

² This is clearly an echo of the Saussurean *dictum* that the signifier and the signified form an indissoluble whole.

literary text. They carry the so-called “‘emotional’ or ‘mood’ qualities [such as]: ‘sad,’ ‘melancholy,’ ‘merry,’ ‘powerful,’ etc.” (Ingarden, 1973b, p. 52).

The polyphonic character of the literary work of art manifests itself further at its next stratum, namely the stratum of *meaning units* consisting, inter alia, of affirmative sentences which, in a literary work, in contradistinction to declarative sentences of a scientific work, are *quasi judgements*. In Ingarden’s own words,

[i]f we were to compare the declarative sentences [affirmative propositions] appearing in a literary work with, for example, those of a scientific work, we would immediately observe that, despite the same form and despite at times also a seemingly identical content, they are essentially different: those appearing in a scientific work are genuine *judgments* in a logical sense, in which something is seriously asserted and which not only lay claim to truth but *are* true or false, while those appearing in a literary work are not pure affirmative propositions, nor, on the other hand, can they be considered to be seriously intended assertive propositions or judgments. (1973b, p. 160)

Let us note that the theory of quasi judgements accounts for what contemporary literary theorists call the “make believe” of a world of fiction – a distance on the part of the reader vis-à-vis the represented world. Without assuming this distance, Wojciech Chojna (2018) notes, “we could mistake art for reality, as those naïve spectators who rushed on to a stage to help a heroine in danger” (p. 106).

This brings us to the third stratum of the literary work – the stratum of *represented objectivities* and their vicissitudes, or simply: the stratum of *presented objects*. For Ingarden (1973b), this is the most important stratum of a literary work, a stratum which

appears to exist within the literary work solely for itself; and it is thus not only the most important element, the focal point of the literary work of art, for the constitution of which all the other elements exist, but it appears to be something which has no other function than simply to be. In fact, in reading a work, our attention is likewise directed primarily at represented objectivities. (p. 288)

Commenting on the passage, Chojna (2018) observes that these words may sound “strange [...], especially from someone who always protested against reducing the complex structure of a literary work of art to one stratum only, not only in the philosophical analysis but also in the aesthetic perception” (p. 97). They should, however, be viewed as an attempt on Ingarden’s part to show that all the other elements of a literary work “exist in order to culminate at the stratum of objectivities” (p. 98). Indeed, each stratum of a literary work, Chojna goes on to say, “possesses certain aesthetic qualities which enhance an aesthetic experience, and contribute to the constitution of a valuable aesthetic object” (p. 98). This aesthetic object, Chojna concludes, “is not only the end of every successful aesthetic experience, but the *telos* of every literary work of art, the only way of being of a literary work as a work of art” (p. 98).

The culmination, as it were, of the aesthetic quality of a literary work of art takes place at the level of the fourth stratum – the stratum of schematised aspects,

a stratum closely linked with the perspectival nature of our perception. It will be recalled that, when introducing the basic idea of places of indeterminacy, we stated that the perception of a literary work of art presupposes the existence of a schematic structure containing the places of indeterminacy, the filling of which yields an aesthetically valued noetic structure of the literary work. But how exactly is the overall aesthetic gestalt structure of a literary work of art constituted? Is it not necessary, Ingarden asks, “to distinguish yet another special stratum of the literary work, one which would, so to speak, ‘cut across’ the above-mentioned strata and have the foundation of its constitution in them – a stratum of aesthetic value qualities and the polyphony that is constituted in them” (Ingarden, 1973b, p. 31)? The answer to this question can be found in the last chapter of Ingarden’s *Literary Work of Art*, in the section titled “The literary work of art and the polyphonic harmony of its aesthetic value qualities.” Says Ingarden:

In the course of our analyses we have frequently referred to the value qualities that are constituted in the individual strata of the literary work and that in their totality bring about a polyphonic harmony. The polyphonic harmony is precisely that “side” of the literary work that, along with the metaphysical qualities attaining manifestation, makes the work a *work of art*. (p. 369)

The polyphonic harmony, then, is the result of the close *interconnections* of the literary work’s strata, which through the active participation of the reader, conspire to produce the gestaltic aesthetic effect. Seen in linguistic terms, this means that a literary work’s *form*, or its *structure*, constitutes an indissociable whole with its *meaning*, or *function*. The question now is how to formally account for the structure-function indissociability. This could be done, we will contend, in the framework of Langacker’s latest version of Cognitive Grammar (2016), which we will call here the *Cognitive Grammar Structure and Function* model (CGSF-model).

3. Structure and function in Cognitive Grammar: Langacker’s conception of grouping

For Langacker (2016), structure and function are “indissociable, like the two sides of a coin,” and “a structure is never independent of its functions” (p. 24). This is not a widely accepted view, though. On the contrary, structure, Langacker notes, “is often identified with grammar, and function with meaning. Or structure with lexicon, morphology, syntax, and phonology, and function with things like semantics, pragmatics, and discourse functions” (p. 16). The structure/function distinction, however,

is a kind of disguised metaphor. It’s a manifestation of the substance/activity distinction which [...] is ultimately wrong [...] The formal elements are substantive only metaphorically. Phonological, lexical, and grammatical structures consist in patterns of processing activity, just as meanings do. (pp. 16–17)

Yet the patterns of processing activity are relatively *stable*, owing to their entrenchment and their ability to reappear. An *established processing routine* (or *unit*), created through entrenchment, “decomposes into subpatterns – *parts* within the *whole* [...] [which] are connected in various ways: via association, temporal sequencing, partial overlap,” giving rise to the “structure’s configuration” (p. 17, italics in original). Seen in this light, the structure-function relation is, according to Langacker, “just a matter of perspective” (p. 17). In an attempt to describe structures at all levels of conceptual organization, Langacker notes, we thus “are implicitly describing [their] functions: we’re describing lower-level structures, and we’re describing how they map onto aspects of higher-level structures, and this amounts to characterizing the functions” (p. 17).

But what is a *structure*, then? For Langacker, a structure is a configuration in which the elements from which it is composed are linked to each other by means of the following three types of connections:

- 1) overlap in the activity comprising the connected elements;
- 2) association, such that one structure tends to activate another;
- 3) operations (e.g. comparison, categorization, assessment of relative position in some field). (2016, p. 20) field)

It should be stressed that the same elements can be connected in many different ways to produce different structures that can be further *augmented* by other elements and/or connections. According to Langacker,

- 1) connection produces a new entity representing a higher-level of organization;
- 2) the higher-level entity has emergent properties, minimally including the nature of the connections and any adjustments the component elements undergo;
- 3) a component of a higher-level entity may participate individually in further connections;
- 4) a higher-level entity (being a structure in its own right) can also participate as a whole in further connections. This is so when the connections depend on emergent properties;
- 5) when this happens at successive levels of organization, the result is hierarchy. (Langacker, 2016, p. 21)

Let us add that the concept of connection can apply to an analysis of a literary text as well. For example, in a sonnet, individual lines combine to form a stanza, i.e. a higher-level entity (cf. 1). Stanzas, in turn, compose the octave and the sestet as constitutive parts of the sonnet (cf. 2). Again, the octave, consisting of two quatrains, is a higher-level entity in relation to them (cf. 3). In this way a hierarchy of successive levels is established within the poem (cf. 4).

Returning to Langacker’s thread of argumentation, when the potential of a higher-order entity created by connected elements to function in some other higher-level structure is realized, a *grouping* emerges. In it “[t]he elements are

grouped into what counts as one entity for this higher-level purpose” (p. 23). The process of grouping can be presented as follows:




Figure 1: Grouping (Langacker, 2016, p. 23)

All expressions, compound or simplex alike, form a *system*: “the set of elements that fulfill a certain function” (Langacker, 2016, p. 28). These elements, called by Langacker *exponents* or *members* of the system, are *mutually exclusive*; they are “in opposition to one another. In neural terms, they are connected by *inhibitory* (rather than *excitatory*) links” (p. 28, italics in original).

The function/schema-related categorizing relationship can be presented as follows:




Figure 2: The function/schema-related categorizing relationship (Langacker, 2016, p. 29)

In Figure 2, according to Langacker (2016),

F is some function, and a, b, and c are its exponents; they constitute a system of elements that serve the function. [...] [T]he exponents of the system are mutually inhibitory. If you activate one, it tends to suppress the others. That’s the basis for the notion of *opposition* – they’re opposed to one another, which is actually an aspect of their value. [...] It’s very commonly the case that, if we take the elements that serve a certain function, they instantiate some schema.

So in [...] (b) there is categorization. [V] is what [i], [a], and [u] have in common – the notion of a vowel, without being specific about which particular vowel it is. [i], [a], and [u] are instantiations of this schema. (pp. 28–29)

In order to incorporate these observations into the Cognitive Grammar model, we have to introduce now two notions: *baseline* and *elaboration*. In Langacker’s parlance,

- 1) The terms *baseline* and *elaboration* indicate both *priority* and a difference in *complexity*.
- 2) Canonically there are three structures exhibiting definite asymmetries: B is *prior* to E (hence to BE); B is more *substantive* than E; BE is more *complex* than B (or E).
- 3) B/E organization represents a kind of *layering* (arrangement in terms of *core* and *periphery*). The layers are referred to as strata (S).
- 4) Each stratum (S_i) is a substrate for the next (S_{i+1}), providing the basis for its emergence. S_{i+1} elaborates S_i by invoking *additional resources* allowing a *wider array of alternatives*. (2016, p. 41)

The layering of strata via the elaboration process and the different ways of elaborating a baseline stratum can be presented as follows:




Figure 3: Strata layering and elaboration (Langacker, 2016, p. 45)

Accordingly, in the chain of elaborations above, “B is elaborated by E₁ to yield BE₁, then that as a whole is elaborated by E₂, resulting in BE₁E₂. So there are three strata” (Langacker 2016, p. 45).

It is precisely the chain of elaborations provided by the grouping process that can be evoked here to account for and thus give substance to Ingarden’s claim about the “polyphonic interconnectedness” of the literary work’s strata. This move is not at all unwarranted, given the striking parallels between Ingarden’s and Langacker’s theoretical proposals. First, both Ingarden and Langacker speak of “strata,” albeit differently understood. Second, both scholars embrace the idea of a gestalt-based form of categorization. For Ingarden (1973b), “the value qualities [...] in the individual strata of the literary work [...] in their totality bring about a polyphonic harmony” (p. 369), while for Langacker (2016), “structure and function, [...], are indissociable” and “a structure is never independent of its functions” (p. 24). Third, both Ingarden and Langacker speak of “category change” leading to the emergence of a new quality. Thus, Ingarden speaks of the changes in the appearances of the people

and things presented caused by the transition from one phase of a literary work into another, while Langacker – of the baseline and elaboration-related process in which “each stratum (S_i) is a substrate for the next (S_{i+1}), providing the basis for its emergence” (p. 41). Finally, both Ingarden and Langacker assume the existence of some “more basic stratum.” However, while for Ingarden, the basic, the “most important stratum,” is the stratum of presented objects/objectivities, for Langacker, the “basic stratum,” or the baseline, is a prototype-based norm, “from which other variants develop by extension, specialization, or schematization” (p. 36).

This brings us to a CGSF-based analysis of “The Ackerman Steppe,” initially proposed, in phenomenological terms, by Ingarden himself. We will concentrate here mainly only on two strata: the stratum of represented objects and the stratum of manifold schematized aspects.

4. Analysis of “The Ackerman Steppe”

Let us begin with Ingarden’s own analysis of Mickiewicz’s poem “The Ackerman Steppe” [Stepy Akermańskie], developed by him in his book *Szkice z filozofii literatury* (Ingarden 1947/2000). The original Polish poem (Mickiewicz, n.d.) and its English translation by Edna Worthley Underwood (Mickiewicz, 1917) are given below.

Wpłynąłem na suchego przestwór oceanu, Wóz nurza się w zieloność i jak łódka brodzi, Śród fali łąk szumiących, śród kwiatów powo- dzi, Omijam koralowe ostrowy burzanu.	Across sea-meadows measureless I go, My wagon sinking under grass so tall The flowery petals in foam on me fall, And blossom-isles float by I do not know.
Już mrok zapada, nigdzie drogi ni kurhanu; Patrzę w niebo, gwiazd szukam przewodniczek łodzi; Tam z dała błyszczący obłok? tam jutrzeńca wschodzi? To błyszczący Dniestr, to weszła lampa Akermanu.	No pathway can the deepening twilight show; I seek the beckoning stars which sailors call, And watch the clouds. What lies there brightening all? The Dneister’s, the steppe-ocean’s evening glow!
Stójmy! — Jak cicho! — Słyszę ciągnące żurawie, Których by nie dościgiły źrenice sokoła;	The silence! I can hear far flight of cranes — So far the eyes of eagle could not reach —
Słyszę, kędy się motyl kołysa na trawie, Kędy wąż śliską piersią dotyka się ziola.	And bees and blossoms speaking each to each; The serpent slipping adown grassy lanes;
W takiej ciszy — tak ucho natężam ciekawie, Że słyszałbym głos z Litwy. — Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!	From my far home if word could come to me! — Yet none will come. On, o’er the meadow-sea!

Ingarden starts his analysis by noting first that the literary work of art has a *dual* nature. For him, it is precisely this *duality* of a literary work of art that distinguishes a literary work from any other work of art, such as, for example, a painting. Thus, on the one hand, the literary work's structure is characterized by its linearity: we start reading "The Ackerman Steppe" word after word, line after line, combining sentences into larger portions of the text, till we reach the final line "Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!" ("On, o'er the meadow-sea!"). We can speak here of the *phases* of a literary text's structure, with one phase leading to the constitution of a higher-order structure. On the other hand, these larger portions of the text, built from sentences, are associated with the four different *strata*, already discussed above.

When moving from one phase-related structure of a literary work to another, higher-order structure, Ingarden notes, we can see that the higher-order structures very often exhibit new qualities. For example, the sounds of words (the stratum of word sounds) in a poem, arranged in a particular order, are combined into verses, e.g., in Mickiewicz's sonnet, "Wpłynąłem na suchego przestwór oceanu" ("Across sea-meadows measureless I go"), or "Patrzę w niebo, gwiazd szukam przewodniczek łodzi" ("I seek the beckoning stars which sailors call") (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 23). The poem's lines, in turn, form stanzas, which, when we "move along" to another phase, form a higher-order text unit, in this case – the sonnet. Consisting of word sounds, higher-order structures of this sort involve, according to Ingarden, such *phenomena* ("zjawiska") as rhythm, rhyme, and melody. Those sound-related phenomena accompany, as it were, the whole of the literary work of art.

Not only word sounds and their combinations are associated with (aesthetically marked) phenomena (e.g. with rhyme and melody), but the meaning units and their higher-order structures, such as phrases and sentences, are accompanied by appropriate phenomena as well. Thus, as Ingarden observes, the sentence "Wóz nurza się w zieloność i jak łódka brodzi" ("My wagon sinking under grass so tall") is composed of individual words. However, a sentence of this kind does not "stand alone"; it forms with other sentences super-ordinate structures, such as stanzas.

Turning to the stratum of represented objectivities, or the represented world, Ingarden notes that the words and sentences describe not only the things and people appearing in the poem but also the various relations between them and the processes and states in which they participate or appear (1947/2000, p. 25). All of these conspire to form a uniform whole. Take the first four lines of the poem. These lines (which form a stanza in the Polish original), Ingarden says, delineate not only "measureless sea-meadows" ("suchego przestwór oceanu") i.e. "steppe" ("step"), the wagon which is sliding – like a boat over the waves – over the meadows, but also somebody who is sitting on the wagon, which, while moving along the steppe, "sinks under grass so tall" ("nurza się w zieloność"). All this, Ingarden observes, forms one coherent whole: an image. Seen through the stratum of repre-

sented objectivities, the things presented in the poem and their arrangement make it possible for us to easily grasp the whole scene.

Yet, this whole delineated by the first stanza does not exhaust everything the poem speaks about (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 25), but changes in accordance with the new details provided in the next phase. In particular, “the deepening twilight” (“mrok zapada”) and the steppe, all covered with grass, disclose “no pathway” (p. 26). New things appear owing to the conjectured look of the speaker, implied in rhetorical questions: the sky over the steppe, the moon rising, the Dniester glowing. In Ingarden’s own words:

The “landscape” of the first stanza turns into a slightly different landscape of the second stanza, becoming a background for what is dwelt on in the following part of the poem – the background from which new details can be singled out (the silence, the flight of cranes), but which, at the same time, becomes merely a background, while what is foregrounded is an individual living in this world. And now, an outburst of quivering emotion (not named, though) explodes in the words: “Jedźmy! nikt nie woła” [lit. “Let’s go, nobody’s calling!”]; the words which directly refer to the represented world. In this way, among the events taking place in the represented world, an important event occurs, the finale and the axis of all. Yet, the environment does not disappear; on the contrary, it constitutes the foundation of the event and its harmonic complementation. (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 26, translation ours)

Turning to the stratum of schematized aspects in “The Ackerman Steppe,” Ingarden claims that the world presented in the poem not only *exists*, but also appears to the reader through the schematized aspects (or the appearances) of the people and things presented. In contrast to the three strata of the literary work just discussed, the appearances, Ingarden observes, do not form a continuum which complements each phase of the literary work in the process of its reading; rather, the appearances, along with each transition to the next phase of reading, “sparkle” from time to time, “light up, go out and light up again” (Ingarden, 1947/2000 p. 28). The appearances are “actualized” by the reader during the reading process; they are “in the readiness, in the state of certain potentiality” (p. 28). They can belong to different senses, they can even be extra-sensory; yet, they can still be “visible phenomena of that which is psychic” (p. 28). Thus, in “The Ackerman Steppe,” we see first the “measureless see-meadow” steppe and then, against this background, the “flowery petals in foam / [...] And blossom-isles float[ing] by,” over the periphery of the whole scene. Then the next visual scene unfolds before the reader’s eyes: the darkening sky, “the beckoning stars,” and “the Dneister’s [...] evening glow.”

Interestingly, in the second part of the sonnet, the visual appearance of the scene gives way to the *aural appearance* of the profound silence, brought to the fore by the practically inaudible “far flight of cranes” or “bees and blossoms speaking each to each” (“kędy się motyl kołysa” – lit. “where the butterfly is swaying”). Also, let us add here, the visual appearance of the scene gives way to yet another appearance: the appearance of the sense of *touch*, perceived especially in the Polish line “Kędy

wąż śliską piersią *dotyka się* [touches] ziola” (“The serpent slipping adown grassy lanes”). This appearance, in its part, contributes to the effect of silence, too.

The transition from visual to aural (and to tactile) appearance, Ingarden observes,

is perfectly justified by the scene of the dusk falling. From an artistic point of view, this transition becomes the background for the outburst of feeling, which, owing to the fact that it is expressed only in the verbal behaviour of the speaking subject, is *visually* imposed on the reader in the form of the moving overpowering emotion. The sensory appearances change into the extra-sensory “appearance” [...] of vivid emotion. (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 28, translation ours)

The “appearance of the vivid emotion,” then, experienced by the reader, is the result of the interplay of the different elements of the sonnet, of its dual character on the level of language and on the level of the image of the world, culminating in the words: “On, over the meadow-seal!” (“Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!”) (p. 29), which define the experience of the overwhelming silence of the steppe. In this way, Ingarden concludes, “the multi-layered structure of the literary work and the order of occurrence of the phases each one after another [...] are firmly related and cannot be separated” (p. 29). With this in mind we can now recast Ingarden’s analysis in terms of the CGSF-model.

Our analysis of the strata of represented objects and schematized aspects in “The Ackerman Steppe” is based on the following claims: (i) the grouping processes apply “vertically,” cutting across the different levels of conceptual organization; (ii) the bi-polar linguistic units constitute the baseline in the literary work (including the baseline of Mickiewicz’s poem); (iii) the semantic poles of these units are associated with their conceptual structure: with the events these units describe and with the construal operations such as metaphor, metonymy and blending building the conceptual system³; and (iv) Ingarden’s places of indeterminacy should be redefined in terms of the emergent information in the blending space of the conceptual integration process.

With respect to (i), the best way to describe the “cutting-across” nature of the grouping process, is to evoke an image of a multilayered cake with the cross-section’s emergent structure organized by the process. Commenting on the so-called *generalization commitment* of cognitive linguistics, Evans, Bergen, and Zinken (2007) note that

cognitive linguistic approaches often take a ‘vertical’, rather than a ‘horizontal’ approach to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of distinct layers of organization – the sound structure, the set of words composed by these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are constitutive of, and so on. If we array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll over time (like layers of a cake), then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense that they take one layer and study it internally – just as a *horizontal slice of cake*. Vertical approaches get a richer view of language by taking a *vertical slice of language* [emphasis added], which

³ For a list and the discussion of construal operations, see, for example, Kövecses (2015, p. 17).

includes phonology, morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics on top. A vertical slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a horizontal one – it is more varied and textured – but at the same time it affords possible explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective. (p. 4)

Certainly, by “offering a vertical slice of language” the grouping process is an ideal tool to account for the intra-stratal nature of the Ingardenian literary work.

In regard to (ii), we assume that the baseline of the grouping process in the case of a literary work such as “The Ackerman Steppe” consists of a succession of linguistic units followed by the reader in the processing time⁴. (This corresponds to Ingarden’s phase-related structure of a literary work followed by the reader during the reading process.) In Cognitive Grammar, linguistic units are bi-polar, consisting of the Phonological Pole [P], and the Semantic Pole [S]. Seen from this perspective, the linguistic units representing the first two sentences in “The Ackerman Steppe” might look as follows (capital letters represent the semantic pole of the sentence, while small letters, the phonological pole):




Figure 4: Processing of linguistic units (sentences)

Figure 4 depicts the processing involving the first two lines in “The Ackerman Steppe”, with the processing taking place sequentially: first sentence [1] is processed, then, the compound sentence consisting of two coordinate sentences, [2] and [3], are analyzed.

Turning to (iii), it is little wonder why Ingarden takes the stratum of the represented objects to be the most important layer of the literary work of art. Indeed, when reading a literary work, we inevitably ask: What is the work about? What are its characters? What relations obtain between them? Where does the action

⁴ Langacker draws a distinction between the so-called *processing time*, i.e. the time during which cognitive abilities, such as, say, reading, take place, and *conceived time*, which is part of a given conceptualization – a *process* which is coded by a given verb.

take place?, etc. In short, we enquire about *events* – understood as the *situations* in which the *participants* (or literary characters) are found, the *activities* (or *processes*) they are engaged in and the *circumstances* (the *setting*) in which the situation develops. In a sentence, participants are usually coded as nouns, processes as verbs, and circumstances, as adjuncts. For our cognitive characterization of an event, we propose the so-called *Schematic Event Model* (SEM), based on Langacker’s conception of the *Canonical Event Model* (Langacker, 1991, pp. 285–286), the latter representing, in Langacker’s parlance, “the normal observation of a prototypical action” (p. 286). The SEM model and the Canonical Event Model are given in Figure 5a and 5b, respectively.




Figure 5: The SEM Model and the Canonical Event Model

As shown in Figure 5b, Langacker’s Canonical Event Model contains participants – prototypically, an Agent (AG) and Patient (PAT), who function in a *setting*, a kind of scene, which is overlooked by a viewer (V). SEM, in turn, is our *schematic* representation (without role specification) of an event, adapted for the purpose of exposition (see below).

Now, since the three sentences represent the respective events, involving the verbs *wpłynąć* ‘lit. sail in’, *nurzać się* ‘sink’ and *brodzić* ‘lit. paddle/wade’, respectively, the events can be said to be elaborations of these baseline structures at a higher strata-level. The process of elaboration may be schematically presented as follows. The lower boxes represent the baseline – the bi-polar linguistic units, which are elaborated at their semantic poles⁵ by the schematic event models – the elaborations in S_1 .

Finally, turning to (iv), i.e. to Ingarden’s places of indeterminacy, we claim that the places of indeterminacy can be seen to be directly linked to the new, emergent information in the blend of the conceptual integration process. The “basic diagram” of the conceptual integration process, shown in Figure 7, is well-known:

⁵ For the purpose of exposition the semantic pole of these units is placed below, not above the phonological pole.




Figure 6: The baseline/the semantic poles of linguistic units elaborated by the event models




Figure 7: Conceptual integration (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 46)

The conceptual integration process involves four mental spaces: the generic space (very often omitted in actual linguistic practice), at least two so-called input spaces, and the so-called blend. Crucial in the case of the latter is new, emergent information that does not appear in either the generic space or in the input spaces. And this is exactly the nature of a place of indeterminacy: the information is “not there,” it is not readily given; it *emerges* as a result of the reader’s attempt to fill in the literary work’s schematic structure with context-governed information. We argue that looked at from this perspective, places of indeterminacy in a literary work (such as Mickiewicz’s sonnet) can

be conceived of in terms of blends: it is precisely in the blends that the “missing information,” indispensable for a possible range of interpretations of the poem, emerges.⁶

But what are those blends in Mickiewicz’s sonnet? A close look at the poem indicates that it is its first two lines (the first three sentences), just cited, that are essential to our understanding and interpretation of the whole poem. These lines juxtapose, in metaphorical/conceptual integration terms, two conceptualizations: the concept of “steppe” and the concept of “ocean.” The resulting blend “step-ocean,” which is clearly seen in the English translation, “sea-meadow,” is the new, emerging structure – an Ingardenian place of indeterminacy – which can now “expand,” depending on the reader’s interpretive skills, their knowledge of the sonnet convention, of the sonnet’s literary critique, etc. The place of indeterminacy in this case, associated with the blending process, which elaborates further the structures in Figure 7, can be schematically shown as follows:




Figure 8: The elaborations and the “places of indeterminacy” in “The Ackerman Steppe”

⁶ We thus assume a “default-value” approach to the role and function of blends. Whereas for Fauconnier and Turner, the blend *contains* new information (or more appropriately: the new information *emerges* in the blend), we claim that the whole blend *is* emergent information, which *also* contains elements recruited from the input spaces and the generic space.

5. Conclusion

Figure 8 represents just a small fraction of what a Cognitive Grammar analysis of Mickiewicz's sonnet based on Ingarden's insights may look like. Due to the limited scope of the paper, we have taken into account here only the strata of *represented objectivities* and *schematized aspects*. We hope to have shown that the conception of grouping combined with the idea of conceptual blending is a promising methodological tool in explaining the mechanism of completion of places of indeterminacy. Further research is needed though on the strata of *word sounds* and *phonetic formations*, which play a very important, often defining role in interpretations of a poem. Yet another issue related to Ingarden's places of indeterminacy, not discussed here, is that of the *aesthetic qualities* of a literary work of art. Nor have we addressed the issue of literary tradition and genre that play an important role in literary analysis. We do believe though that these issues can be handled in a principled way by Ronald Langacker's theory of Cognitive Grammar. Generally, it is our conviction that cognitive linguistics, and Cognitive Grammar in particular, can be successfully applied in cognitive-poetic study of literary texts, drawing on the valuable insights of "old" literary theories like Ingarden's, embedding them in the modern literary discourse.

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Zoltán Kövecses, Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary

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Metaphorical Creativity in Discourse¹

ABSTRACT

On the “standard” view of conceptual metaphors (Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), metaphorical creativity arises from the cognitive processes of extending, elaboration, questioning, and combining conceptual content in the source domain (Lakoff & Turner, 1989). I will propose that such cases constitute only a part of metaphorical creativity. An equally important and common set of cases is comprised by what I call “context-induced” metaphors. I will discuss five types of these: metaphors induced by 1) the immediate linguistic context itself, 2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse, 3) the physical setting, 4) the social setting, and 5) the immediate cultural context. Such metaphors have not been systematically investigated so far, though they seem to form a large part of our metaphorical creativity.

Keyword: conceptual metaphors, context, creativity, source domain, target domain

1. Introducing creativity of metaphors

One of the criticisms of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is that it conceives of metaphors as highly conventional static conceptual structures (the correspondences, or mappings, between a source and a target domain). It would follow from this that such conceptual structures manifest themselves in the form of highly conventional metaphorical linguistic expressions (like the metaphorical meanings in a dictionary) based on such mappings. If correct, this view does not easily lend itself to an account of metaphorical creativity. Clearly, we often come across novel metaphorical expressions in real discourse. If all there is to metaphor is static conceptual structures matched by highly conventional linguistic expressions, it would seem that CMT runs into difficulty in accounting for the many unconventional and novel expressions we find in discourse. I will discuss various types of metaphorical creativity in this section.

The paper will examine the interrelations among metaphor, discourse, and metaphorical creativity. I will propose that 1) metaphorical creativity in discourse

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can involve several distinct cases, and 2) conceptualizers rely on a number of contextual factors when they use novel metaphors in discourse.

Metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve a variety of distinct forms. In my *Metaphor in Culture* (2005), I distinguished two types: creativity that is based on the source domain and creativity that is based on the target. “Source-related” creativity can be of two kinds: “source-internal” and “source-external” creativity. Source-internal creativity involves cases that Lakoff and Turner (1989) describe as elaboration and extending, where unused source-internal conceptual materials are utilized to comprehend the target. “Source-external” cases of creativity operate with what I called the “range of the target,” in which a particular target domain receives new, additional source domains in its conceptualization (Kövecses, 2005). The type of creativity in discourse that is based on the target was also described by Kövecses (2005). In it, a particular target that is conventionally associated with a source “connects back” to the source taking further knowledge structures from it. We can call this “target-induced” creativity.

In the remainder of the paper, I will suggest that there is yet another form of metaphorical creativity in discourse – creativity that is induced by the context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place. This kind of creativity has not been systematically explored in the cognitive linguistic literature on metaphor.

I will term the creativity that is based on the context of metaphorical conceptualization “context-induced” creativity. This occurs where the emergence of a particular metaphorical expression is due to the influence of some aspect of discourse. In particular, five such contextual aspects, or factors, seem to produce unconventional and novel metaphors: 1) the immediate linguistic context itself; 2) what we know about the major entities participating in the discourse; 3) physical setting; 4) social setting, and 5) the immediate cultural context. There are surely others, but I will limit myself to the discussion of these five.

2. The effect of the linguistic context on metaphor use

2.1. The effect of the linguistic context on metaphor

Let us provisionally think of discourse as being composed of a series of concepts organized in a particular way. The concepts that participate in discourse may give rise to either conventional or unconventional and novel linguistic metaphors. I propose that metaphorical expressions can be selected because of the influence of the immediate linguistic context, that is, the concepts that surround the conceptual slot where we need a word or phrase to express a particular meaning. Jean Aitchison (1987) made an interesting observation that bears on this issue. She noted that in newspaper articles and headlines about (American) football games, the names of the teams may select particular metaphors for defeat and victory. She found such examples as follows in the sports pages of American newspapers: “Cougars *drown* Beavers”, “Cowboys *corral* Buffaloes”, “Air Force *torpedoes*

the Navy”, “Clemson *cooks* Rice” (Aitchison, 1987, p. 143). Metaphors used in these sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Since beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; since cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; since navy ships can be torpedoed, the opponent can be torpedoed, too; and since rice can be cooked, the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The metaphors in the above sentences indicate that the target domain of DEFEAT can be variously expressed as drowning, corraling, etc., the choice depending on the concepts (in this case, corresponding to the names of the teams) that make up the utterances in which the metaphor is embedded.

Defeating an opponent is a form of symbolic control, in the same way as the sports activities themselves are symbolic activities. In general, defeating an opponent is conceptualized as physically and/or socially controlling an entity (either animate or inanimate). The high-level, schematic conceptual metaphor DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL AND/OR SOCIAL CONTROL is pervasive in English (and also in other languages); metaphorical words for this conceptualization abound: *beat, upset, subdue, knock out, clobber, kill, demolish, conquer, crush, dash, destroy, dust, lick, overcome, overwhelm, ruin, stump, vanquish, thrash, trample, trounce*, and literally hundreds of others. The words all indicate some form of physical or social control. The words *cook* and *torpedo* from Aitchison’s examples could be added to this list, although they seem to be somewhat *less conventional* than the others. Since defeat is conceptualized as physical and social control, it makes sense for the author to use the words *cook* and *torpedo* in the conceptual slot in the neighborhood of the concepts RICE and NAVY, respectively. It makes sense because the frame for RICE involves COOKING and the frame for NAVY can involve the weapon TORPEDO, on the one hand, and because COOKING and TORPEDOING are ways of physically controlling an entity, on the other.

There is, however, more complication we need to be aware of. In the SPORTS COMPETITION frame, or more specifically, the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame, there are two opponents, there is an activity on the basis of which the winner is decided, and a resulting relationship between the two opponents: one opponent defeating the other. Given these minimal elements in the frame, we can say that one team defeats another and we can choose a word from the list above to express this meaning. We do this on the basis of the metaphor DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL CONTROL. However, how do the concepts of RICE and NAVY that are used in the source domain of this metaphor end up in the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame? American football teams are not identical to RICE and NAVY; these are concepts that we primarily associate with very different entities, such as plants and the armed forces, respectively. Football teams are not plants and armed forces. Obviously, they enter the frame because they are the names of the two football teams. They enter it on the basis of the metonymy NAME FOR THE INSTITUTION (i.e., NAME OF THE TEAM FOR THE TEAM). This metonymy is crucial

in understanding the selection of the particular linguistic expressions for defeat. Without the metonymically introduced names for the teams, it would be much less likely for the author to use the terms *cook* and *torpedo*.

The other two words in the set of examples offered by Aitchison, *corral* and *drown*, require similar treatment. We should note, however, that *corralling* and *drowning* are even less conventional cases of talking about defeat than *cook* and *torpedo* are. What nevertheless makes them perfectly understandable and natural in the context is that the frame for AMERICAN FOOTBALL contains the names Cowboys and Beavers. The words *corral* and *drown* are coherent with these names, on the one hand, and they also fit the DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/SOCIAL CONTROL metaphor, on the other.

In other words, there seem to be three constraints on the use of such metaphorical expressions in discourse. First, the words used must be consistent with an element of a conceptual frame that occurs in the discourse (such as that for DEFEAT). This would simply ensure that we use literal or metaphorical linguistic expressions for DEFEAT, and not for something else. Second, the linguistic metaphor must be consistent with a high-level, schematic metaphor conventionally used for that element, such as DEFEAT). In the case above, it would be DEFEAT IS PHYSICAL/ SOCIAL CONTROL. Third, the linguistic metaphors chosen on the basis of such metaphors should (probably *must* would be too strong a word here) be consistent with other more specific elements in the same frame (such as AMERICAN FOOTBALL). Such more specific elements within the AMERICAN FOOTBALL frame would be the names of the teams.

2.2. The effect of knowledge about major entities in the discourse on metaphor use

In other cases, it seems to be our knowledge about the entities participating in the discourse that plays a role in choosing our metaphors in real discourse. Major entities participating in discourse include the speaker (conceptualizer), the hearer (addressee/conceptualizer), and the entity or process we talk about (topic). I'll discuss two such examples, involving the topic and the speaker/ conceptualizer.

To begin, I will reanalyze an example first discussed in Kövecses (2005). The Hungarian daily *Magyar Nemzet* [Hungarian Nation] carried an article some years ago about some of the political leaders of neighboring countries who were at the time antagonistic to Hungary. One of them, the then Slovak president, Meciar, used to be a boxer. This gave a Hungarian journalist a chance to use the following metaphor that is based on this particular property of the former Slovak president:

A pozsonyi exbokszolóra akkor viszünk be atlanti pontot érő ütést, ha az ilyen helyzetekben megszokott nyugati módra "öklözzük": megvető távolságot tartva. [We deal a blow worth an Atlantic point to the ex-boxer of Bratislava if we box in a western style as customary in these circumstances: keeping an aloof distance] (*Magyar Nemzet*, September 13, 1997, translation mine).

Confrontational international politics is commonly conceptualized as war, sports, games, etc. There are many different kinds of war, sports, and games, all of which could potentially be used to talk about confrontational international politics. In all probability, the journalist chose boxing because of his knowledge (shared by many of his readers) about one of the entities that constitute the topic of the discourse.

In using the metaphor *CONFRONTATIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS BOXING*, the author is relying both on some conventional and unconventional mappings. What is common to the war, sports, and games metaphors is, of course, that they all focus on and highlight the notion of winning in relation to the activity to which they apply. This is their shared “meaning focus” (Kövecses, 2000, 2002) and this is that makes up the conventional part of the metaphor. The boxer corresponding to the politician and the blows exchanged corresponding to the political statements made are explicitly present in the discourse in question. In addition, we also assume that both boxers want to win and that the participating politicians want the same (whatever winning means in politics). However, the manner in which the boxers box and politicians argue is not a part of the conventional framework of the metaphor. “Keeping an aloof distance” probably comes into the discourse as a result of the author thinking about the target domain of politics. In the author’s view, politics regarding Meciár should be conducted in a cool, detached manner. What corresponds to this way of doing politics in boxing is that you box in a way that you keep an aloof distance from your opponent. The process is then similar to what we have seen above in the discussion of the *EUROPEAN HOUSE* metaphor.

In the previous case, the metaphor was selected and elaborated as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about the topic. It is also possible to find cases where the selection of a metaphor depends on knowledge that the conceptualizer has about himself or herself. What is especially intriguing about such cases is that the author’s (conceptualizer’s) knowledge about him- or herself does not need to be conscious. The next example, taken from my previous work (Kövecses, 2005) but reanalyzed here, demonstrates this possibility. As one would expect, one important source of such cases is the area of therapy or psychological counseling. In a therapeutic context people commonly create novel metaphors as a result of unique and traumatic life experiences. The metaphors that are created under these circumstances need not be consciously formed. The example comes from an article in the magazine *A & U* (March, 2003) about photographic artist Frank Jump.

Frank Jump photographs old painted mural advertisements in New York City. He has AIDS, but he has outlived his expected life span. His life and his art are intimately connected metaphorically. The conceptual metaphor operative here could be put as follows: *SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR EXPECTED “LIFE SPAN.”* At first, Jump

was not consciously aware that he works within the frame of a conceptual metaphor that relies on his condition. In his own words:

In the beginning, I didn't make the connection between the subject matter and my own seropositivity. I was asked to be part of the Day Without Art exhibition a few years ago and didn't think I was worthy—other artists' work was much more HIV-specific. ... But my mentor said, "Don't you see the connection? You're documenting something that was never intended to live this long. *You* never intended to live this long". (p. 27)

The mentor made the conceptual metaphor conscious for the artist. I believe something similar is happening in many cases of psychotherapy and counseling.

It is clear that the metaphor SURVIVING AIDS DESPITE PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY IS FOR THE OLD MURAL ADVERTISEMENTS TO SURVIVE THEIR EXPECTED "LIFE SPAN" is anything but a conventional conceptual metaphor. The metaphor is created by Frank Jump as a novel analogy – the unconscious but nevertheless real analogy between surviving one's expected life span as a person who has AIDS and the survival of the mural advertisements that were created to be around on the walls of buildings in New York City for only a limited amount of time. In this case, (unconscious) self-knowledge leads the conceptualizer to find the appropriate analogy. The analogy is appropriate because the source and the target domains share schematic structural resemblance; namely, an entity existing longer than expected. The resulting metaphor(ical analogy) is novel and creative and it comes about as a result of what the conceptualizer knows about himself.

2.3. The effect of physical setting on metaphor use

The physical setting may also influence the selection and use of particular metaphors in discourse. The physical setting comprises, among possibly other things, the physical *events and their consequences* that make up or are part of the setting, the various aspects of the physical *environment*, and the *perceptual qualities* that characterize the setting. I'll briefly discuss an example for each.

The first of these, *physical events and their consequences*, is well demonstrated by a statement made by an American journalist who traveled to New Orleans to do an interview with Fats Domino, the famous American musician and singer, two years after the devastation wreaked by hurricane Katrina, when the city of New Orleans was still struggling with many of the consequences of the hurricane. The journalist comments:

The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino's life, though he's loath to confess any inconvenience or misery outside of missing his social circle [...]. (USA TODAY, 2007, September 21, Section 6B.

The metaphorical statement "The 2005 hurricane *capsized* Domino's life" is based on the general metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and its more specific version LIFE

IS A SEA JOURNEY. The SEA JOURNEY source domain is chosen probably because of the role of the sea in the hurricane. More importantly, it should be noted that the verb *capsize* is used (as opposed to, say, *run aground*), though it is not a conventional linguistic manifestation of either the general JOURNEY or the more specific SEA JOURNEY source domains. I suggest that this verb is selected by the journalist as a result of the (still) visible consequences in New Orleans of the hurricane as a devastating physical event. The physical setting thus possibly triggers extension of an existing conventional conceptual metaphor and causes the speaker/ conceptualizer to choose a metaphorical expression that best fits that setting.

Next, let us consider *environmental conditions* as a part of the physical setting. The physical setting as a potential cause of, or factor in, which metaphors we choose was first studied by Boers (1999). He started out from the following general hypothesis. People will make more extensive use of a source domain when that particular source domain becomes more salient for them under certain circumstances. In other words, certain changes in the circumstances of the communicative situation may make people more aware of a particular source domain, and this may result in an increased use of the source domain in metaphorical conceptualization. The specific hypothesis was that the source domain of HEALTH will be especially productive of linguistic expressions in the winter because this is the time when, at least in countries of the northern hemisphere, people are more aware of their bodies through the more frequent occurrence of illnesses (such as colds, influenza, pneumonia, bronchitis). The particular target domain that was selected for the study was ECONOMY. Thus, according to the hypothesis, we can expect an increase in the relative salience of the ECONOMY IS HEALTH metaphor in the winter period. The salience of the HEALTH domain was assessed in terms of the frequency of health-related metaphorical expressions for economy.

In order to test the hypothesis, Boers counted all the metaphorical expressions that have to do with economy and that are based on the HEALTH source domain in the editorials of all issues of the English weekly magazine *The Economist* over a period of ten years. The study resulted in a sample of over one million words. Here is a selection of some of the metaphorical expressions that he identified: “*healthy companies*,” “*sickly firms*,” “*economic remedy*,” “*symptoms of a corporate disease*,” “*a financial injection*,” “*arthritic markets*,” “*economic recovery*,” and many others. The heavy presence of such and similar expressions shows that economy is commonly talked and thought about in terms of bodily health. The question for the researcher was whether there was any fluctuation in the frequency of use of the HEALTH metaphor from season to season. Boers found that the frequency of the metaphor was highest between the months of December and March. The same result was found systematically for the ten years under investigation. During this period, the frequency of health-related metaphors for economy went up and stayed higher in the winter. This finding supported the hypothesis. When

the HEALTH domain becomes more salient for people, they make more extensive use of it than when it is less salient.

We can reinterpret Boers' findings in the following way. Since the physical setting is part of the communicative situation, it may play a role in selecting particular metaphorical source domains. In the present example, wintertime is more likely to lead to the selection of health-related metaphors than to other metaphors, simply because such metaphors may be higher up in awareness than others due to the adverse impact of the physical environment on conceptualizers.

2.4. The effect of social setting on metaphor use

When we use metaphors, we use them in a social context as well. The social context can be extremely variable. It can involve anything from the social relationships that obtain between the participants of the discourse through the gender roles of the participants to the various social occasions in which the discourse takes place. Let us take an example for the last possibility from the American newspaper *USA TODAY*.

As mentioned above, in 2007 the newspaper carried an article about Fats Domino, one of the great living musicians based in flood-stricken New Orleans. In the article, the journalist describes in part Domino's life after Katrina – the hurricane that destroyed his house and caused a lot of damage to his life and that of many other people in New Orleans. The subtitle of the article reads:

The rock 'n' roll pioneer rebuilds his life—and on the new album 'Goin' Home,' his timeless music. (*USA TODAY*, 2007, September 21, Section 6B)

How can we account for the use of the metaphor “*rebuilds his life*” in this text? We could simply suggest that this is an instance of the LIFE IS A BUILDING conceptual metaphor and that whatever meaning is intended to be conveyed by the expression is most conventionally conveyed by this particular conceptual metaphor and this particular metaphorical expression. But then this may not entirely justify the use of the expression. There are potentially other conceptual metaphors (and corresponding metaphorical expressions) that could also be used to achieve a comparable semantic effect. Two that readily come to mind include the LIFE IS A JOURNEY and the LIFE IS A MACHINE conceptual metaphors. We could also say that *x set out again on his/her path* or that after his/her life broke down, *x got it to work again or restarted it*. These and similar metaphors would enable the speaker/ conceptualizer and the hearer to come to the interpretation that the rebuilding idea activates.

However, of the potentially possible choices it is the LIFE IS A BUILDING metaphor is selected for the purpose. In all probability this is because, at the time of the interview, Domino was also in the process of rebuilding his house that was destroyed by the hurricane in 2005. If this is correct, it can be suggested that the

social situation (rebuilding his house) triggered, or facilitated, the choice of the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A BUILDING. In other words, a real-world instance of a source domain is more likely to lead to the choice of a source concept of which it is an instance than to that of a source domain of which it is not. In this sense, the social setting may play a role in the selection of certain preferred conceptual metaphors, and hence of certain preferred metaphorical expressions in discourse.

In such cases, the emerging general picture seems to be as follows: There is a particular social setting and there is a particular meaning that needs to be activated. If the meaning can be activated by means of a metaphorical mapping that fits the social setting, speakers/ conceptualizers will prefer to choose that mapping (together with the linguistic expression that is based on the mapping). More simply, if the social setting involves an element that is an instance of an appropriate source domain, speakers are likely to use that source domain.

2.5. The effect of the immediate cultural context on metaphor use

The social setting can be relatively easily distinguished from the cultural context when we have to deal with social roles, social relations, and social power. However, the social setting is less clearly distinguishable from what I call the “cultural context” in many other cases. The situation I wish to describe in this section is probably more cultural than social, in that it lacks such straightforward social elements and characteristics as power, relations, and roles.

Consider the following example taken from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, in which Bill Whalen, a professor of political science in Stanford and an advisor to Arnold Schwarzenegger, uses metaphorical language concerning the actor who later became the governor of California:

“Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald Reagan, but the first Arnold Schwarzenegger,” said Bill Whalen, a Hoover Institution scholar who worked with Schwarzenegger on his successful ballot initiative last year and supports the actor’s campaign for governor.

“He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a whole sea of immigrant body builders who are coming here to run for office. This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not ‘Attack of the Clones.’” (*San Francisco Chronicle*, A16, August 17, 2003)

Of interest in this connection are the metaphors *He’s a unique commodity* and particularly *This is ‘Rise of the Machine,’ not ‘Attack of the Clones.’* The first one is based on a completely conventional conceptual metaphor: PEOPLE ARE COMMODITIES, as shown by the very word *commodity* to describe the actor. The other two are highly unconventional and novel. What makes Bill Whalen produce these unconventional metaphors and what allows us to understand them? There are, I suggest, two reasons. First, and more obviously, it is because Arnold Schwarzenegger played in the first of these movies. In other

words, what sanctions the use of these metaphorical expressions has to do with the knowledge that the conceptualizer (Whalen) has about the topic of the discourse (Schwarzenegger), as discussed in a previous section. Second, and less obviously but more importantly, he uses the metaphors because these are movies that, at the time of speaking (i.e., 2003), everyone knew about in California and the US. In other words, they were part and parcel of the immediate cultural context. Significantly, the second movie, *Attack of the Clones* does not feature Schwarzenegger, but it is the key to understanding of the contrast between individual and copy that Whalen is referring to.

Given this knowledge, people can figure out what Whalen intended to say, which was that Schwarzenegger is a unique individual and not one of a series of look-alikes. But figuring this out may not be as easy and straightforward as it seems. After all, the metaphor *Rise of the Machine* does not clearly and explicitly convey the idea that Schwarzenegger is unique in any sense. (As a matter of fact, the mention of machines goes against our intuitions of uniqueness.) However, we get this meaning via two textual props in the text. The first one is a series of statements by Whalen: “Arnold Schwarzenegger is not the second Jesse Ventura or the second Ronald Reagan, but the first Arnold Schwarzenegger” and “He’s a unique commodity – unless there happens to be a whole sea of immigrant body builders who are coming here to run for office.” What seems to be the case here is that the speaker emphasizes the idea of individuality *before* he uses the MACHINE metaphor. But not even this prior emphasis would be sufficient by itself. Imagine that the text stops with the words “...This is ‘Rise of the Machine.’” I think most native speakers would be baffled and have a hard time understanding what Whalen intended to say in this last sentence. Therefore, in order to fully understand the discourse we badly need the second textual prop, which is: “not ‘*Attack of the Clones*’”. It is against the background of this phrase that we understand what the metaphorical expression *Rise of the Machine* might possibly mean.

In other words, in this case we have an entirely novel (but contextually motivated) metaphor in the discourse. In order to understand the meaning of this metaphorical phrase we need support from the neighboring linguistic context. In the present example, it is provided in the form of the two contextual props discussed above.

3. The combined effect of factors on metaphor use

For the sake of the clarity of analysis, I have tried to show the relevance to the selection of discourse metaphors of each of the factors one by one. But this does not mean that in reality they always occur in an isolated fashion. As a matter of fact, it is reasonable to expect them to co-occur in real discourse. For example, a person’s concerns, or interests, as a factor may combine with additional knowledge about himself or herself, as well as the topic of the discourse, and the three can,

in this way, powerfully influence how the conceptualizer will express himself or herself metaphorically. The next and final example demonstrates this possibility in a fairly clear way.

In the period from January to March, 2008, there was heated debate in Hungarian society about whether the country should adopt a health insurance system, similar to that in the U.S.A., based on competing privately-owned health insurance companies, rather than staying with a single, state-owned and state-regulated system. As part of the debate, many people volunteered their opinion on this issue in a variety of media, the Internet being one of them. As I was following the debate on the Internet, I found an article that can serve, in my view, as a good demonstration of a situation in which one's use of metaphors in a discourse is informed by a combination of factors, not just a single one.

A Hungarian doctor published a substantial essay in one of the Hungarian news networks about the many potential undesirable consequences of the proposed new privatized system. He outlines and introduces what he has to say in his essay in the following way (given first in the Hungarian original):

Dolgozatom a gondolkodási időben született.
 Célkitűzése a törvény várható hatásainak elemzése.
 Módszereiben az orvosi gondolkodást követi.
 A magyar egészségügyet képzeli a beteg helyzetébe.
 Kezelőorvosnak a kormányt tekinti, és konzulensként a szakértőket illetve a szerzőt magát kéri fel.
 A prognózis meghatározás feltételének tekinti a helyes diagnózist.
 Végül röviden megvizsgálja van-e alternatív kezelési lehetőség.

Here's an almost literal translation of the text into English (I have used quotation marks for cases where there is no clear equivalent for a Hungarian word or expression in English or I am not aware of one):

This paper was born in the period when people think about the issue.
 Its objective is to analyze the expected effects of the law.
 In its methods, it follows the way doctors think.
 It imagines Hungarian healthcare as the patient.
 It takes the government as the attending physician, and invites experts and the author (of the article) himself to be the consultants.
 It considers the correct diagnosis to be the precondition for predicting the prognosis.
 Finally it briefly examines if there is an alternative possibility for treatment.

Unless the author of the article deliberately wishes to provide an illustration for the use of metaphors in discourse and/or has read Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By*, and/or, even less likely, that s/he has read my *Metaphor in Culture* (and I doubt that either of these is the case), this is a remarkable example of how a combination of contextual factors can influence the way we

often speak/write and think metaphorically. The author of the article is a doctor himself/herself, we can assume s/he has a great deal of interest in his/her job (s/he took the trouble of writing the article), and s/he is writing about Hungarian healthcare. The first of these is concerned with what I called knowledge about the speaker/conceptualizer; the second corresponds to personal concern, or interest (related to the speaker); and the third involves what was called the topic of the discourse. It seems that the three factors are jointly responsible for the way the author uses metaphors in the discourse (and, given this example, for how s/he, in addition, actually structures what s/he says). Needless to say, many other combinations of factors can be imagined and expected to co-occur in and influence real discourse.

4. An extended view of metaphorical creativity

We are now in a position to discuss two important issues regarding metaphorical creativity. First, we can ask what the sources of metaphorical creativity are, and second, we can try to tackle the issue of the role of the communicative situation in metaphorical creativity.

4.1. What are the sources of metaphorical creativity?

The “standard” version of CMT operates with largely uncontextualized or minimally contextualized linguistic examples of hypothesized conceptual metaphors. The conceptual metaphors are seen as constituted by sets of mappings between the source and the target domains. The mappings are assumed to be fairly static conceptual structures. The linguistic metaphors that are motivated by such static correspondences are entrenched, conventional expressions that eventually find their way to good, detailed dictionaries of languages. Dictionaries and the meanings they contain represent what is static and highly conventional about particular languages. In this view it is problematic to account for metaphorical creativity. How does this somewhat simplified and rough characterization of “standard” CMT change in light of the work reported in this paper?

If we look at metaphors from a discourse perspective and if we try to draw conclusions on the basis of what we have found here, we can see three important sources of metaphorical creativity. The first is the type of creativity that arises from the source domain (in its source-internal and source-external versions), the second derives from the target domain, and the third emerges from the context. Since I have discussed the first two elsewhere (cf. Kövecses, 2005), I’ll deal with the third type only.

The third type of metaphorical creativity is what I called “context-induced” creativity. To the best of my knowledge, apart from some sporadic instances (such as Aitchison, 1987; Benczes, 2010; Koller, 2004/2008; Kövecses, 2005; Semino, 2008), the issue of context-induced metaphorical creativity has not been systematically in-

vestigated. A considerable portion of novel metaphorical language seems to derive from such contextual factors as the immediate linguistic context, knowledge about discourse participants, physical setting, and the like. It remains to be seen how robust the phenomenon is and whether it deserves serious further investigation. Based on an informal collection of data from a variety of newspapers, it appears that the context provides a major source of motivation for the use of many novel metaphors. These metaphors are clearly not, in Grady's (1999) classification, either resemblance or correlation-based cases. They seem to have a unique status, in that they are grounded in the context in which metaphorical conceptualization is taking place.

4.2. The role of context in metaphorical creativity

Many of the examples of unconventional metaphoric language we have seen in this paper could simply not be explained without taking into account a series of contextual factors. Five such factors have been identified, but possibly there are more. My claim is that in addition to the well studied conceptual metaphors and metaphorical analogies used to convey meanings and achieve rhetorical functions in discourse, conceptualizers are also very much aware and take advantage of the various factors that make up the immediate context in which metaphorical conceptualization takes place.

The *linguistic context* is constituted by the various conceptual frames (including temporary mental spaces) and symbolic units (form-meaning pairs, or, simply, words) representing and activating the frames. Metaphorically-used expressions (i.e., metaphoric symbolic units) are placed into this flow of frames and words at appropriate points in the manner explained in the discussion of several of the examples. Thus the most immediate context in which metaphorical expressions are used is the linguistic context; more specifically and precisely, the frames that immediately precede and provide the slot into which linguistic metaphors can be inserted. This flow of discourse can be imagined as a line of successive (though not necessarily temporally arranged) frames (with the frames commonly nested in more general frames).

The *major entities that participate in the discourse* are the speaker/ conceptualizer, the topic, and the hearer/ conceptualizer. The speaker and the hearer are both also conceptualizers in the sense that both the production and understanding of discourse requires the activation of literal, metonymic, and metaphoric frames. More importantly for the present purpose, the speaker may have, sometimes detailed, knowledge about him- or herself, the hearer, and the topic. As we have seen, in the case of the speaker this knowledge need not be conscious. The knowledge the speaker has about these entities may form the basis of the use of both conventional and unconventional metaphors in discourse.

Discourses do not occur in a vacuum. The three types of situations that I have considered in the paper include the *physical environment*, the *social setting*, and the *immediate cultural context*. This means that the speaker and the hearer are

communicating about a topic (i.e., producing and reproducing a discourse) in a specific and immediate physical, social, and cultural context. The use of metaphors is affected by less specific and less immediate contexts as well, such as the “broader cultural context” (cf. Kövecses, 2005), but this larger context was not the focus of this paper. Moreover, as was noted above, each of these contextual factors comes in a variety of distinct forms, and they can shade into each other. Finally, all the factors can affect the use of metaphors in discourse simultaneously, and they can do so in various combinations.

We can imagine the three factors as frames that are nested in one another, such that the physical setting as the outermost frame includes the social frame that includes the cultural frame, where we find the speaker/ conceptualizer, the hearer/ conceptualizer, and the topic, as well as the diagram for the flow of discourse. These contextual factors can trigger, singly or in combination, the use of conventional or unconventional and novel metaphorical expressions in the discourse. We can represent the joint workings of these factors in the diagram below:




Figure 1: The influence of contextual factors on discourse

As noted, all the factors can trigger the use of metaphors in discourse. In some cases, the contextual factors will simply lead to the emergence and use of well-worn, conventional metaphorical expressions, but in others they may produce genuinely novel expressions. We can call this mechanism the “pressure of coherence,” a notion I introduced elsewhere (Kövecses, 2005). The pressure of coherence includes all the mechanisms that lead to the use of particular metaphors in discourse. The core idea is that we try to be coherent, in addition to the body, with most of the other, especially contextual, factors that regulate what we say and think.

5. Conclusions

The paper has examined the interrelations among the notions of metaphor, discourse, and creativity. Several important connections have been found.

First, metaphorical creativity in discourse can involve several distinct cases: a) the case where a novel source domain is applied or novel elements of the source are applied to a given target domain (source-induced creativity); b) the case where elements of the target originally not involved in a set of constitutive mappings are utilized and found matching counterparts in the source (target-induced creativity); c) the case where various contextual factors lead to novel metaphors (context-induced creativity).

Second, context plays a crucial role in understanding why we use certain metaphors as we produce discourse. Conceptualizers seem to rely on a number of contextual factors when they use metaphors in discourse. The ones that have been identified in the paper include the immediate linguistic context, the knowledge conceptualizers have about themselves and the topic, the immediate cultural context, the social context, and the physical setting. Since all of these are shared between the speaker and hearer (the conceptualizers), the contextual factors facilitate the development and mutual understanding of the discourse.

Given the evidence in the paper, we can conclude that conceptualizers try and tend to be coherent not only with their bodies (as is the case with correlational metaphors) but also with the various facets of the context in the course of metaphorically conceptualizing the world.

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Joanna Pędzisz, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland

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Verbalisierung des Wissens über Bewegungsqualitäten im zeitgenössischen Tanz: Fallstudie

Verbalization of Knowledge about Movement Qualities in Contemporary
Dance: Case Study

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Bewegungskomponenten (Raum, Gewicht, Zeit, Fluss) in der Bewegungsanalyse von Rudolf Laban sind miteinander verbunden und voneinander abhängig. Zeitgenössische Tänzer*innen als Lehrende formulieren Instruktionen, die sich auf alle qualitativen Eigenschaften einer Bewegung beziehen, was als Verbalisierung von Wissen um Bewegungsqualitäten gilt. Es ist stark individualisiert und von Fähigkeiten, Ausbildung und Erfahrung eines Tänzers/einer Tänzerin abhängig. Das Ziel des Artikels ist es, das Repertoire der sprachlich externalisierten Formen des Fachwissens zu definieren, die während der zeitgenössischen Tanzworkshops verwendet werden. Die Fallstudie konzentriert sich auf die Bestimmung, auf welche Bewegungskomponenten mittels den von Tanzlehrenden verwendeten Metaphern Bezug genommen wird.

Schlüsselwörter: Bewegung, Rudolf Laban, (Re-)Konstruktion von Bedeutung, Verbalisierung von Wissen, Exponenten des Fachwissens

ABSTRACT

The components of movement (space, weight, time, flow) in Laban's Analysis of Movement are connected and dependent of each other. A contemporary dancer as a teacher realizes instructions related to the all qualitative properties of movement. This is the verbalization of knowledge about the qualities of movement, strongly individualized, dependent on the skills, education and experience of the dancer.

The aim of the article is to define the repertoire of the knowledge exponents, which are using during a contemporary dance workshops. The case study will focus on determining which components of movement are indicated by metaphors used by dance teachers.

Keywords: Movement, Rudolf Laban, (re)construction of meaning, verbalization of knowledge, knowledge exponents

Joanna Pędzisz, Katedra Lingwistyki Stosowanej, Instytut Językoznawstwa i Literaturoznawstwa, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, ul. Sowińskiego 17, 20-040 Lublin, joanna.pedzisz@mail.umcs.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0931-8387>

1. Einführung

„Ich trete in den Boden ein; Ich sammle den Körper“. Teilnehmer*innen von zeitgenössischen Tanzworkshops denken nicht darüber nach, auf welche Tanztechnik oder welches Bewegungskonzept sich die Instruktionen von Tanzlehrenden beziehen. Das liegt am Profil der Tanzworkshops, während deren es sich nicht darum handelt, Bewegungen zu kategorisieren und einer bestimmten Tanzschule zuzuordnen. Im Fokus des Interesses befinden sich Entwicklung motorischer Koordination, Realisierung von Bewegungssequenzen, Erkennung der Intention von realisierten Bewegungen, Körperwahrnehmung und -bewusstsein in Bewegung, Entwicklung der Achtsamkeit und Handlungsbereitschaft sowie die Präsenz des Körpers im dreidimensionalen Raum. Deswegen haben Tanzlernende eine Bewegung aufgrund einer verbalen Instruktion als eines auditiven Stimulus (Frydrysiak, 2017, S. 172) und einer von Tanzlehrenden vollzogenen motorischen Demonstration als einer visuellen Information zu realisieren. Allerdings können Tanzlehrende die realisierten Tanztechniken benennen, z. B. Release-Technik, Body Mind Centering®, obstruction technique, polnische Tanztechnik, oder sich auf Personen aus der Tanzwelt beziehen, die die Entwicklung verschiedener Tanzkonzepte prägten, z. B. Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, William Forsythe oder Rudolf Laban. Der Letzte steht im Mittelpunkt der hier präsentierten Ausführungen. Es steht außer Frage, dass seine Worte: „Wir sollten in der Lage sein, alle Bewegungen zu machen, die wir uns vorstellen können [...]“ (Wojnicka, 2010/2011, S. 4)¹ den Kern seiner langjährigen Arbeit an der Analyse und Beschreibung der Bewegung des menschlichen Körpers bilden.

2. Konzept der Bewegung nach Rudolf Laban

Rudolf Laban analysierte Bewegungsformen, während er mit Kabarett und Boulevardtheatern in Paris zusammenarbeitete. Damals unternahm er seine ersten Versuche, ein System der Bewegungsnotation zu entwickeln (Wojnicka, 2010/2011, S. 5). Laban wandte sich gegen die damals modische Rückbesinnung auf antike Wurzeln und begann, den menschlichen sich bewegenden Körper zu erforschen (S. 6). Er erkannte, dass der Mensch Harmonie mit der Natur und dem Kosmos braucht, um sich zu entfalten. Die Bewegung ist hingegen ein gemeinsamer Nenner dieser drei Elemente. Er assoziierte Bewegungen des menschlichen Körpers mit Rhythmus, Vibration, Pulsation, Anspannung und Entspannung und Zirkulation. Position und Stabilität galten als statische Werte, die nach Laban illusorisch waren (S. 7–8).

Laban konzentrierte sich auf die Elemente der Körperbewegung und den Antrieb (Effort), die im Folgenden besprochen werden, auf die Bedeutung der Bewe-

¹ Alle Übersetzungen aus dem Ursprungstext von der Verfasserin des vorliegenden Beitrags.

gung, ihre äußere Form und innere Motivation sowie ihren Wert für den geistigen und emotionalen Zustand eines Menschen. Laban interessierte sich für Körperteile, die sich in bestimmte Raumrichtungen bewegen, Dauer der Bewegung und die für die Ausführung einer Bewegung eingesetzte Energie.

Laban beschäftigte sich auch mit der räumlichen Struktur von Bewegung, die Raumharmonielehre oder Choreutik genannt wurde, und Dynamik des Bewegungs- und Tanzrhythmus, die zuerst Eukinetik und später Antrieb (Effort) bezeichnet wurde (S. 11). Im Falle von Choreutik ließ sich Laban von der Formstruktur der Natur inspirieren. Er stellte fest, dass die Qualität der Bewegung in verschiedene Raumrichtungen den Kräften der Natur ähnlich ist. Infolgedessen definierte er unterschiedliche Konstellationen von Richtungen mit einer bestimmten Ordnung von Bewegungsabläufen. Er schrieb die Richtungen in kristallähnliche Strukturen ein (S. 18): „So his idea of choreutics, or the practical study of space harmony, is based on a distinction between general space, in the way geometry or topology might define space, and space as a field of relations produced by the moving body” (Sutil, 2013, S. 176).

Laban lenkte die Aufmerksamkeit auch auf die Aktivierung der multisensorischen Wahrnehmung, in der eine visuelle Wahrnehmung nicht mehr als ein primäres Phänomen betrachtet wird. Er wies auf die wichtige Rolle der Propriozeption und der Hörreize bei der Konstruierung von Bewegungssequenzen in einem bestimmten Raum hin. Gleichzeitig bemühte er sich, andere Modalitäten zu identifizieren, die die räumliche Harmonie ausmachen würden.

Choreutics is a vision of space movement that involves a multisensory perception: vision is not only trained to produce sight perception, but also a motional perception (proprioception), as well as an audial-spatial sense. Laban claims that when seeing space harmonically he is also thinking space in terms of sound relations or musical harmonic relations. Laban’s conception of harmony is therefore key to understanding to what extent his approach crosses over modalities of sensation as well as artistic disciplines (Sutil 2013, S. 177).

Rudolf Laban schuf ein Begriffsraster, mit dessen Hilfe Bewegungsqualitäten identifiziert und bezeichnet werden. Rudolf Laban differenziert demnach Aspekte des Rhythmus wie a) Raum-Rhythmus (space rhythm), dank dem verschiedene Bewegungsabläufe in Form- und Richtungskonfigurationen vollzogen werden (Wojnicka, 2010/2011, S. 15), b) Zeit-Rhythmus d. h. eine zeitliche Beziehung zu der vorangegangenen und der darauf folgenden Bewegung, und c) Gewicht-Rhythmus, also Grad der Muskelspannung (S. 15).

Er unterschied auch grundlegende Entwicklungsmuster des motorischen Apparats: a) Atem; b) core-distal-connectivity; c) head-tail-connectivity; d) upper-lower-connectivity; e) body-half connectivity; f) cross-lateral-connectivity (S. 33–37).

Der schon erwähnte Antrieb (Effort) wird von Laban definiert, um den Energieeinsatz von Tänzer*innen zu analysieren und ihn mit den vier Bewegungsfaktoren und den vier grundlegenden Bewegungsqualitäten – Raum (space), Gewicht (weight), Zeit (time) und Fluss (flow) – in Beziehung zu setzen. Laban identifizierte deswegen die Eigenschaften des Antriebs, die durch das Prinzip der Opposition geprägt werden:

- begrenzt (bound) oder frei (free), die durch Fluss (flow) bestimmt werden;
- schwer/ heftig (strong) oder leicht (light), wenn Gewicht (weight) berücksichtigt wird;
- schnell (quick) oder anhaltend (sustained), wenn Zeit (time) die Bewegungsqualität bedingt;
- direkt/ gerichtet (direct) und indirekt (indirect) im Falle der Bewegung im Raum (S. 40–42).

Thus, to understand a dynamospheric movement one has to consider dynamics which Laban categorised in relation to the four basic properties (effort factors) of any effort-action, that is, Weight, Space, Time and Flow - each of which is in turn divided into a subcategory of oppositions known as effort elements (heavy-light, direct-indirect, quick-slow, free-bound) (Sutil, 2013, S. 179).

Dank der Verknüpfung dieser Kategorien und der Differenzierungen der Beziehungen zwischen ihnen betont Laban die Dynamik der Bewegung und berücksichtigt gleichzeitig die von Tänzer*innen realisierte Intention der Bewegung. Sie werden mit einer bestimmten Spannung, einem bestimmten Gewicht, in einem bestimmten Raum in einer bestimmten Zeit ausgeführt. Laban bezeichnete diese Gesamtform der Bewegung *die innere Haltung* (inner attitude) (Sutil, 2013, S. 179; Wojnicka, 2010/2011, S. 40).

3. Wissensvermittlung im zeitgenössischen Tanz

Zeitgenössische Tänzer*innen als Tanzlehrende realisieren sprachliche Handlungen in Form von Instruktionen bezüglich der Eigenschaften, der Qualitäten und der Komponenten von Bewegungen. Sie sind stark individualisiert und hängen von den Fähigkeiten, der Ausbildung und der Erfahrung der Tänzer*innen ab. Unter Berücksichtigung der von Warnke und Spitzmüller (2008, S. 26–27) vorgeschlagenen analytischen Kategorien verfügen zeitgenössische Tänzer*innen über das Expertenwissen.

Im Mittelpunkt der im Weiteren präsentierten Ausführungen befindet sich eine der definierten analytischen Kategorien der linguistischen Diskursanalyse, nämlich Metaphernlexeme. Ihre Identifizierung zielt darauf ab, die Verbalisierung des Wissen um Bewegungsqualitäten im zeitgenössischen Tanz zu definieren und die Funktionen der Metaphernlexeme zu erkennen.

Sprachen, Kulturen und Texte stehen mit bestimmten Menschen und mit ihrem Wissen im Zusammenhang (F. Grucza, 2006, S. 20). Angesichts dessen wird der zeitgenössische Tanz als kein homogenes Phänomen betrachtet, das auf der Ausdrucksebene kodifiziert ist. Zeitgenössische Tänzer*innen lassen sich durch verschiedene Bereiche menschlicher Aktivitäten (östliche Kampfkünste oder Kampfsportarten, Konzeptualismus, Psychologie, Astronomie etc.) inspirieren. Zeitgenössische Tanzpraktiken sind oft als das Ergebnis von Erfahrungen mit sensorischen – visuellen, taktilen, olfaktorischen, auditiven, propriozeptiven – Reizen, mit physischer Interaktion mit der Umgebung, mit der motorischen und Wahrnehmungsaktivität des Körpers zu sehen. Von daher gelten die Instruktionen als Realisierung des Idiolektivs eines/ einer konkreten zeitgenössischen Tänzers/Tänzerin und sprachlicher Ausdruck des individuellen Wissens, mit dem zeitgenössische Tänzer*innen auf die von Laban definierten Bewegungsqualitäten Bezug nehmen.

Im Kontext der Tanzworkshops wird das Wissen um Bewegungsqualitäten zum Fachwissen, das im Kommunikationsgefüge Experten (Tanzlehrende) – Laien (Tanzlernende) vermittelt wird. Zum Ziel der Experten ist es, relevantes Fachwissen effektiv einem Kommunikationspartner zu übertragen, der dieses Wissen nicht oder im unzureichenden Maße besitzt, aber (bewusst oder unbewusst) benötigt (Heller & Engberg, 2017, S. 119). Der Geltungsbereich des Fachwissens umfasst nach Bajerowska (2014, S. 35) a) das Objekt (sein Gegenstand); b) die Eigenschaften des Gegenstandes, auf die sich dieses Wissen bezieht und c) die Beziehungen zwischen den Eigenschaften dieses Gegenstandes. In dem hier erörterten Fall wird zum Gegenstand des Fachwissens die Bewegung im zeitgenössischen Tanz. Als seine Eigenschaften werden die Qualitäten der Bewegung betrachtet. Das Fachwissen umfasst die Beziehungen zwischen den Qualitäten, Komponenten und Eigenschaften der ausgeführten Bewegung.

Hervorhebung verdient die Tatsache, dass

jeder Mensch sein eigenes Fachwissen unter dem Einfluss spezifischer Reize (z. B. mittels den von Spezialisten formulierten und externalisierten Fachtexten – jeder Spezialist erschafft sein Fachwissen auf der Grundlage des Idiofachwissens² anderer Spezialisten – selbst generiert (rekonstruiert) (Bajerowska, 2014, S. 33).

Die Wissensvermittlung erfolgt mittels entsprechend aufbereiteten Fachtexten. Ihre Herstellung wird auf spezifische Art und Weise vollzogen (Niederhauser, 1997, S. 109). Die im Folgenden präsentierten Instruktionen werden als Exponenten (materiell d. h. sprachlich externalisierte Formen) des Fachwissens (S. Grucza,

² Der Ausdruck „Fachwissen“ bezieht sich in seiner ersten Bedeutung auf das konkrete Fachwissen eines konkreten Fachmanns, das als „Idiofachwissen“ bezeichnet wird. Das Fachwissen ist also, wie jedes (andere) Wissen auch, zuerst das konkrete Fachwissen eines konkreten Menschen, d. h. eines konkreten Fachmanns (S. Grucza, 2010, S. 37).

2008, S. 17), eine Art Wissensrepräsentation (F. Grucza, 1997, S. 12) angesehen. In der Fallstudie manifestieren sie einen bestimmten Bereich des Fachwissens um Bewegungsqualitäten, haben eine Form von Äußerungen, die von Tanzlehrenden als Spezialisten formuliert und externalisiert werden.

Im Fokus befindet sich deswegen die Frage, mit welchen Exponenten das Fachwissen von zeitgenössischen Tänzer*innen manifestiert wird. Verwenden sie konkrete Begriffe oder greifen sie eher auf Strategien wie Inhaltsreduktion, Textdichtereduktion, vereinfachte Syntax, angemessene Ausdrucksstruktur, Bilder und Visualisierungen, Personalisierung etc. zurück? (Woźniak, 2018, S. 215) Tanzlehrende arbeiten mit einer heterogenen Gruppe von Laien. Deswegen muss die strukturell-funktionale Ebene von Instruktionen so formuliert werden, dass Kommunikationskonflikte vermieden werden (Baumann, 1998, S. 730). Es handelt sich hier um die Optimierung des Zieltextes, d. h. die formale und inhaltliche Anpassung an die kognitiven Bedürfnisse und Fähigkeiten sowie das Ausgangswissen der Adressaten (Göpferisch, 1998, S. 888). Um die Spezifik von Exponenten (Bajerowska, 2014, S. 8–9) zu erkennen, wird in der Fallstudie der Frage nachgegangen, welche Bewegungseigenschaften mit den Metaphernlexemen bezeichnet werden, welche Funktion die identifizierten Metaphernlexeme haben und welche Wissensbestände um Bewegungsqualitäten sie aktivieren.

In der Fallstudie werden die angeführten Beispiele von Instruktionen der Tanzlehrenden aus Sicht der Bewegungsanalyse von Rudolf Laban interpretiert. Der von ihm geschaffene Begriffsapparat gilt als Filter für die (Re-)Konstruktion der Bedeutungen dieser Instruktionen.

Die Instruktionen werden in einem sehr spezifischen Kontext und einer bestimmten Situation formuliert. Deswegen ist für die Bestimmung des methodologischen Rahmens der Fallstudie nicht ohne Bedeutung die Unterscheidung zwischen dem innerem und dem äußeren Kontext, d. h. der konkreten Situation, in der Texte formuliert und rezipiert werden (S. Grucza, 2008, S. 16).

Anhand dessen wird die (Re-)Konstruktion der Bedeutungen von Instruktionen der zeitgenössischen Tänzer*innen durch die bereits erwähnten Lebens- und Kommunikationserfahrungen der Tanzlehrenden, Erfahrungen in der Leitung der Tanzworkshops und Kenntnisse über die Welt, über die Tanzlernenden und ihre Erfahrungen mit dem zeitgenössischen Tanz, Möglichkeiten ihrer Körper, sowie durch die spezifische Situation der Tanzworkshops geprägt. Tanzworkshops, ihr Ziel, die Phase der Workshops, die Form der Arbeit mit dem Körper, das Konzept des Körpers in der Bewegung, im Raum und in der Relation mit anderen Körpern sind Determinanten (re)konstruierter Bedeutungen.

4. Fallstudie

Das Forschungskorpus umfasst sprachliche Handlungen von zwei zeitgenössischen Tänzern, die Tanzworkshops in Centrum Ruchu des Lubliner Tanztheaters

im Februar 2019 durchführten. Die Analyse der sprachlichen Handlungen umfasst: 1) den Rhythmusaspekt; 2) die Eigenschaften des Antriebs; 3) die daraus resultierenden Bewegungsqualitäten und 4) die sechs Entwicklungsmuster des motorischen Apparats.

Beispiel Nr. 1: Tlehr1: „Lass Hände los, lass das Gewicht los!“³

Beispiel Nr. 2: Tlehr1: „Das Gewicht in den Boden loslassen“

Beispiel Nr. 3: Tlehr1: „Lass Schultern nach unten!“

Hier wird der Aspekt des Gewicht-Rhythmus hervorgehoben. Tlehr1 weist darauf hin, dass Tlern ihre Schultern entspannen. Das Verb „loslassen“ bezeichnet die Richtung der ausgeführten Körperbewegung nach unten und soll zur Entspannung der Arme und Schultern sowie das Schweregefühl im Unterkörper hervorrufen.

Mit der Verwendung des Imperativs des Verbs „loslassen“ wird auch der Zeit-Rhythmus hervorgehoben, dank dem eine gleich lange Bewegung entsteht. Tlehr1 akzentuiert das Verb „loslassen“, was die Eigenschaften des Antriebs prägt. Nach dem Begriffsraster von Laban wird die Bewegung quick, direct, strong und free.

Da die Bewegung mit dem Ausatmen ausgeführt wird, kann Tlehr1 auf zwei Muster der Entwicklung des motorischen Apparats Bezug nehmen: breath und upper-lower-connectivity.

Beispiel Nr. 5: Tlehr1: „Greif nach oben, schlag dich in den Boden hinein, drücke dich vom Boden ab“.

Die zitierte Aussage enthält drei Instruktionen, die auf den ersten Blick widersprüchlich sein können. Der Raum-Rhythmus wird in der gesamten Phrase hervorgehoben. Der Körper bewegt sich in zwei Richtungen: nach oben („Greif nach oben [...], drücke dich vom Boden ab“) und nach unten ([...] „schlag dich in den Boden hinein“, [...]). Die Verben verweisen auf unterschiedliche Zeit- und Gewicht-Rhythmus. Durch das Greifen nach oben ist die Bewegung direct, sustained, bound und light. Die Verwendung des Verbs „greifen“ manifestiert die Reichweite und Dauer der Bewegung. Dank dem gleichzeitigen Abdrücken vom Boden und dem Hineinschlagen in den Boden ist die Bewegung strong, quick, bound und direct. Der Körper ist in der Lage, die so beschriebene Bewegung auszuführen, da sie auf zwei Entwicklungsmuster zurückzuführen ist: 1) upper-lower-connectivity: das ist eine Bewegung, in der der Körper einerseits der Schwerkraft folgt ([...] *schlage dich in den Boden hinein*) und andererseits gegen die Schwerkraft wirkt (*Greife nach oben, drück dich vom Boden ab* [...]). Dabei werden gleichzeitig Ober- und Unterkörper aktiviert (Wojnicka, 2010/2011, S. 35); 2) core-distal-

³ Alle Beispiele werden von der Verfasserin des Beitrags wörtlich übersetzt, um das Wesen der Ausdrücke wiederzugeben. Die Abkürzung „Tlehr“ steht für Tanzlehrende, „Tlern“ steht hingegen für Tanzlernende.

connectivity als Muster der Körperbewegung vom Zentrum zur Peripherie, die Hände und Füße bilden (S. 33). Das Zentrum des Körpers liegt im Becken, was die gleichzeitige Beteiligung des Ober- und Unterkörpers ermöglicht, d. h. einerseits das Greifen mit erhobenen Armen und Händen und andererseits eine stabile Position der Füße.

Beispiel Nr. 6: Tlehr1: „Bis eine Tabletop-Position. Streck aus. Steißbein, Kopf in der Opposition. Löst auf. Nach unten“.

Mit der Instruktion „Bis eine Tabletop-Position. Streck aus. Steißbein, Kopf in der Opposition“ [...] wird der Raum-Rhythmus hervorgehoben. In der Tabletop-Position sind die Linien relevant, die gestreckte Beine und Arme und eine aktivierte Wirbelsäule bilden. Tlehr1 weist mit der Verwendung des Verbs „ausstrecken“ auf die Länge und Anspannung hin. Das Verb betont auch die Dauer, die Aktivität des Körpers und den dynamischen Charakter der Position. Da diese Position viele Muskeln aktiviert, erfordert sie einen hohen Muskeltonus. Die Bewegung wird *direct, strong, sustained* und *bound*.

Tanzlernende realisieren eine Bewegung, die auf das Entwicklungsmuster *head-tail-connectivity* zurückzuführen ist, was explizit ausgedrückt wird: „Steißbein und Kopf in der Opposition“ [...]. Das Gefühl, dass der Kopf vom Steißbein entfernt ist, verstärkt das Bewusstsein der langen Linien, die der Körper bildet.

Die Instruktion „Löst auf [...] Nach unten“ weist auf eine Veränderung der Bewegungsqualität hin. Der Gewicht-Rhythmus ändert sich. Das Verb „auflösen“ bezeichnet eine Veränderung des Aggregatzustandes. Der Körper soll sich entspannen und runtergehen. Dadurch ändert sich der Raum-Rhythmus. Da die Auflösung zeitlich gedehnt ist, können der Bewegung Qualitäten wie *direct, sustained, light, bound* zugeschrieben werden. Die Bewegung folgt dem Muster *upper-lower-connectivity*.

Beispiel Nr. 14: Tlehr2: „Ich verschmelze in den Boden“.

Beispiel Nr. 15: Tlehr2: „Verschmelzt langsam mit dem Partner!“

Die Verwendung des Verbs „verschmelzen“ entspricht der Definition im Duden-Wörterbuch: „durch Schmelzen und Zusammenfließen lassen miteinander verbinden, durch Schmelzen und Zusammenfließen zu einer Einheit werden“⁴. „Langsam“ betont die Kontinuität dieses Prozesses. Die Instruktionen verweisen auf den Gewicht-, Raum- und Zeit-Rhythmus. Mit dem Verb „verschmelzen“ wird metaphorisch die Aufforderung der Muskelentspannung ausgedrückt, auf die Tanzlernende geduldig warten. Beim Prozess der Entspannung helfen der Boden

⁴ <https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/verschmelzen> (abgerufen am 26.6.2022).

und der Partner. Infolge dessen entsteht eine Bewegung, die *strong, direct, free, sustained* ist.

Diese Bewegung kann auf das Entwicklungsmuster – den Atem – zurückgeführt werden. Das Ausatmen, das aus biologischer Sicht das Zwerchfell und die Atemmuskulatur des Brustkorbs entspannt, führt dazu, dass der Körper schwer wird und die Körperoberfläche den Kontakt mit dem Boden bzw. mit anderem/anderer Tanzlernenden hat.

Beispiel Nr. 16: Tlehr2: „Ich versuche mit jeder Bewegung so viel Raum wie möglich zu essen“.

Ein Raum ist für Tanzlernende ein Bezugspunkt für die Positionierung des Körpers. Im Raum und dem Raum gegenüber führen Tanzlernende ihre Bewegungen aus. Sie interagieren mit dem Raum und ihre Aufmerksamkeit wird auf den sich im Raum bewegenden Körper oder auf den Raum selbst gelenkt.

In dem Beispiel wird der Raum zum Objekt, das Tanzlernende manipulieren. Der metaphorische Ausdruck „mit jeder Bewegung [...] Raum [...] essen“ bedingt die Bewegungsqualität. Um so viel Raum wie möglich zu essen, muss eine Bewegung in verschiedene Richtungen und auf unterschiedliche Ebenen (Raum-Rhythmus) ausgeführt werden, sodass sich einzelne Körperteile an den entferntesten Punkten der Kinesphäre befinden. Da das Essen eine Bewegung „nach innen“, „zu sich“ impliziert, bezieht sie sich auf das Muster *core-distal-connectivity* und setzt eine Bewegung von den peripheren Händen, Füßen, Fingerspitzen zum Zentrum voraus. Diese Bewegung kann den Grad des Muskeltonus bestimmen. Je kleinere Muskelspannung es ist, desto größere Reichweite der Bewegungen kann beobachtet werden. Deswegen sind der Bewegung die Qualitäten: *free, light, indirect, quick* zuzuschreiben.

Beispiel Nr. 17: Tlehr2: „Ich trete in den Boden ein“.

Das Beispiel zeigt, dass der Raum als ein Objekt betrachtet wird, das seine Grenzen hat und der sich bewegende Körper mit ihm interagiert. Das Eintreten suggeriert das Überschreiten der Grenze eines Raums: „in einen Raum hineingehen oder hereinkommen; einen Raum durch eine Tür betreten“⁵. Aber in Kontakt mit dem Boden passt sich der Körper an die Härte seiner Oberfläche an. Das Verb „eintreten“ hebt die Dauer dieser Handlung oder die Sequenzialität dieser Bewegung hervor, die nur dann möglich sind, wenn kein hoher Muskeltonus vorhanden ist. Die Bewegung ist *direct, free, strong* und *quick*. Ein entspannter Körper muss sich beim Kontakt mit einer harten Oberfläche der Schwerkraft unterwerfen. Der freie Fluss reduziert den Kraftaufwand, der erforderlich ist, um den Körper durch

⁵ <https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/eintreten> (abgerufen am 24.6.2022).

den Raum zu bewegen. Eine harte Oberfläche ist eine Barriere, der der Körper ausgesetzt ist.

Beispiel Nr. 18: Tlehr2: „Ich sammle den Körper“.

Anhand der Definition des Verbs „sammeln“ (an einem Ort zusammenkommen lassen, Dinge, für die man sich interessiert, zusammentragen⁶) lässt sich das Entwicklungsmuster core-distal-connectivity erkennen. Mit dieser Instruktion wird die Bewegung von der Peripherie der Kinesphäre zum Zentrum, d. h. dem Bereich des Beckens und des Unterbauches bezeichnet. Mit dem Verb *sammeln* wird der Zeit-Rhythmus betont, weil die Bewegung dauert. Die Instruktion bezieht sich auch auf ein anderes Entwicklungsmuster, den Atem. Während der Ausatmungsphase werden die peripheren Körperteile näher zum Zentrum herangeführt. Aus biologischer Sicht erzeugt eine verlängerte Ausatmung viel mehr Energie, die der Körper für diese Bewegung verwenden kann. Diese Bewegung kann folgende Merkmale haben: free, quick, light, direct.

5. Schlussfolgerungen

Die Fallstudie zielt darauf ab, die effiziente Verwendung des Begriffsapparats, den Rudolf Laban im Zuge seiner Reflexion über Bewegung schuf, zu demonstrieren. Die angeführten Beispiele von Instruktionen der Tanzlehrenden beziehen sich auf die von Laban spezifizierten Bewegungsqualitäten und können Aspekten des Rhythmus und der Qualität des Antriebs zugeordnet werden. Alle Instruktionen lassen sich auch auf die Entwicklungsmuster des Bewegungsapparates zurückführen.

Die Auswahl von sprachlichen Exponenten, die metaphorisch das Fachwissen um die Bewegungsqualitäten manifestieren, resultiert aus der Tatsache, dass die Exponenten an keine einheitliche Terminologie gebunden sind. Die Instruktionen sind keine Terminologie im Sinne derjenigen, die Bestandteil von Fachwörterbüchern ist. Sie sind materiell externalisierte Formen des Fachwissens (S. Grucza, 2008, S. 17–18).

Dank der Rekonstruierung der Bedeutungen von metaphorisch ausgedrückten Instruktionen ist es auch möglich, die Funktion der so ausgedrückten Beschreibungen von Bewegungsqualitäten zu identifizieren. Die hier präsentierte Reflexion richtet deswegen den Fokus auf die Etablierung der Relation zwischen dem sprachlich externalisierten Fachwissen und auf das dadurch kreierte Verhältnis zwischen Tanzlehrenden und -lernenden.

Tanzlehrende fordern Tanzlernende auf, konkrete Bewegungen auszuführen. Dominierend ist die informative Funktion der Instruktionen. Die Tatsache, dass Tlehr1 und Tlehr2 sowohl Indikativformen (Beispiele Nr. 14, 16, 17, 18) als auch

⁶ <https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/sammeln> (abgerufen am 24.6.2022).

Imperativ (Beispiele Nr. 1, 3, 5, 6, 15) verwenden, zeugt von der Aktivierung von bestimmten Strukturen, Regeln und Operationen um dadurch ihr Bild als Personen zu kreieren, die über die Handlungen der Tanzlernenden entscheiden. Das ergibt sich aus ihrer Rolle im Kommunikationsgefüge Tanzlehrende (Experten) – Tanzlernende (Laien). Tlehr1 und Tlehr2 schlagen auch Tanzlernenden die Handlungen vor, die dem Konzept der Körperbewegung entspricht, das unter den zeitgenössischen Tänzer*innen am häufigsten als *organisch* bezeichnet wird. Tlehr1 und Tlehr2 beschreiben in meisten Fällen metaphorisch möglichst natürliche Körperbewegungen, die mit der Funktionsweise des Körpers, seiner Physiologie, anatomischen und biologischen Aspekten übereinstimmen.

Hervorhebung verdient noch die Tatsache, dass die vorgeschlagenen Bewegungen auch den Möglichkeiten des Körpers eines/ einer konkreten Tanzlehrenden entsprechen. Ihre Qualitäten werden aufgrund der körperlichen und sozio-kulturellen Erfahrung und der von den Tanzlehrenden repräsentierten Bewegungspraktiken entwickelt. Tlehr1 praktiziert Yoga, deswegen basiert er in seiner Tanzpraktik auf der gleichzeitigen Aktivierung des Ober- und Unterkörpers (Beispiele Nr. 5, 6) sowie auf der Stabilisierung der Position (Beispiele Nr. 1, 2, 3). Tlehr2 verbindet Release-Technik und Floorwork mit der zeitgenössischen Tanztechnik (Beispiele Nr. 14, 15, 17, 18). Der enge Zusammenhang zwischen dem Tanz-Praktizieren, dem Tanz-Praktizieren-Lehren bestätigt dementsprechend die Embodiment-These von Johnson und Lakoff (2002, S. 249): „Mind is embodied, meaning is embodied and thought is embodied in the most profound sense. This is the substance of an embodied realism“.

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Robert Kiełtyka, University of Rzeszow, Poland

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In Search of Metonymic Motivation for Semantic Change: The Case of Words with Remarkable Origins

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to account for the semantics of selected terms of Germanic, Romance and Arabic origin, labelled by the editors of the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* as the “top ten words with remarkable origins”, which initially referred to objects, animals, places and later started to be employed figuratively in various human- and nonhuman-related contexts. The theoretical framework adopted in the research embraces such tools offered by Cognitive Linguistics as conceptual metaphor and metonymy. The paper attempts to explain the conceptual motivation behind the semantics of the targeted terms. The results of the research may be said to corroborate not only the conceptual nature of metaphors/metonymies as such but also their impact on social cognition. Keywords: conceptual metaphor, conceptual metonymy, metonymic chain, source, target

1. Introduction

Metaphor and metonymy are regarded as important conceptual mechanisms motivating semantic change (see, for example, Traugott, 2012). Sometimes a metaphorical or metonymic sense starts to dominate which may, in turn, cause the loss of a literal sense, while in other cases it becomes a new sense functioning next to the literal one. As a result, a lexical item may develop several metaphorical and metonymic senses over time.

When analysing the historical meaning development of words, one may face a number of obstacles. One of them might be cases of loanwords enriching the lexicon of English with only the figurative senses characterising their donor languages, which leads to the problem of interpretation of the metaphorical or metonymic senses found in their English form. It is, therefore, not always clear whether the meanings found in the English versions of the borrowings should be regarded as figurative or literal. In this account, I delve into individual semantic histories of both originally Germanic lexemes in which the transition of meaning from literal to figurative can easily be established and those in the case of which the figurative senses have been borrowed from such languages as Italian, French or Arabic.

Robert Kiełtyka, Zakład Współczesnego i Historycznego Językoznawstwa Angielskiego i Porównawczego, Katedra Anglistyki, Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Al. mjr. W. Kopisto 2 B, 35-315 Rzeszów, rkiełtyka@ur.edu.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3287-8582>

The aim set to this paper is thus to account for the semantics of the “top” ten (see section 3) English terms of Germanic, Romance and Arabic origin with surprising origins (*trivia, hazard, muscle, avocado, handicap, fiasco, slapstick, bedlam, eavesdrop, phon(e)y*) which are used figuratively in various human- and nonhuman-related contexts. An attempt is made to show in what way the mechanisms of conceptual metaphor and metonymy may be used to account for the semantic motivation of the analysed words. Being inspired by Paradis (2011, p. 2), I refer to the concept of metonymization which “involves the use of a lexical item to evoke the sense of something that is not conventionally linked to that particular item”. It will become clear in later sections of the paper that a vast majority of the terms subject to analysis seem to have developed figurative senses due to the activation of the mechanism of metonymization which holds between senses. The ultimate conclusion one may arrive at is that this mental process may be regarded as “a key mechanism in semantic change” (Paradis, 2011, p. 1).

The article is organized as follows. Firstly, I briefly present the methodology, namely the cognitive framework adopted in the paper (section 2), the way I have obtained the data for my investigation (section 3), similar research (section 4) and the contrastive perspective from which the “top ten” terms used in the research are investigated (section 5). The analysis proper (section 6) is conducted with the aid of the methodological tools offered by the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm. Last but not least, the major findings, conclusions, and implications for future research may be found in the paper’s final section.

2. Methodology

In this account, I refer to the theory of conceptual metaphor proposed originally by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) which was later modified by a number of scholars (e.g., Kövecses, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2020) and conceptual metonymy (e.g., Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Radden & Kövecses, 1999; Littlemore 2015). I follow the definition of metaphor advocated by Kövecses (2015, p. ix) for whom

conceptual metaphors consist of sets of systematic correspondences, or mappings between two domains of experience and [...] the meaning of a particular metaphorical expression realizing an underlying conceptual metaphor is based on such correspondences.

In turn, the view of conceptual metonymy pursued in this paper is that proposed by Kövecses (2006, p. 99) for whom

metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual element or entity (thing, event, property), the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity (thing, event, property), the target, within the same frame, domain or idealized cognitive model (ICM).

The mechanism of metonymization as discussed by Paradis (2011) seems to be instrumental in semantic change. Due to this mechanism, a lexical item is used to embody the sense of something that is not normally connected with that particular lexical item.

Some of the semantic developments analysed in this paper seem to be motivated by more than one metonymic projection, that is a series of metonymies known as metonymic chains. The term metonymic chain or chained metonymy has been used in research on metonymy by a number of researchers, for example, Barcelona (2005), Brdar (2015), Fass (1991), Hilpert (2007), Kiełtyka (2018), Kiełtyka and Grząsko (2022), Nerlich & Clarke (2001), Radden and Kövecses (1999), Reddy (1979), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2008). Hilpert (2007, p. 80) argues that some of the studies mentioned above are, first and foremost concerned with metonymies involving multiple conceptual shifts, breaking up “complex conceptual mappings into simple, well-motivated mappings with a strong experiential basis” (p. 80). As for metonymic chains, Hilpert (2007, p. 81) emphasises the fact that the English expression *with an eye on NP* (a noun phrase) is polysemous, conveying ‘vision’, ‘attention’, and ‘desire’. The proposed model of metonymic chains (eye → vision → attention → desire) naturally accounts for this polysemy, since people tend to watch the things they pay attention to, and pay attention to the things they desire. The semantics of some of the lexical items addressed in my research seem to be accounted for in terms of metonymic chains, which involve more than one conceptual shift.

3. The corpus

The corpus of data subject to analysis is obtained from the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* website whose editors, in the section “Words at Play”, discuss their “top” ten words with remarkable origins.

Two sources were consulted to find the frequency of use of the analysed terms: the Google search engine and the *Corpus of Contemporary American English*. The order of the terms ranked according to their frequency of use in the Google search engine is depicted in Table 1.

Table 1. The frequency of use of the “top” ten words with remarkable origins – results obtained from the Google search engine

Term	Number of occurrences
<i>muscle</i>	6,930,000,000 results
<i>trivia</i>	1,030,000,000 results
<i>hazard</i>	917,000,000 results
<i>handicap</i>	598,000,000 results
<i>avocado</i>	529,000,000 results
<i>fiasco</i>	42,300,000 results

<i>phony/ phoney</i>	30,600,000 results / 4,750,000 results
<i>eavesdrop</i>	20,000,000 results
<i>slapstick</i>	14,400,000 results
<i>bedlam</i>	9,120,000 results

Table 2 presents the frequency of use of the analysed words in the *Corpus of Contemporary American English*.

Table 2. Frequency of use of the analysed words in the *Corpus of Contemporary American English*

Term	Frequency of use in the corpus
<i>hazard</i>	6336 hits
<i>phony / phoney</i>	4959 hits / 408 hits
<i>handicap</i>	3110 hits
<i>trivia</i>	2789 hits
<i>fiasco</i>	2541 hits
<i>avocado</i>	2442 hits
<i>muscle</i>	2317 hits
<i>eavesdrop</i>	609 hits
<i>slapstick</i>	575 hits
<i>bedlam</i>	487 hits

A cursory glance at the frequency of use of the terms subjected to analysis provided both by the Google search engine and the *COCA* corpus shows that, although the results obtained from the two sources differ, the “top” ten terms selected by the editors of the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* enjoy considerable productivity

4. Similar research

Allan (2014, 2015) provided inspiration for this paper. She discussed the loss of literal senses of conceptual metaphors and the sense development of borrowed metaphor. Some of the lexical items discussed in the paper have been borrowed into English with already figurative senses (e.g., *hazard*, *avocado*, *fiasco*, *muscle*, *trivia*), others, like the native *eavesdrop*, *slapstick*, *phon(e)y*, *handicap* and *beldam* developed figurative senses in the course of their semantic development in English.

Moreover, the papers by Paradis (2011) and Koch (2012), which emphasise the role of metonymy in semantic change, have been additional stimuli in my research into the history of the words analysed in this paper. Finally, the paper “Metonymy as a prototypical category” by Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) deserves a mention because it offers an interesting treatment of metonymy, a conceptual mechanism responsible for several semantic changes discussed in this research. Last but not

least, the research conducted by Nerlich and Clarke (2001), emphasising the role of the so-called serial metonymy or metonymic chains in both synchronic and diachronic investigations, inspired my research which also focuses on the presence of chained metonymy as a mechanism leading to semantic changes in the terms analysed in the paper.

5. The “top” ten terms of remarkable origin from a contrastive perspective

Using the *Online dictionary* website I have searched more than 100 languages in six different groups (European, Asian, Middle-Eastern, African, Austronesian and other languages) in order to indicate the range of use of the analysed lexical items (*trivia, hazard, muscle, avocado, handicap, fiasco, slapstick, bedlam, eavesdrop, phon(e)y*) provided by <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/top-10-words-with-remarkable-origins-vol-1/fiasco>.

It is important to emphasise the fact that taking into consideration the differences between the Roman script and the writing systems of Asian languages, I decided to disregard the latter ones. In these cases, the numbers provided should be interpreted as rough estimates. The results of my research (which unfortunately for space reasons cannot be reproduced here in detail) have shown that the words *fiasco* and *avocado* are present in more than 60 different languages. The lexical item *bedlam* can be found in about 50 languages, while *trivia(l)* in circa 32 languages. Details are shown in Table 3.

Even a glance at the data listed in Table 3 makes it possible to claim that such terms as *fiasco* and *avocado* enjoy an almost universal status cross-linguistically, which, in all likelihood, may result from the interaction between different cultures. One can naturally emphasise the role of Latin (e.g. *muscle*), but also Romance languages as exemplified by Italian (e.g. *fiasco*) and French (from which *hazard* entered English). As far as European languages are concerned, we may safely say that nearly half of the words provided by <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/top-10-words-with-remarkable-origins-vol-1/fiasco> may be said to have attained near-universal status: *fiasco* may be found in 88% of European languages, *avocado* in 83%, *trivia* in 60%, *handicap* in 54% and *muscle* in 52% of this group of languages. A possible reason for this status quo is the fact that languages sharing similar or the same cultural roots naturally have a lot in common, which may result in the presence of similar or virtually identical forms of some lexical items in the analysed languages. Various cultures around the world have their own traditions or customs and, as a result, their conceptualization of certain notions/phenomena is similar.

Table 3. Distribution of the analysed lexical items across languages of the world

	European languages (42) ¹	Asian languages (36) ²	Middle-Eastern languages (4) ³	African languages (13) ⁴	Austronesian languages (10) ⁵	Other languages (3) ⁶
<i>trivia(l)</i> ⁷	25	≤ 3	0	≤ 1	0	3
<i>hazard</i>	1	0	0	1	1	0
<i>muscle</i>	22	≤ 3	≈ 1	≤ 1	0	2
<i>avocado</i>	35	≤ 13	2	≤ 5	5	2
<i>handicap</i>	23	≈ 4	1	≈ 4	≈ 1	2
<i>fiasco</i>	37	≤ 10	≤ 1	≤ 11	4	2
<i>slapstick</i>	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results
<i>bedlam</i>	15	≤ 15	≈ 1	12	3	0
<i>eavesdrop</i>	5	≤ 7	0	8	≈ 6	0
<i>phoney</i>	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results	no dictionary results

¹ The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Albanian, Basque, Belarusian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Catalan, Corsican, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, Frisian, Galician, German, Greek, Hungarian, Icelandic, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Luxembourgish, Macedonian, Maltese, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Scots Gaelic, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, Swedish, Tatar, Ukrainian, Welsh, and Yiddish.

² The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Armenian, Azerbaijani, Bengali, Chinese Simplified, Chinese Traditional, Georgian, Gujarati, Hindi, Hmong, Japanese, Kannada, Kazakh, Khmer, Korean, Kyrgyz, Lao, Malayalam, Marathi, Mongolian, Myanmar (Burmese), Nepali, Odia, Pashto, Punjabi, Sindhi, Sinhala, Tajik, Tamil, Telugu, Thai, Turkish, Turkmen, Urdu, Uyghur, Uzbek, Vietnamese.

³ The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Arabic, Hebrew, Kurdish (Kurmanji), Persian.

⁴ The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Afrikaans, Amharic, Chichewa, Hausa, Igbo, Kinyarwanda, Sesotho, Shona, Somali, Swahili, Xhosa, Yoruba, Zulu.

⁵ The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Cebuano, Filipino, Hawaiian, Indonesian, Javanese, Malagasy, Malay, Maori, Samoan, Sudanese.

⁶ The languages provided by the online dictionary <https://www.indifferentlanguages.com/> in this section are as follows: Esperanto, Haitian Creole, Latin.

⁷ The search for the term *trivia* produced no results, hence the related *trivial* was the subject of investigation.

6. Analysis

6.1 Semantic change motivated by metaphor: *muscle*

According to the *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* (henceforth: *M-W*), the word *muscle* ‘a body tissue consisting of long cells that contract when stimulated and produce motion’ is etymologically related to the Latin *musculus* meaning ‘little mouse.’ Its first known use in English recorded by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (henceforth: *OED*) dates back to the end of the 14th century (“1398 J. Trevisa tr. Bartholomaeus Anglicus *De Proprietatibus Rerum* (BL Add.) f. 21 þe vertu þat hatte animalis motiva meueþ þe sinewis, muscules [L. *musculos*], brayn”). A possible reasoning here is that a flexed muscle, for example a bicep, was conceptualised by ancient Romans in terms of a rodent called mouse hidden or moving beneath the skin of an athlete. In this case, one may refer to a physical resemblance operation in which mappings are established between the source domain of ANIMAL and the target domain of OBJECT. The conceptual metaphor responsible for the semantics of *muscle* may be formalised as OBJECTS (resembling animals in appearance) ARE ANIMALS (A MUSCLE IS A MOUSE).

6.2 Semantic change motivated by metonymy: *fiasco*, *handicap*, *trivia*, *avocado*, *hazard*, *phon(e)y*

Available etymological sources (see the *OED*) inform us that Italian *fiasco* ‘bottle, flask’ is related to Late Latin *flasca*, *flascō* ‘bottle, container’, Frankish *flaska* ‘bottle, flask’ and Proto-Germanic **flaskō* ‘bottle’. As the *OED* quotation shows: “The figurative use of the phrase *far fiasco* [literally: to make a bottle] in the sense ‘to break down or fail in a performance’ is of obscure origin”. Italian etymologists have pointed to the fact that when Venetian glassblowers noticed a flaw in a glass work of art, they downgraded it into an ordinary bottle, that is a mere *fiasco*. In this way *fiasco* ‘a downgraded work of art’ acquired the extended or generic meaning ‘complete failure’. This sense is evidenced by the following *OED* quotation: “1855 Ld. Lonsdale in *Croker Papers* (1884) III. xxix. 325 Derby has made what the theatrical people call a *fiasco*”. It clearly shows that the word enriched the lexicon of English in the middle of the 19th century.

As far as the conceptual motivation behind the delineated changes in meaning is concerned, one may argue that the development of the literal sense ‘to make a bottle’ (‘to produce something with a flaw’) into the figurative one ‘to break down or fail in a performance’ is a case of general ACTION FOR ACTION metonymy, while the change of the sense ‘a downgraded work of art’ into the generic meaning ‘complete failure’ seems to result from the working of the metonymic projection OBJECT FOR RESULT OF USING THIS OBJECT. In other words, an ordinary glass bottle, being a result of a failure to produce a glass work of art, provides mental access to failure in general which seems to be an application of SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC METONYMY.

As we learn from *M-W*, the historical meaning development of the Germanic lexical item *handicap* began more than 400 years ago with a technique called *hand in cap* which was a method for exchanging items of unequal value. As part of this exchange, it was proposed that the owner of the more precious item should receive some money to make the act of bartering fair. The people involved in the exchange had to deposit money into a hat, put their hands there and then remove them either with or without money in order to show whether or not they agreed on the conditions of the deal. The earliest recorded evidence for the use of *handicap* provided by the *OED* dates from the 17th century: “1660 S. Pepys *Diary* 19 Sept. (1970) I. 248 Some of us fell to *Handycapp*, a sport that I never knew before, which was very good”. One may argue that the word’s original sense resulted from the working of conceptual metonymy verbalized as ACTION FOR ACTION, in which putting a hand in a cap provides mental access to a transaction associated with it.

The sense ‘a race in which a designated umpire or official determines, according to the horses’ known or assumed ability, what weight has to be carried by each in order to equalize their chances’, which, according to the *OED*, developed in the course of the 18th century is also motivated by a metonymic projection OBJECT (WEIGHT) FOR EFFECT PRODUCED BY CARRYING IT. In turn, the more recent sense ‘a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult’ seems to be motivated by SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC metonymy in which a specific instance of carrying extra weight by stronger horses in order to equalise their chances with weaker ones causing a specific disadvantage is generalised and understood figuratively as a disadvantage in general.

Another lexical item whose meaning development is metonymy-based is that of *trivia*. The *M-W* dictionary specifies that in ancient Rome, a *trivium* was an intersection of three roads (*tri* ‘three’ + *vium* ‘road’). People who met at such an intersection usually discussed *trivialis*, that is ‘inconsequential things’. This association of an intersection with things discussed in its vicinity led to the rise of the modern meaning of *trivia* ‘unimportant matters’ (*M-W*).

The word entered English quite late as the first documented use in the *OED* goes back to the first part of the 20th century (“1920 *Glasgow Herald* 21 July 8 His [*sc.* Mr. Bennett’s] method suggests the amount of human interest and knowledge that may lurk in the *trivia* of holiday experience”). The conceptual motivation behind the analysed meaning development is a metonymic projection of the type OBJECT (*trivium* ‘an intersection of three roads’) for SOMETHING ASSOCIATED WITH THAT OBJECT (discussing *trivialis* ‘inconsequential things’).

The lexical item *avocado* is a modification of Spanish *aguacate*, from Nahuatl *ahuacatl*, short for *ahuacacuahuitl*, literally, ‘testicle tree’, from *ahuacatl* ‘testicle’ + *cuahuitl* ‘tree’. The *M-W* dictionary points to the use of the fruit as an aphrodisiac which may have influenced its name as a fruit of a testicle tree. The first known use in the *OED* in the sense ‘the fruit of a West Indian tree (*Persea*

gratissima)’ goes back to the 17th century: “1697 W. Dampier *New Voy. around World* vii. 203 The *Avogato* Pear-tree is as big as most Pear-trees the Fruit as big as a large Lemon”. This word is therefore a late borrowing into the lexicon of English.

As far as the conceptual motivation for the semantics of *avocado* is concerned, one may point to the working of two metonymies verbalised as WHOLE FOR PART ((testicle) tree for its fruit) and OBJECT FOR EFFECT PRODUCED BY THIS OBJECT (fruit for aphrodisiac). Since both testicles and aphrodisiacs are responsible for hormone levels and the increase of blood flow in the body, the name of the fruit originated as a metonymic reference to testicles.

Apart from *handicap*, another example of a lexeme which originated in games is *hazard*. The word dates to the time of the Crusaders and involves a game of chance. According to the *M-W*, the original *hazard* (*al-zahr*, in Arabic) was a die. Players of this game of chance would roll the dice and bet on the result. If we adopt the view that the original meaning of *al-zahr* first refers to a die and later to a game which involved the use of a die we may look for its motivation in conceptual metonymy of the type AN OBJECT FOR ACTION/A SET OF ACTIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF THIS OBJECT (a die for a game).

The English version of the word spelt *hazard* was borrowed from French at the beginning of the 14th century (see the *OED* quotation: “c1300 *Havelok* (Laud) (1868) l. 2326 Leyk of mine, of *hasard* ok, Romanz reding on þe bok”) with the sense “a gambling game with two dice in which the chances are complicated by a number of arbitrary rules”.

Further meaning development of the word is also metonymic. In the 16th English, it came to mean ‘any chance, risk, or source of danger’ (a sense quoted from the *M-W*) ‘risk, danger, jeopardy’ (a sense quoted from the *OED*). In this case the metonymic projection responsible for the rise of the new sense can be verbalised as GAME FOR RISK/DANGER RELATED TO PLAYING THIS GAME.

In contradistinction to English, Polish *hazard* ‘gambling’ is also metonymically related to the sense ‘game’; however, the metonymic projection highlights the act of playing for stakes in the hope of winning rather than the risk involved. The metonymy which motivates this sense seems to have the form: GAME FOR THE ACT OF PLAYING.

Yet another interesting example of metonymic motivation for semantic change involves the rise of the figurative meaning of *phony* whose original sense was related to something that glittered but was not gold. The development of the literal sense is based on an old British scam described by the *M-W* in the following way: “A con man would gild a brass ring to disguise it as gold, surreptitiously drop it, and then run to pick it up at the same time that an unsuspecting passerby noticed it on the ground. The scammer would then propose that the found treasure should be split between them. The one who’d “found” the ring, convinced now of its

value, would choose instead to keep the ring and pay the con artist some amount of money. That amount, of course, was a bargain for gold but a high price for brass”⁸ This gilded brass ring to be mistaken for a fake gold ring started to be called the *fawney*, later respelled as *phony*. The literal sense seems to be motivated by the OBJECT FOR OBJECT metonymy, while the figurative sense ‘fake, sham, counterfeit’ results from the SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC metonymy (a fake ring for anything that is not genuine or authentic). The first attestation of the figurative sense goes back to the end of the 19th century (the *OED*: “1893 *Chicago Tribune* 29 June 6/2 Many of the ‘phony’ bookmakers in the ring had not enough play to keep them alive”).

6.3 Semantic change motivated by metonymic chains: *eavesdrop*, *bedlam*, *slapstick*

As confirmed by the *OED*, the word *eavesdrop* is of Germanic origin. The Old English *yfesdrype*, was a combination of two nouns *eaves* ‘the edge of the roof of a building’ and the obsolete *drip* ‘a falling drop’, later respelled as the noun *drop* ‘a globule of liquid’. The first attested *OED* quotation goes back to the 9th century (“868 *Kentish Charter* in *Brit. Museum Fac-Sim.* II. plate xxxviii An folcæs folcryht to lefæne rumæs butan twigen fyt to yfæs drypæ”). As the senses of the nouns forming the compound *eavesdrop* may suggest, originally this word had nothing to do with its present-day figurative meaning, that is ‘to listen secretly to what other people are saying’ (*Oxford Learner’s Dictionary*). It was first used as a noun and, as evidenced by *M-W*, it referred to ‘the water that fell from the eaves of a house,’ then it came to mean ‘the ground where that water fell’. This change of meaning might be interpreted as resulting from the working of the conceptual metonymy SUBSTANCE FOR PLACE.

In turn, the original meaning provided by the *OED* refers to the action of ‘dripping of water from the eaves of a house’. The subsequent sense is expressed in a likewise manner, that is ‘the space of ground which is liable to receive the rain-water thrown off by the eaves of a building.’ In this respect, we might look for the motivation behind the sense change in the conceptual metonymy ACTION FOR PLACE. Now, in the case of the figurative sense ‘to stand within the ‘eavesdrop’ of a house in order to listen to secrets’, one may notice the metonymic projection PLACE FOR ACTION. Finally, the current meaning ‘to listen secretly to what is said in private’ may result from the working of the conceptual metonymy SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC. This complex development of meaning can, therefore, be accounted for by reference to the metonymic chain SUBSTANCE or ACTION FOR PLACE FOR ACTION FOR (GENERIC) ACTION. In other words, water falling from the eaves of a house, or the act of dripping of water from the eaves of

⁸ Retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/top-10-words-with-remarkable-origins-vol-1>.

a house, provides mental access to the associated place which, in turn, provides access to the action of standing within the ‘eavesdrop’ of a house in order to listen to secrets and finally the more generic action of listening secretly to what is said in private.

Let us now consider another example of a term whose semantic development was conditioned by chained metonymy. The *Hospital of St. Mary of Bethlehem* was the first asylum for the mentally ill in England. In the 16th century, one of the component words from the name of the hospital, *Bethlehem*, was respelled and used elliptically in the form *Bedlam* with reference to this institution. The following quotation from the *OED* confirms the first use of this form: “1528 W. TYNDALE *Obed. Christen Man* f. xxxvj For they doo thinges which they of Bedlem maye se, that they are but madnes”. At the same time, the metonymic projection PLACE FOR PERSON ASSOCIATED WITH THAT PLACE led to the rise of the sense ‘inmates’ of this asylum associated with the word *bedlams*. Further meaning development is also metonymically conditioned.

By the late 17th century, *bedlam* started to be used in the sense ‘a scene of wild uproar or confusion’ motivated by the conceptual metonymy PERSON FOR EVENT. This sense emerged when, as argued by Flavell and Flavell (1993, p. 44), “during the eighteenth century, for a small entrance fee, visitors were admitted to ogle and jeer at the inmates, chained in their cells. Such sport was disruptive and noisy bouts of disorder must have been commonly witnessed, so that *bedlam* came to be used figuratively to describe scenes of commotion and uproar”. Therefore, the semantic development of *bedlam* seems to be motivated by the metonymic chain PLACE FOR PERSON FOR EVENT.

According to *M-W*, the reason why physical comedies were often described as *slapstick* is that original *slapsticks* ‘sticks used for slapping’ were used by the comedians of 16th century Italy. The *OED* defines the word as ‘two flat pieces of wood joined together at one end, used to produce a loud slapping noise; specifically, such a device used in pantomime and low comedy to make a great noise with the pretence of dealing a heavy blow.’ It was documented for the first time in the *OED* towards the end of the 19th century: “1896 *N.Y. Dramatic News* 4 July 9/3 What a relief, truly, from the slap-sticks, rough-and-tumble comedy couples abounding in the variety ranks”.

The conceptual motivation behind the original sense of the word seems to result from the activation of conceptual metonymy verbalised as OBJECT FOR INSTRUMENT (used for making a noise imitating a blow). Metonymic projection is also responsible for the emergence of a later sense defined by the *M-W* dictionary as ‘comedy that depends for its effect on fast, boisterous, and zany physical activity and horseplay (such as the throwing of pies, the whacking of posteriors with a slapstick, chases, mugging)’. Its first attestation provided by the *OED* dates back to the beginning of the 20th century (“1926 *Amer. Speech* 1 437/2 *Slap-stick*, low

comedy in its simplest form. Named from the double paddles formerly used by circus clowns to beat each other”). The metonymic projection alluded to above may be formalised as OBJECT/INSTRUMENT FOR EVENT (in which this object or something associated with this object is used). Consequently, the changes which characterise the semantic evolution of *slapstick* may be said to result from the activation of the metonymic chain OBJECT FOR INSTRUMENT FOR EVENT.

7. Concluding remarks

I hope to have managed to show that the conceptual motivation for the semantics of the “top” ten terms analysed in this paper should be sought in the activation of conceptual metaphor and metonymy. As the conducted analysis shows, the lexical items under scrutiny may be divided into three groups according to the mechanisms that motivated the creation of their meanings. The research proves that it is mainly conceptual metonymy that accounts for the semantic motivation of the targeted lexical items. Thus, it turns out that conceptual metonymy is the mechanism that played a substantial role in the development of the meaning of *trivia*, *hazard* and *phony* in which single metonymic projections may be identified. The conceptual metonymies that lead to the rise of individual senses include, among others, OBJECT FOR SOMETHING/ACTION ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OBJECT (*hazard*, *trivia*) or OBJECT FOR OBJECT (*phony*).

The semantic development of some of the analysed terms seems to be motivated by the working of groups of consecutive metonymies exemplified by OBJECT FOR RESULT OF USING THIS OBJECT, ACTION FOR ACTION, SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC in the case of *fiasco*, WHOLE FOR PART and OBJECT FOR EFFECT PRODUCED BY THIS OBJECT (*avocado*), ACTION FOR ACTION, OBJECT (WEIGHT) FOR EFFECT PRODUCED BY CARRYING IT (*handicap*), AN OBJECT FOR ACTION/A SET OF ACTIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF THIS OBJECT, GAME FOR RISK/DANGER RELATED TO PLAYING THIS GAME (*hazard*) and a number of metonymic chains responsible for sense shifts in other targeted terms – OBJECT FOR ACTION FOR PLACE FOR ACTION FOR ANOTHER ACTION (*eavesdrop*), OBJECT FOR INSTRUMENT FOR EVENT (*slapstick*), PLACE FOR PERSON FOR EVENT (*bedlam*). One of the analysed terms, that of *muscle*, seems to be the result of the activation of conceptual metaphor based on physical resemblance OBJECTS ARE ANIMALS.

The paper is a pilot study indicating an interesting area of research and as such it does not aspire to cover a number of issues which still remain as potential scope for future research. One of the areas worth investigating might be the question of why some of the figurative terms subject to analysis are so commonly employed, not only in English but also in other languages, to the extent that – at least some of them – may be argued to have acquired near-universal status in a cross-linguistic perspective. As far as future research is concerned, it would also be interesting to

explore whether the terms used in different languages as shown in Table 3 have developed related or distant senses. In this respect, it would be useful to analyse the cultural models that seem to explicate both the similarities and differences in the conceptualizations of the analysed terms.

My findings indicate that some of the analysed lexical items (*fiasco*, *avocado*, *trivia*, *handicap* and *hazard*) may be said to have acquired a nearly universal cross-linguistic status, at least in European cultures. They are deeply entrenched and culture-bound terms and therefore the conceptual metonymies they embody seem to exert a strong impact on social cognition. From this it follows that one should therefore emphasise the role of embodiment and cognition in meaning construal. Being inspired by Kövecses (2017a, p. 215), I believe that the working of conceptual metaphor and metonymy may be evidenced at all levels of linguistic description, while their “important contribution to connecting mind with the body, language with culture, body with culture, and language with the brain” cannot be underestimated.

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Elżbieta Muskat-Tabakowska, Jagiellonian University of Kraków, Poland

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Cognitive Linguistics Explains What Happened to the Russian Tank

ABSTRACT

Usage-based models that underlie cognitive approach to language and grammar imply investigation of language as a dynamic tool used in interpersonal communication rather than as an abstract system of signs. Hence the linguists' interest in the language of social and mass media, with its focus upon real current situations and events.

One of such events, reported by journalists and widely commented upon, was an incident that occurred in Ukraine shortly after the Russian invasion of 24 February 2022. In one of the villages in the battle zone a group of Ukrainian civilians seized a tank from the Russian army. On the Internet, the news soon became a hit and was translated into several languages.

Focusing upon Polish, the analysis presented in the paper will show the relation between the form of those messages and their epistemological value. In the case study I will use the concept of the linguistic worldview combined with that of conceptual integration, thus substantiating the claim that theoretical framework offered by Cognitive Linguistics can be profitably used to describe, to optimize and to operationalize acts of linguistic communication.

Keywords: Cognitive Linguistics, Usage-based models, linguistic worldview, conceptual integration

1. Introduction

Usage-based models constructed within cognitive approach to language and grammar imply investigation of language as an instrument used in dynamically changing acts of interpersonal communication rather than as an abstract system of signs. In literature, the constitutive metaphor is built around the notion of “tool”. However, “instrument” seems preferable: the Google search machine (and who could resist using Google, even in a text that aspires to the status of a scholarly paper...) defines “instrument” as “a tool or implement, especially one for precision work”. Effective communication is exactly that: a precision work.

With language users aiming at effective communication, special interest of pragmatically minded linguists is in the language of social and mass media as well as in the focus upon situations and events that take place in what the media

Elżbieta Muskat-Tabakowska, Katedra UNESCO do Badań nad Przekładem i Komunikacją Międzykulturową, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Collegium Paderevianum, al. Adama Mickiewicza 9, 33-332 Kraków, elzbieta.muskat-tabakowska@uj.edu.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3676-792X>

perceive as current reality. One such event has inspired the present discussion and provided material for the analysis. In agreement with basic tenets of Cognitive Linguistics I will assume that:

- i) One of the basic cognitive mechanisms that shape and condition the use of language is metonymy; it underlies a more general process, defined as conceptual integration (blending);
- ii) Since language expressions are inherently metonymic, processing extra-linguistic contextual information is essential for understanding linguistic messages;
- iii) The context, conceived in a wide sense, is fed by a particular worldview;
- iv) Effective communication requires that the worldview is shared (at least to some extent) by senders and receivers of the message¹.

Obviously, all these issues will sound trivial to anybody conversant with the foundations of CL. In view of such lack of originality, the purpose of the analysis presented further in this paper is not to support statements that have already been amply evidenced; its aim is rather to demonstrate how the interrelation between “the said” and “the unsaid” shapes the overall meaning of the message.

2. The timeline

The incident which is discussed below reportedly occurred in Ukraine shortly after the Russian invasion of 24 February 2022: in one of the villages then in the battle zone a group of Ukrainian civilians seized a Russian tank. The event was reported by journalists and then widely commented upon in various public contexts. On the Internet the news soon became a hit.

In what follows, some reports will be analysed which appeared in the social media at the end of February and beginning of March 2022. The items discussed were representative of general trends. Rather than carry out a statistical analysis, a shift in the attitudes of the netizens will be described, such as it was manifested in the messages published on the Internet in the first weeks following the Russian invasion.

On February 27, just three days after the Russian aggression, the online version of *Głos Szczeciński* (GS) brought a sensational piece of news, provided in (1):

- (1) Podczas trwającej agresji wojsk Kremla na Ukrainę, we wsi Lubimowka nieopodal miasta Kachowka w obwodzie chersońskim (południowa Ukraina), lokalni Romowie ukradli Rosjanom czołg [During the invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin army in the village of Lubimovka near the town of Kakhovka in the Kherson region (southern Ukraine) local Roma people stole a tank from the Russians]² (Rabiega, 2022).

¹ For discussion, see e.g. Evans (2019).

² All translations from Polish are made by the author of this paper.

(1) specifies the spatio-temporal setting and the participants of the event (ongoing aggression with the Kremlin as perpetrator and Ukraine as victim; the Roma locals and the Russian tank), with the transitive construction employing canonical (unmarked) word order (SVO: subject – verb – object). The indirect object, the Dative “Rosjanom” [Russians-DAT], marks the stolen tank as situated in the “sphere of influence” of the Russians: it expresses the conceptualization of the object as being affected by the action referred to by the verb³. The *pars pro toto* metonymic reference to “Kreml” [the Kremlin] implicates Putin and his Kremlin entourage as the aggressor. As in all instances of this type of metonymy, it appeals to the readers’ background knowledge.

The next day, on February 28, 2022, the You Tube channel issued a 54-second documentary, showing an instance of civilian resistance against Russian invaders; the film included a brief footage of what was commented on as “a carrier being stolen and hauled away with a tractor”.

On the same day on the website of the farmers’ magazine *Top Agra* the journalist Dorota Kolasińska reported, as listed in (2), that:

- (2) Dziennikarz Oleg Baturin z herson.depo.ua podał krótką informację, że Romowie w miejscowości Lubimówka uprowadzili rosyjski transporter opancerzony. Ponieważ film rejestrujący to zdarzenie jest słabej jakości, niektórzy mylnie sądzą, że to czołg. W późniejszym komunikacie poinformowano, że również szybko rozebrali go na części. [The journalist Oleg Baturin provided on herson.depo.ua website brief information that in the village of Lubimovka some Roma people highjacked a Russian carrier. As the film on which the event was recorded was of poor quality, some people were mistaken in thinking that it was a tank. In a later report it was said that it was quickly taken apart] (Kolasińska, 2022).

(2) is a matter of fact report: it refers to verified, authored information and identifies the event as a case of highjacking. The mistake made when identifying the object is explained in a reasonable way, the carrier is described with the neutral adjective “Russian”, as is a probable sequel of the incident, the subsequent taking the carrier apart. The report sounds true and objective. Had it appeared on a more frequently visited and more popular website, it might have well influenced the attitudes expressed later on the media.

On March 1st, 2022, the website of the trade union *Solidarność* passed on the message of the Ukrainian website 24tv.ua, which had reported “in disbelief,” as given in (3), that:

- (3) We wsi Lubimowka Cyganie ukradli czołg. Jeszcze raz. Cyganie. Czołg. Ukradli. W ruchu. [In the village of Lubimovka Gypsies stole a tank. Once again. Gypsies. A tank. Stole. On the move] (Tysol.pl, 2022).

³ For a comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the Polish Dative semantics, see e.g. Rudzka-Ostyn (2000, pp. 97–178).

According to the website, the news was “subsequently confirmed by the Ukrainian Press Agency UNIAN” (Tysol.pl, 2022).

In contrast to (1) and (2), (3) departs from standard grammatical rules. The simple affirmative sentence appears twice (and the repetition is openly announced: “jeszcze raz” [once again], and then it is broken down into individual phrases; each phrase ends with a full stop corresponding to the falling intonation speech contour. As a result, (3) is strongly iconic: spelling mimes intonation, and intonation mimes beating a drum, which in its turn is a conventional metaphor for forcing something to be learned by someone not able and/or diligent enough, as in the expression “to drum something into someone”. Moreover, the politically correct “Roma people” is absent; it is replaced by the colloquial – and less correct – “Cyganie” [Gypsies] – a choice that will be discussed in more detail below (Section 3). All in all, the background knowledge (the war) makes the news difficult to believe (and thus requiring “drumming in”), but there is no suggestion of the item being fake news.

On March 3rd, the homepage of the TVN24 television station brought the following news, given in (4):

- (4) Ukraińska telewizja podała, że - we wsi nieopodal Chersonia na południu kraju – Romowie ukradli rosyjskim wojskom czołg. [...] Przekazała, że informacje pochodzą od lokalnych mieszkańców. W mediach społecznościowych pojawiło się nagranie, na którym widać cieszących się mężczyzn. „Okupancki czołg będzie służył Ukrainie” – mówią. [Ukrainian television reported that- in a village near Kherson in the south of the country – the Roma stole a tank from the Russian army. It said that the information comes from the local people. In social media a recording appeared showing some men enjoying the news. “The occupant tank will now serve Ukraine”, they say] (TVN24.pl.).

(4) provides less explicit information than (1) or (2), since – in view of the date of its publication - some background knowledge could be expected. The names of the village and the neighbouring town are not given (probably because they are considered identifiable or insignificant). The owners of the stolen tank are not just the “Russians” but “the Russian army”. This is a minute and seemingly insignificant change, but it announces a more relevant shift in public opinion, which was soon to appear in the ongoing public debate: the responsibility for the heinous atrocities falls on the military (of all ranks) rather than on “the Russians” at large. However, it should be pointed out that at the same time some texts that appeared in the press and other social media called for boycotting works by great Russian writers or composers.

Such is the timeline that places the Internet news selected for the following analysis in the chronological order. But there seems to be more to it than mere chronology: the data shows ways in which the formal structure of messages reflects the underlying changes of netizens’ attitudes. In the cognitivist parlance,

it shows the way in which linguistic expressions correspond to the changing perception and the resulting change of conceptualizations.

3. Stereotypes

Even though the analysis that follows is limited to a few Internet websites, using Polish in Polish social media, it points to the evolution of social response. The first days after February 24th left the Poles – as well as people all over the world – shocked and stunned. In this early period, social media provided fact-based reports, conforming to norms and conventions of the genre. Factual information was clear and explicit, as was the linguistic structuring of the information. Such are the items given in (1), (2) and (4) above. However, it might be noticed that they differ in the proportion between “the said” and “the unsaid”, i.e. the textual vs. contextual or background information.

Considering the general scale of the events, the single Lubimovka incident might seem unimportant. Yet it was quite exceptional: we all know (i.e. we share the particular element of the worldview) that during the war enemy tanks are captured and/or destroyed by the military, rather than stolen by a group of civilian villagers. Thus the information naturally provoked disbelief: Could it be a piece of fake news?, the suspicion already apparent in (2), whose author takes precautions, attributing the news to the “local people”, and expressing astonishment felt by Ukrainian reporters and most probably shared by Polish users of Internet at large.

However, from the point of view of a linguist interested in pragmatic aspects of (online) messages what is most interesting is the 31-second film, launched by the YouTube *Wujcio EDC-EkipaDuegoCiagnika Channel* on February 28. On March 1st it scored 2099 390 views; by March 3 the Internet listed 1446 comments. The film features a bearded man reporting on the Lubimovka event; the original sound track is Russian; Polish watchers are offered a Polish translation. The relevant fragment, given in (5), runs as follows:

- (5) Chodzą słuchy jakoby „Cyganie ukradli czołg”. Przyjaciele, to nie jest prawda, my go po prostu podpie**oliliśmy! [There are rumours saying that “[some] Gypsies stole a tank”. Well, my friends, this is not true: we simply fucking snatched it] (*Wujcio EDC-EkipaDuzegoCiagnika Channel*, 2022).

To begin with, one might ask whether it is a true report or fake news? The information is first classified by the narrator as rumour, but then he explicitly pronounces it to be false. But one should not jump to conclusions: at the end of the film the man admits that he “might have been or not have been” present on the stage of the crime... Interestingly, what is denied is not, as might be expected, the fact itself, but its verbal description. The verb “ukradli”, which in standard Polish conveys the idea of taking someone else’s property without permission and without the

intention to return, is replaced with its vulgar slang counterpart with an equivalent semantic load, that is, the verb “podpie**oliliśmy”. The agents are referred to as “Cyganie” – not a politically correct name, with derogatory racist undertones - in opposition to the neutral “Roma people”. The label evokes the ethnic stereotype of a Gypsy, which is enhanced by the looks of the man who appears in the film: he is a prototypical bearded, black eyed and dark skinned Roma. When describing the stereotypical image of Roma people in modern Polish press, Adam Bartosz (2007) claims that the most frequent picture of a Gypsy man in contemporary Polish media is that of a petty criminal, thief and thug; Gypsy women are believed to possess secret knowledge, e.g. to be able to tell people’s future (p. 98). In general, the stereotype is negative.

“Yet it is not merely through our own stereotypes that we look at the Gypsies; to a large extent it is the Gypsies themselves who know their image and who show themselves to us in a way in which we wish to see them” (Zambrzycka, 2010; see also Czachur, 2011, p. 89, translation mine). This is precisely the case in (5), expressing ironic self-reference and selecting a substandard verb to describe the action: the verb might be used either by the Gypsies themselves or by those upholding the stereotype.

Early on, the netizens comment on properties constitutive of the stereotype, as listed in (6) – (11):

Gypsies (but not the Roma!) steal things:

- (6) A już zacząłem się przyzwyczajać do tego, że Cyganie nie kradną... [And I was just beginning to get used to the idea that Gypsies do not steal];

Gypsies sell stolen goods:

- (7) Hej kolego, po ile masz te pojazdy, chętnie bym kupił jakąś terenówkę wojskową, ale nie czołg tylko coś mniejszego, może być bez papierów. [Hey, buddy! How much for those vehicles? I would be willing to buy a military truck, something smaller than a tank, no official documents required];

Gypsies manufacture frying pans:

- (8) Tylko nie przeróbcie go na patelnie! [But don’t make it into frying pans!];

Gypsy women are fortune-tellers:

- (9) kwadrans wcześniej jego żona wróżyła załodze tego czołgu (oczywiście nie za darmo), że wrócą do Rosji pieszo. [a quarter of an hour earlier his wife told the crew of the tank – not for free, to be sure – that they would go back to Russia on foot].

In short,

(10) ... niektórzy ludzie mówią że prawdziwych cyganów już niema to się mylą bo oto prawdziwi cyganie. [some people say real Gypsies don't exist anymore and they are mistaken because here are real Gypsies for you];

(11) Pozdrawiam serdecznie i życzę samych sukcesów. W Polsce jesteście bohaterami. [Best wishes, and I wish you all success. In Poland you are heroes].

4. Blending

Stealing, considered reprehensible, turns the Lubimovka Gypsies into war heroes. In the first week of March, this assessment came as the result of what is defined as conceptual integration, or blending, that is, meaning construction that involves creation of an integration network, in which different mental spaces, which belong to a common and more abstract domain (called generic space), are merged to produce an emergent structure endowed with a new meaning⁴. The meaning thus created is novel in that it is not contained in any of the mental spaces that are blended.

In the case under discussion the mechanism can be represented as given in Figure 1:




Figure 1: Blending model with 'Gypsies' and 'war heroes'

⁴ The reader is assumed to know the rudiments of the conceptual integration theory. For explanation, see e.g. Relevant chapters in Evans (2007).

By stealing the enemy tank, the Gypsies fight the enemy and become war heroes. In agreement with communicative strategies, irrelevant elements of the Gypsies' stereotype do not enter the blend.

(5) was meant to poke fun at the incident, and nearly all watchers treated it as a joke; it is precisely the axiological clash that accounts for the humorous effect, as illustrated in (12) – (13):

(12) Na pewno jest to pierwsza kradzież ciesząca się tak powszechną sympatią. [it is certainly the first theft that has become so popular].

(13) Chwała cyganom nie za to , że pod.....li czołg. Chwała za to, że rozbawili cały świat. [Glory to the Gypsies not because they fucking snatched the tank, but because they made the whole world laugh].

Online communication is interactive, and the discourse in which the netizens become engaged has a number of aspects. Some commentaries develop the joke, contrasting the Gypsies with the Russian tank soldiers, as illustrated in (14) – (15):

(14) no dobra, ukradłem, ale tylko frajer by nie skorzystał, trzeba było pilnować. [oh well, I did steal, but you should have watched it].

(15) Ruskie tankisty wracają do czołgu z kradzionymi komórkami, a tu бляд, куда ушел наш танк?" [The Russian tank soldiers come back with the mobiles they had stolen, and, lo and behold: "where has our fucking tank gone?"]

(14) and (15) express the new blended meaning, as illustrated in Figure 2.

The emergent meaning is that of Russian tank soldiers behaving according to the Gypsy stereotype.

Some Internet users (who have no sense of humour?) protest because they find the message to be factually erroneous, and therefore reject the information as a piece of fake news, given in (16): Prawda jest taka że czołgu nie ukradli tylko pojazd opancerzony. [the truth is they did not steal a tank but a troop carrier].

However, a more significant twist came after a few days, as people in Poland were getting more news about the atrocious behaviour of Russian troops in Ukraine. The netizens vent their protest because they find it improper to poke fun at the war, as illustrated in (17): Ludzie giną za wschodnią granicą, a Wy macie ubaw z filmiku. Brak słów na Wasze komentarze. [People are dying at the eastern border, and you have a blast watching a little film. Your comments leave me speechless].

One is reminded of McLuhan's idea: "the message of a newscast about a heinous crime may be less about the individual news story itself (the content), and




Figure 2: Blending model with 'war heroes' and 'Russian tank soldiers'

more about the change in public attitude towards crime that the newscast engenders by the fact that such crimes are in effect being brought into the home to watch over dinner" (McLuhan, 1964, as cited in Federman, n.d.).

Against the background of a large scale outrageous violence the Lubimovka incident becomes insignificant, both as a source of humour – nobody feels like laughing any more – and as a meaningful act of resistance. Frustration makes some of the watchers of the Gypsy film turn against the issue of political correctness and stereotypes that had provoked the joke, as provided in (18):

- (18) Cygan mówi o swej społeczności „Cyganie” a marksišci i poprawni politycznie z uporem maniaka powtarzają „Romowie”. Nie wiedzieć po co. AS Roma to porządny klub z Rzymu(Roma) a nie rolnicy z Dzikich Pól. [The Gypsy call their community “Gypsies” while Marxists and advocates of political correctness stubbornly repeat “the Roma”. Hard to say why. AS Roma is a decent football club from Rome (Roma), and not villagers from the Ukrainian Wilderness] (own source).

The film is now six months old, and the more recent You Tube comments are five months old, meaning that it is not commented upon, and probably not watched, any more. This is of course only natural. The question whether it has

played its role in shaping Internet users' attitudes towards ethnic stereotypes⁵, the Russian aggressors and political correctness remains open. Looking for a viable answer would require common efforts of linguists, media experts and sociologists, or, in other words, an interdisciplinary project.

Post scriptum 1. A project of this kind would profit from a contribution from the field of translation studies. The English subtitles to the "Gypsy Film" read, as given in (19): A lot of people are now saying that the Gypsies stole the tank. But friends, it's all not true: we just stupidly snatched it.

In (19) two lexemes seem objectionable: "all" rejects the original news in its entirety rather than refer to the character of the action (cf. above). The adverb „stupidly” runs counter the assessment of the tank-snatching act, made either by the agents themselves or by the general public (cf. above the comments of the viewers). Interesting as it is, a discussion of this aspect would mean going beyond the limits of this paper.

Post scriptum 2. I am sending this text to the editors on September 20, 2022. Today's *Gazeta Wyborcza* brings a report by Wieliński, entitled „Najnowocześniejszy rosyjski czołg wpadł w ręce Ukraińców” [The most modern Russian tank fell into the hands of the Ukrainians]. The tank is real, the piece is well documented, free of stereotypes. Full of hope.

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⁵ For a discussion, see e.g. Bartosz (2004, 2007).

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Yakiv Bystrov, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine
Olha Bilyk, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine
Nataliia Ivanotchak, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine
Iryna Malyshivska, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine
Nataliia Pyliachyk, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine

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Visual, Auditory, and Verbal Modes of the Metaphor: A Case Study of the Miniseries *Chernobyl*

ABSTRACT

The article examines the multimodal metaphors which actualise the concept of CHORNOBYL in the five episodes of the miniseries *Chernobyl*. The procedure of the analysis includes identifying and selecting the multimodal metaphors following the Filmic Metaphor Identification Procedure, construing and describing the structure of key and sub-metaphors with the target domain CHORNOBYL, distinguishing the modes of the domains, interpreting the meanings and attitudes that are mapped onto the target domain. The source domains DETECTIVE STORY, ESPIONAGE, DISEASE, HOSPITAL are cued via the combination of visual, auditory (sonic and musical), and verbal (written and spoken) modes.

Keywords: multimodality, conceptual metaphor, Chernobyl, visual mode, auditory mode, verbal mode

1. Introduction

Many decades have already passed since the Chernobyl disaster, but it still occupies its multifaceted space within social consciousness, producing its own myths, assumptions, and implications. Despite having been kept in secret for years, Chor-

Yakiv Bystrov, Kafedra anhliiskoi filolohii, fakultet inozemnykh mov, Prykarpatskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Vasylia Stefanyka, vul. Shevchenka, 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, Phone: 0038067046841, yakiv.bystrov@pnu.edu.ua, <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6549-8474>

Olha Bilyk, Kafedra anhliiskoi filolohii, fakultet inozemnykh mov, Prykarpatskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Vasylia Stefanyka, vul. Shevchenka, 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, olha.bilyk@pnu.edu.ua, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3973-0700>

Nataliia Ivanotchak, Kafedra anhliiskoi filolohii, fakultet inozemnykh mov, Prykarpatskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Vasylia Stefanyka, vul. Shevchenka, 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, natalie.ivanotchak@pnu.edu.ua, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8430-7752>

Iryna Malyshivska, Kafedra anhliiskoi filolohii, fakultet inozemnykh mov, Prykarpatskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Vasylia Stefanyka, vul. Shevchenka, 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, iryna.malyshivska@pnu.edu.ua, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5544-5889>

Nataliia Pyliachyk, Kafedra anhliiskoi filolohii, fakultet inozemnykh mov, Prykarpatskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Vasylia Stefanyka, vul. Shevchenka, 57, Ivano-Frankivsk, natalia.pyliachik@pnu.edu.ua, <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0642-6745>

Chornobyl issues penetrated into the global popular culture, finding their representation through different media. Though Chornobyl's presence in USSR and Post-Soviet media discourse was rather distorted and disconnected from the mainstream culture, it found its way into the literary works by not only Ukrainian writers (Kostenko, 2012; Sirota, 2013; Zabuzhko, 2020) but also foreign authors (Alexievich, 2005; Higginbotham, 2019; Leatherbarrow, 2016). Thus, "Chornobyl discourse" has appeared and it includes "the numerous official and unofficial proclamations, rumours, witness testimonies, and documental and fictional works about Chornobyl" (Hundorova, 2019, p. 6). It serves as a means of rethinking the traumatic experience which seeks new forms of expression. For example, using the nuclear apocalypse, the popular video game trilogy S.T.A.L.K.E.R. forms a different approach to how Chornobyl memory is constructed.

The denotation of "Chornobyl" is threefold. It stands for 1) the city near Kyiv; 2) the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant; 3) the catastrophe itself (Oxford Reference, 2006). In our research the concept name "Chornobyl" amalgamates all three definitions, gaining its connotation in cinematic context through the multimodal metaphors. The word "Chornobyl" has at least two ways of its spelling: Chornobyl and Chernobyl, the former being the Romanisation of the Ukrainian spelling and the latter – of the Russian one. In our research, we stick to the variant Chornobyl, still using Chernobyl when referring to the film under study.

HBO's five-part miniseries *Chernobyl* (2019) reintroduced the world to the nuclear catastrophe, renewing public interest to the cultural memory of Chornobyl. The events of the film take place around the Chornobyl disaster that happened at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in 1986. The five episodes of the series encompass the time a few minutes before the explosion and a two-year period after it describing the liquidation efforts that followed. The miniseries depicts the stories of the people of different backgrounds – plant workers, the authorities, scientists, firefighters, miners, and Prypiat locals. The film offers a powerful combination of expert analysis with real facts and dramatic plotlines featuring personal stories. Such representation of the Chornobyl disaster reinforced by vivid computer graphics and sound effects makes the film especially appealing and thought provoking.

The Chornobyl disaster is studied in different fields of research but it received little investigation in cognitive linguistics. As multimodal metaphor is a powerful tool to explore concepts in films, this paper aims at to construct the CHORNOBYL concept via multimodal metaphorical expressions in a five-part miniseries. The study focuses on analysing the stance-constructive meaning of each metaphor with a view to establishing a wider range of perceptions evoked by the target domain CHORNOBYL. Moreover, the multimodal metaphor theory is highly implemented in studying TV commercials and the Internet memes (Koller, 2009; Urios-Aparisi, 2010). The world's perception of the Chornobyl catastrophe is

construed not only by purely scientific records but also by dynamic and vivid cinematic images which together with sonic and verbal manifestations feature strong emotional load. This research is a contribution to multimodal studies as it provides an in-depth analysis of modes and their combinations construing the multimodal metaphors with the CHORNOBYL target domain in HBO's miniseries *Chernobyl*. What is more the study will help to deepen the understanding of so sensitive an issue as the Chernobyl tragedy.

2. Material and Methods

2.1. The Overview of Chernobyl Legacy

Personal accounts of the Chernobyl tragedy were firstly presented in *Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster* (titled *Chernobyl Prayer: A Chronicle of the Future* in the UK) by Svetlana Alexievich (2005), the winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature. The book consists of interviews taken from people affected by the explosion, revealing personal emotions, attitudes, memories which they still live with.

Serhii Plokyh presented a great insight into the Chernobyl catastrophe in his book *Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy* (2018) from the very meltdown in 1986 to 2018 when the new shelter over the ruined reactor was constructed. Studying embodied and engendered writing after nuclear disaster, Emily Jones (2017) states that narrative structures in Christa Wolf's *Accident: A Day's News*, "an atomized narrative that both criticises and lauds technology's ability to shape human life" (p. 93), represent the repercussions of the disaster in its entirety. Tamara Hundorova explores the topic of Chernobyl in the context of the "post-Chernobyl library" which she sees as a number of varied texts that mark a "postapocalyptic narrative" in Ukrainian literature (Hundorova, 2019). Using a great deal of theoretical approaches and frame works in her doctoral dissertation, Haley J. Laurila analyses "how memory of nuclear disaster is conditioned in a variety of ways through multimodal and multifaceted interactions and encounters with Chernobyl in film, literature, tourism, and memorial practices" (Laurila, 2020, p. 276). The latest research on the Chernobyl disaster by Vardanian focuses on the investigation of how the cultural memory and traumatic experience are presented in children's fiction via its imagery (Vardanian, 2021, pp. 1–17).

2.2. Multimodal Metaphor Studies

Within the framework of film study, the works on multimodal metaphor are still sparse (Bort-Mir, 2019; Eggertsson & Forceville, 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2016; Whittock, 1990). The developing interest in the analysis of metaphors in movies is stimulating due to fact that the latter are a great source of material for cognitive research.

The paradigm of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) introduced by Lakoff and Johnson and developed in more recent scholar researches (Bilyk, Bylytsia, Doichyk, Ivanotchak, & Pyliachyk, 2022; Bystrov, 2014; Cammaerts, 2012; Kövecses, 2002) underlies the cognitive approach to studying metaphor, multimodal in particular. Following Lakoff and Johnson, metaphor is cognitive by nature and it emerges when one concept is understood in terms of another. This understanding is based on metaphorical mapping which is “a set of systematic correspondences between the source and the target in the sense that constituent conceptual elements of B correspond to constituent elements of A” (Kövecses, 2002, p. 6).

Before analysing multimodal metaphor, it is necessary to distinguish between the notions of monomodal and multimodal metaphor. Unlike monomodal metaphors in which both domains are presented in the same mode, multimodal metaphors are those “whose target and source are each represented exclusively or predominantly in different modes” (Forceville, 2009, p. 24). The key argument here is that “exclusively or predominantly” is essential as target and/or source domains may be simultaneously cued in more than one mode (p. 25).

According to Elisabeth El Refaie (2013), multimodality gives unique opportunities for construing metaphors by using the abilities of the various modes (p. 236). Despite the absence of exact definition of “mode”, the following modes are distinguished: 1) pictorial signs; 2) written signs; 3) spoken signs; 4) gestures; 5) sounds; 6) music; 7) smells; 8) tastes; 9) touch (Forceville, 2009, p. 4). Taking into account the list of modes, the target and source domains of multimodal metaphor in films can be recognizable visually, sonically, musically, in spoken and written language. In the current study, we refer to the following five modes: 1) if a domain is visually depicted, it is either itself portrayed or its elements metonymically related to it are portrayed; 2) if a domain is sonically depicted, a non-musical, non-verbal sound is used to cue its meaning; 3) if a domain is musically depicted, some music is used to cue its identification; 4) if a domain is depicted in spoken language, it is identified by on-screen characters or voice-overs; 5) if a domain is depicted in written language, it or its elements are presented onscreen in written form. This approach to creating and distinguishing multimodal metaphors combines the modes in unexpected ways.

2.3. Data and Methodology

Our sample consists of 7 multimodal metaphors manifested in 5 episodes of the HBO’s miniseries *Chernobyl* (“1:23:45”, “Please Remain Calm”, “Open Wide, O Earth”, “The Happiness of All Mankind”, “Vichnaya Pamyat”) lasting 347 minutes.

The metaphors were selected according to the following criteria: 1) the amalgamation of components (the target and source domains are presented in different

modes); 2) the frequency of occurrence (the metaphor emerges several times in the film). The multimodal metaphor study results related to the CMT have enabled utilising the following methodological procedure for analysing multimodal metaphors in the HBO's miniseries:

- Identifying and selecting the multimodal metaphors following the Filmic Metaphor Identification Procedure (FILMIP) which consists of two phases (Bort-Mir, 2019). The first phase presupposes content analysis according to which the film may be divided into different shots, scenes and sequences; identifying and describing modes; establishing general understanding of the messages of the material under study. The second phase comprises metaphor identification itself.
- Construing and describing the structure of the metaphor by exploiting Lakoff and Johnson's model A is B (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is taken into consideration that "if the target domain has little or no structure, a metaphorical coupling of this target with a richly-structured source domain can even import or impose structure on the target" (Forceville, 2013, p. 7). Thus, the target domain evolves in different ways depending on the meaning of its source domains. It should be noted that in our research, following Fahlenbrach's approach to the classification of audio-visual multimodal metaphors, the key and sub-metaphors are analysed (Fahlenbrach, 2016).
- Distinguishing the modes of the domains. It is crucial that both domains are cued in different modes within the multimodal metaphor theory. The keynote is as follows: though the target domain is the same – CHORNOBYL – it is represented in various modes.
- Analysing and interpreting the multimodal metaphor by discovering which meanings and attitudes associated with the source are mapped onto the target domain. The mapping of the features depends on the context in which the metaphor occurs (Forceville, 2013, p. 10), but at least one feature that is mappable from source to target should be identified.

3. Results and Discussion

As concepts are considered to be complex cognitive issues, it is typical of target domains to be comprehended in terms of more than one source domain (Kövecses, 2002, p. 84). The source domains DETECTIVE STORY, ESPIONAGE, DISEASE, HOSPITAL highlight different conceptual features of the target domain CHORNOBYL and enable the viewers to understand various aspects of the catastrophe. Hence, the structure of the CHORNOBYL concept is construed within the network of key and sub-metaphors (Fahlenbrach, p. 36). The key metaphor is characterised by the higher degree of structural richness of its source domain, thus enabling some additional mappings via sub-metaphors.

The target domain CHORNOBYL is cued verbally, visually and partially via auditory mode. The verbal mode is presented by spoken (characters referring to the concept name in dialogues, monologues, voices-over) and written language (topographic signs, final credits, newspaper headlines). It is worth mentioning that the very title of the series is a powerful verbal cue for the target domain and like a spoiler it evokes strong associations even before watching the film. The visual mode is rendered in numerous bird's-eye views of the plant, the city and the explosion. These two modes are supported by non-diegetic crackling sounds which are associated with radiation.

One of the key metaphors construed in the course of the film is CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY. The task of the scientists is to find out the reason for the explosion which is not easy as the responsible people try to conceal the facts. The truth about Chornobyl is deliberately distorted, hidden from the public view and it is substituted by a calming lie. The title of Episode 2 "Please, remain calm" speaks for itself. As in any detective story there are protagonists – detectives – who investigate the case (Legasov, Khomyuk) and antagonists who cover up the tracks telling lies (the authorities, Dyatlov). The first moment to exemplify this metaphor is the episode when Dyatlov leaves the control room to investigate the situation at the plant after the explosion. While walking along the corridor he notices something burning. The camera focuses on chunks of graphite burning on the ground. Dyatlov's facial expression makes it clear to the viewers that he realises the danger of the situation. The non-diegetic crackling static sound proves that we deal with radiation. However, Dyatlov's stoic face and unemotional behaviour back in the control room show that he is hiding the truth. Even seeing Toptunov's affected by the radiation red face, he lies by saying, "*He's delusional... He'll be fine. I've seen worse*". As a result, CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY is construed through visual, auditory, and verbal modes.

In Episode 4 "The Happiness of All Mankind", the secrecy of a detective story is revealed in two scenes. The first one is set in the Moscow University Library Archive where Khomyuk asks the librarian to give her some documents from the secure reference section. Being invited by the librarian, the KGB agent takes the list and returns it with every single request crossed out except for one. The viewers see that the library is empty. In the total silence of the reading room every little diegetic sound – pen clicking, paper rustling, shoes clattering – together with dismal music (non-diegetic) act as a representation of the source domain DETECTIVE STORY implying secrecy. The visual manifestation of secret is also rendered through a close-up of the crossed out list of documents (Figure 1), the verbal mode is expressed by a short phrase she can have that one, uttered by the agent. Consequently, the DETECTIVE STORY source domain is represented in visual, verbal and auditory (sonic and musical) modes.

The second scene is no less expressive though it employs only verbal and visual modes. Hence, we may follow the conversation between Legasov, Khomyuk

and Shcherbina in an abandoned building which is about possible causes of the explosion. When the truth comes out Shcherbina as the representative of the authorities offers to keep it secret. His words

The KGB classified it as a state secret. You leave this information out in Vienna, and they quietly allow us to fix the remaining reactors

allow for CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY to be inferred. The verbal mode of the source domain is amplified by a visual mode represented by a damaged wall poster behind Shcherbina. We notice that a woman in the poster is without the mouth because of the torn out piece of paper, which makes her look unable to speak like a crime witness who is afraid to utter the truth (Figure 2). In sum, these verbal and visual modes indicate the multimodal metaphor CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY.




Figure 1: Cross out List of Documents



Figure 2: 'Silent' Woman in the Poster

This metaphor develops into a sub-metaphor CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE. The very beginning of the series (Episode 1 “1:23:45”) introduces the viewers to the metaphor CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE. Under disguise of darkness Legasov leaves his flat in an attempt to hide the cassettes in a small air vent in a dark alley next to his building. He quickly passes through the beam of a streetlamp to avoid being noticed by a man from the surveillance car parked nearby. The source domain is recruited visually – by darkness, subdued light, and Legasov’s furtive behaviour – and it is reinforced by the suspenseful tunes of the musical mode.

This metaphor also surfaces in Episode 2 ‘Please Remain Calm’. During the telephone conversation Khomyuk and her colleague from Kurchatov Institute use coded language to refer to the accident in Chernobyl. While discussing the fire extinguishing process they use children’s names and age – Boris (5) and Simka (14) – to identify chemical elements. The viewers become aware of this due to the

symbols B (5) and Si (14) from the periodic table which appears on the screen. Thus, the source domain is cued both verbally and visually.

In the above mentioned scenes the scientists Legasov and Khomyuk are perceived as spies whose aim is either to reveal or to find out the secret information about Chornobyl. The features of spies' behaviour map onto the scientists: they are very careful in their words and actions, use coded language, and arrange meetings in discreet places.

The multimodal metaphor CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE is mostly established through visual and auditory modes. The pictures of injured people appearing throughout the film make a strong effect on viewers. One of the most salient scenes is that of Lyudmilla and Vasily in hospital in Episode 3 "Open Wide, O Earth". The first thing that draws attention is a horrible shriek of pain echoing from a hospital ward. In a moment we see Vasily covered in lesions on a hospital bed and some nurses trying to inject morphine (Figure 3). Judging by open bleeding sores all over his body, he is in agony. The verbal manifestation of the source domain is represented by Lyudmilla's words "*You are hurting him!*", and the interaction of auditory, visual, and verbal modes triggers CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE.



Figure 3: Vasily's Suffering in Hospital

Any disease involves not only physical pain and wounds, which are visible, but also emotional suffering. The multimodal metaphor CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE implying mental pain is especially vivid in Episode 3 when Lyudmilla is in hospital near Vasily who endures unbearable physical pain while she suffers from no less strong mental anguish. Her pain is constantly developing during the course of the episodes (Vasily's death and funeral) and reaches its climax when Lyudmilla loses her newborn baby. The domain of disease is cued visually by the pictures of Lyudmilla's face (Episodes 3 and 4) bearing a wide range of emotions starting with genuine sympathy, deep fear, bitter tears, inconsolable grief, and finally finishing with total indifference. Lyudmilla's disturbing emotional condition is highlighted by the sounds of crying babies in a maternity ward and sad background music (auditory mode).

As any disease requires a cure, it is natural that the target domain is viewed through the source domain HOSPITAL of the sub-metaphor CHORNOBYL IS

HOSPITAL. In the film, the treatment process is metaphorically pictured through different measures taken to overcome the consequences of the explosion. The meeting of the authorities in Kremlin Conference Room resembles the meeting of doctors in hospital discussing a disease (Episode 3 “Open Wide, O Earth”). Being an expert in the field of nuclear physics, Legasov stands out as the ‘chief doctor’ who offers the most appropriate ‘treatment’ strategy:

This entire region must be completely evacuated... All animals still surviving within the zone... must be presumed contaminated, and will have to be destroyed to prevent the spread of radiation and disease. We will have to raze forests. And we will have to rip up the top layer of earth, and bury it under itself.

The radiation is perceived as the infection affecting humans. This verbal mode is supported by a visual one in Episode 4 “The Happiness of All Mankind”. The scene opens with the picture of bulldozers ripping off the upper layer of the cabbage field like medical instruments removing an infected skin (Figure 4). The men spraying the road in protective suits with hoods drawn tight and gas masks resemble medieval plague doctors (Figure 5).



Figure 4: Ripping up the Fields



Figure 5: ‘Doctors’ Disinfecting the Streets

4. Conclusions

We have analysed 5 episodes of the miniseries *Chernobyl* in order to identify the multimodal metaphors actualising the concept of CHORNOBYL. In addition, the stance-constructive meaning of each metaphor has been brought into view to reveal the emotional potential of the multimodal metaphors under study.

In the research, such multimodal metaphors have been singled out: CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY, CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE, CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE, CHORNOBYL IS HOSPITAL. This list is not ultimate as the metaphors which occurred rarely in the miniseries are not included in it. The actualisation of metaphors also depends on the subjective perceptions, and consequently, the viewers of the same film may construe different multimodal metaphors.

CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY and CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE are key metaphors as they appear throughout the film and their source domains render the conceptual features of CHORNOBYL. The sub-metaphors CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE and CHORNOBYL IS HOSPITAL suggest additional mappings. Thus, the multimodal metaphor CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY is reinforced by its sub-metaphor CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE and they together reveal such features of the Chernobyl tragedy as secrecy, lie, and false facts. In the film there were characters who tried to get to the bottom of the truth by deep investigation of the case. One of the most powerful metaphors under study is CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE which presupposes the existence of not only physical but also mental pain. As any disease needs treatment and medical specialists the appearance of the sub-metaphor CHORNOBYL IS HOSPITAL is obvious. The key and sub-metaphors of the series have a stance-constructive potential, either enhancing or downgrading the intensity of Chernobyl negative perception.

We argue that the CHORNOBYL concept in the miniseries *Chernobyl* is an issue of multimodal manifestation of the metaphors, and the visual and verbal modes take part in construing all the metaphors under study. As the film provides a wide range of meaningful shots, the multimodal metaphors have the vivid visual manifestation. The language embodiment of the verbal mode depends on the context. Primarily it is presented by dialogues and extended sentences but in some cases a simple sentence in the whole scene may perform a nominative function being informative itself. Unlike the spoken mode, the written one is used for the actualisation of the target domain (e.g. headlines, posters, road signs, and final notes of the series) rather than for source domains. It is the auditory mode that adds new emotional meaning to the imagery. The sonic and musical modes make the multimodal metaphors more powerful in their influence on viewers. The crackling and beeping sounds, sirens, crying, and moaning together with songs and somber tunes contribute to the multimodal evocation of the metaphors.

The above results show how the perception of CHORNOBYL is interpreted through the prism of the multimodal metaphors functioning in the film. The title of the series is the “speaking” notion and the CHORNOBYL concept is initially associated with disaster, explosion, and destruction. Consequently, such metaphors as CHORNOBYL IS DISEASE, CHORNOBYL IS HOSPITAL are easily recognizable in the film. The multimodal metaphor CHORNOBYL IS DETECTIVE STORY and CHORNOBYL IS ESPIONAGE are quite unexpected to discover, mapping new conceptual features onto the target domain. This research may be further developed in the framework of comparative studies involving different discourses.

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Aleksandra Majdzińska-Koczorowicz, University of Łódź, Poland
Julia Ostanina-Olszewska, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Poland

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Pro-Ukrainian Memes Against the 2022 Russian Invasion. A Cognitive Linguistics Perspective

ABSTRACT

In relation to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, memes and Internet jokes have a special status. They work as stress-relievers, information vessels, or Russian propaganda resistance. The effectiveness of a meme relies on mingling verbal and visual elements in such a way that seemingly unrelated scenarios become relatable and can be interpreted in a given context. The text aims at discussing the cognitive mechanisms employed in chosen pro-Ukrainian memes against the 2022 Russian invasion in terms of their bimodal construal. An analysis of a group of memes was conducted within the cognitive linguistics framework, with reference to the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, conceptual integration theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), and construal (Langacker, 2008, 2019). The creation of memes triggers frameshifting and convergence of different mental spaces, which results in online meaning construction, where humorous incongruity derives directly from blending and shows how jokes (about tragedies) may become humorous, due to frame substitution.

Keywords: Internet meme, metaphor, metonymy, conceptual blending, Ukraine

1. Introduction: why memes?

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a number of reactions and comments from internet users, some of which were internet memes. Memes regarded as networked creativity and a mechanism of political participation are multimodal constructions which activate new frames and meanings. Their humorous and satirical form fulfils a referential function but is also aimed to be relatable. The impact of internet memes is rather significant mainly due to their visual humour and generative capacity. The way we interpret memes allows us to be part

Aleksandra Majdzińska-Koczorowicz, Instytut Anglistyki, Zakład Językoznawstwa Angielskiego i Ogólnego, Uniwersytet Łódzki, ul. Pomorska 171/173, 90-236 Łódź, Phone: 0048426655220, aleksandra.majdzinska@uni.lodz.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9238-2453>

Julia Ostanina-Olszewska, Instytut Neofilologii, Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny w Krakowie, ul. Studencka 5, 31-116 Kraków, Phone: 048126626731, julia.ostanina-olszewska@up.krakow.pl, <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9073-3934>

of the debate and create online communities based on our common values, ideas, and beliefs.

This paper examines chosen pro-Ukrainian memes against the 2022 Russian invasion that exhibit humour provoked by tragedy. Humour is a sort of defensive mechanism which assists in undermining the gravity of a situation, thus it can be helpful in facing “sinister subjects like death, disease, deformity, handicap or warfare with bitter amusement and present[ing] such tragic, distressing or morbid topics” (Willinger et al., 2017, p. 160). Humour “can help facilitate recovery from stressful situations, even prolonging people’s tolerance to physical pain” (Michel, 2017, p. 25). It thus has enormous power, even when it comes to facing a brutal, extremely serious authoritarian regime such as Russia.

Pro-Ukrainian memes against the 2022 Russian invasion play a number of significant roles. Apart from being comforting and relieving, they are informative as they help disseminate the current state of affairs in Ukraine and stand up to Russian propaganda. Memes become vessels of information or commentary on current events even on the official Twitter account of Ukraine (<https://twitter.com/Ukraine>). There are a number of pro-Ukrainian social media movements such as Saint Javelin, NAFO (North Atlantic Fellas Organisation) or Ukrainian Memes Forces that fight Russian disinformation in the form of memes and work as fundraisers for Ukraine. It is characteristic of NAFO that it bases memes on the image of the Shiba Inu dog, known on the internet as Doge (Figure 1). Their presence and activity have been recognised by Ukrainian government officials, i.e. Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Oleksii Reznikov, who changed his profile picture to a NAFO meme (Hamill-Steward, 2022).



Figure 1: The picture presents the so-called NAFO ‘fella’¹

¹ The tweet was posted 28.8.2022 on the Defence of Ukraine Twitter account.

Referring to familiar and tangible situations, memes bring internet users conceptually closer to the events taking place in Ukraine and thus help them identify with Ukrainians. They also highlight the heroism of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians fighting on the front lines to boost the country's morale, and at the same time mock Russian troops for their ineptitude and disparage their president, Vladimir Putin. It should be disclaimed that the present analysis is by no means exhaustive (it was never meant to be) and cannot serve as an attempt at a systematic study. The cited examples, however, represent recurring observable trends.

This form of commentary may seem interesting for linguists since a meme carries a lot of meaning (content) packed typically into a small bimodal form. Its compactness triggers frames and scenarios that have to be recognised and related to an event/situation depicted. That is why memes can be interpreted as blends (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), the understanding of which rests on the invocation of extensive background information and the completion of complex inferential processes. This form of expression is not self-explanatory and requires extra-contextual knowledge, such as the recognition of the convention of a given meme and its intertextual references/allusions to people, places, occurrences, quotes, and cultural phenomena. These, in turn, are hidden in conceptual packets (input spaces) that need to be recognized by the observer and “unpacked” (cf. Majdzińska-Koczorowicz & Ostanina-Olszewska, 2021).

The cognitive dissonance caused by the juxtaposition of incompatible elements invites readers first to recognize the different input spaces of the blend, then to search for connections between such elements, and, eventually, to identify the incongruity on which the humour is based (Marín-Arrese, 2008; Schilperoord & Maes, 2009). Incongruity is then a puzzle to be solved, which signals to the recipient that blending/incongruity resolution must be applied. Thus memes become extremely popular since they contain the element of gamification.

An application of a cognitively understood set of notions is meant to provide a framework facilitating the extraction and interpretation of particular levels of a bimodal message. Chosen dimensions of construal by Langacker (2008, 2019) will serve to clarify the relationship between verbal and visual signs. The theory of conceptual and visual metaphor (Forceville, 1996, 2002; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) will be useful for capturing the analogy between the situation depicted in a meme and the one referring to the war. This conceptual similarity and relevance will specifically be accounted for with reference to blending theory (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), which elucidates conceptual mappings between seemingly unrelated entities. Blending seems a perfect tool for the recognition of meme components since “memes, as multimodal constructions, trigger the retrieval of a schematic constructional meaning that is blended with more specific concepts evoked by various aspects of the text as well as concepts evoked by the image” (Coulson, 2022, p. 282). Those various components of a message can

be seen as input spaces providing the basis for an incomplete collection of their elements that finds reflection at the generic level and gets embodied in the blend.

2. Analysis: examples and discussion

The memes presented below have been divided into two groups: 1) those visually communicating the frame within which a meme should be interpreted (in particular, these are memes exhibiting Vladimir Putin by blending his face in a given scenario) and 2) those based on a visual template that is endowed with an interpretative frame via the verbal layer. Both groups are construed from the perspective of an observer who identifies themselves with Ukraine, hence the memes mostly mock Vladimir Putin and the Russian army, whilst at the same time glorifying Ukraine and emphasising the country's resistance and invincibility.

2.1 Memes featuring Vladimir Putin



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

The first meme (Figure 2) was created on the basis of the original painting known as Jesus at the Door (Jesus Knocking at the Door) by Del Parson that refers to a scene from the Primary manual 6-36; Revelation 3:20. Here, Jesus's head has been replaced with Putin's. In tune with the FACE FOR PERSON metonymy, the provided picture seems sufficient to understand that the person knocking at the door is the president of Russia. Another significant element is the change of colour visible in the upper part of the door window: the yellow light (a warm glow from within that is probably a reflection of an indoor fireplace) is replaced with a blue shadow which together with the original lower part represents the blue and yellow flag of Ukraine. Thus, it can be said that the visual layer represents Vladimir Putin knocking at the door of Ukraine. The verbal layer completes the visual one, mak-

ing us re-conceptualise the initial interpretation. It involves a short dialogue, in which the entity representing the Russian president threatens that the host would face consequences for not letting him in; however, he is not precise about the type of consequences (“what I’m going to do to you”).

We can see the Putin-Jesus figure that is quite inconsistent: the traits of character ascribed to each of the persons sharply contrast, to say the least: Jesus, known in religion and culture as an inherently good character that saved mankind; Vladimir Putin, in the light of the present events seems a ruthless war criminal. The very act of knocking at the door amplifies the image of the figure being polite and humble. This clash seems to lead to the interpretation of the picture as ironic: Putin (and his intentions) in disguise, Putin as a hoax, a deception. This explanation correlates with an official explanation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine based on the ‘made up’ reasons (e.g., Russophobia, security demands of Ukraine, NATO, and non-NATO allies in the EU, cf. Kirby, 2022).

The meme is multidimensional as it draws on a number of inputs blended into the form of a bimodal structure and as such can be discussed as an instance of conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The emergent structure presented above in the form of a verbo-visual scenario composes elements from various input spaces (a painting by Del Parson, a tale from the Primary manual 6-36; Revelation 3:20, a photo of Vladimir Putin’s face, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the convention of a meme, a comic picture) that need to be completed by background knowledge and accurately interpreted in order to strike a meaning. The first input space (IS 1) involved in the scenario is a painting by Del Parson known as *Jesus at the Door*, which refers to a passage from Revelation 3:20 “Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will enter his house and dine with him, and he with me.” One of the most popular interpretations of this passage is that people decide whether to open their hearts to Jesus or not (the guest cannot open the door as the handle is on the other side of it). The relationship between the guest and the host is not symmetrical, the host is in power, and the guest’s position is inferior as his action depends on the owner’s decision. Another input space (IS 2) involves the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, whose face has replaced the face of Jesus, entailing that it is Putin who knocks at the door (the FACE FOR PERSON metonymy). His face also stands for the country and its decision to invade Ukraine (CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED). The next space that is activated (IS 3) is Ukraine: the yellowish glow of light combined with a blue shade placed on the glazing stands for the flag/colours of Ukraine that metonymically symbolise the country. Another input space (IS 4) is the convention of a meme/ comic strip. The blend requires some background knowledge in order to complete the missing elements triggered by familiar frames (e.g., the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s reasoning behind it). In the process of completion, the missing blanks are filled in and the existing ones are elaborated. The meme can also be seen as analogous to

the scene from the fairy tale “The Wolf and the Seven Young Goats” when the wolf pretended to be the young goats’ mother and tried to convince the kids to open the door, while their mother was away, so he could get in and gobble them up. We arrive at the notion of deception, fraud and hypocrisy which is highlighted as a characteristic feature of the subject. Thus we complete our understanding of the meme by unveiling the main feature of the subject (Putin), prompted by the juxtaposition of elements from the inputs.

However serious the topic it deals with, the picture seems humorous in its nature (joking works as a stress-reliever since it can reframe a negative experience and divert it into positive emotions; cf. Dynel, 2020, as cited in Kuiper, Martin, & Olinger, 1993 and Martin, 2007). Its humorousness can be explained in reference to Koestler’s (1964) bisociation (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002), a concept explained by Dynel (2011, p. 63) as an approach “according to which humour perception is an act of oscillation between two unrelated matrices of thought and the discovery of various similarities or analogies implicit in concepts seen as remote from one another”. Here, Putin’s face replaces Jesus’s face, which seems ridiculous and triggers a humorous incongruity. This metaphorical substitution of one element from the structuring input space (Jesus) for another (the Russian president) creates a hybrid that acquires an entirely new meaning and makes us find parallelism between Jesus and Putin: since both characters do not have much in common, we realise that the Russian president should be interpreted as a hoax. This resolvable incongruity is amplified at the verbal level, in which it becomes apparent that the president’s intentions are rather evil.

The next meme (Figure 3) presents the president of Russia carrying away a lectern tagged as “Ukraine”. In fact, it is a photoshopped image of Adam Johnson, who was punished for his role in the US Capitol riot in February 2021. The lectern was a podium for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the situation led to a court appearance with Johnson being “charged with trespassing, disorderly conduct and theft of government property” (US Capitol riot, 2022).

The scene presented in the picture can be seen as a blend comprising various input spaces, one of which is the above-mentioned riot case with the lectern becoming the object of the theft. Another one is the face of the Russian president, representing the country’s recent decisions about the attack on Ukraine (the **CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED** metonymy). The substitution of the faces is metaphorical and triggers conceptual mapping culminating in perceiving similarities between the situation of stealing a lectern and taking away the territory of Ukraine. The caption “Ukraine” placed on the lectern works as an important element contributing to the resolution of the blend: it makes the interpreter merge the visible elements from two mental spaces in order to place them in a given scenario: Russia illegally seizing Ukraine. It is ridiculous that someone could decide that invading another country would be as easy as snatching the lectern, therefore the clash/incongruity between these two events, a petty crime and the war, ac-

accompanied by the common element – the attitude of the actor – is perceivable and creates humour. In this way, in our mind, the construct LECTERN IS UKRAINE is created, which highlights the Russian attitude towards Ukraine in having the upper hand in this relationship and treating the other country instrumentally.

Ukraine being represented visually with a lectern may also be interpreted symbolically. A lectern/podium can be associated with giving a talk, proclaiming views, having freedom of speech, and also a symbol of power, thus taking it away would mean depriving someone of their voice, agency, independence, and power. By its shape, the lectern may also be associated with a cup, which is why the figure of Putin seizing it in one hand and having the other hand triumphantly waving can be identified with a champion getting a trophy. This interpretation would also highlight the pride Russia takes in its violent invasion.

The third meme (Figure 4) presents the Russian president trying to pop a balloon, where the balloon metonymically stands for Ukraine due to its colours (yellow and blue). The action in itself may not be very original; however, our attention is drawn to the unusual result, which is caused by reversed Force Dynamics (Talmy, 1988). In the meme, the Russian president is depicted again as the aggressor, though one whose attack was a failure. The surprising result could be interpreted as depicting that against all odds Ukraine is strong enough to fight back and even win. The meme may function as a sort of warning, that an attempt at popping the balloon (read: attacking Ukraine) could be lethal.

In the context of the meme, a number of verbal references may be evoked, for example, the one familiar to the Russian people «Кто с мечом к нам придёт, от меча и погибнет!», which could be an allusion to the following passage from the New Testament: “Put away your sword,” Jesus told him. “Those who use the sword will die by the sword” (Matthew 26:52) or a similar expression that was known even in pre-evangelical times; in ancient Rome, it existed as the Latin saying: “Qui gladio ferit, gladio perit”.

In the meme, this saying is not presented verbally, but it can be evoked in our minds and could have been uttered by Ukraine in the presented situation. The message appears to be ironic since it is assumed that originally these words are said to be uttered by Alexander Nevsky (a Russian ruler and a military leader, who defended the northern borders of Rus against the Swedish invasion and defeated the Teutonic knights at Lake Chud in 1242). In the meme, the incongruity which produces a humorous effect due to the reversed force dynamics makes us see the balloon, an inanimate object, as an actor/active element. Hence, in the blend Putin metonymically representing Russia is no longer associated with the role of a victim, but rather with an attacker, whose weapons are used against him.

Although the visual elements of the meme might be surprising and seem to work against the laws of physics, it is an accurate reflection of the words in which

the message is presented in a clear and straightforward manner. Such unusual actions are possible also due to the unusual situation in the new reality, where the impossible becomes possible and the Ukrainian army and ordinary people make extraordinary actions happen.

Incongruity Resolution based on the reversed forced dynamics depicts the action of pricking the balloon, which in turn causes the attacker to burst into pieces. It is not an absurd scenario, considering the balloon and its action represents the Ukrainian resistance and combat, therefore, it is rather natural that it actively ‘fights back’. In fact, the meme contains two actors: a person who is aggressive but ineffective and the balloon, which is capable of reversing the evil forces and popping the attacker. The roles of the actors are presented below in Table 1.

Table 1. “Popping” the balloon mappings

Input space 1	Input space 2	Blended Space
Attacker/aggressor/forceful entity	Russian leader	Identity – Russian leader Role – aggressor
Balloon	The country (Ukraine)	Identity – balloon Role – counterattacking country
Needle	Military weapons	Identity – needle Role – military arms, weapons, equipment
Pricking the balloon	Attacking/invading another country	Action/goals – pricking the balloon Means: invading Ukraine
Force Dynamics (we expect the balloon to pop)	Reversed Force Dynamics (the attacker bursts into pieces)	Incongruity Based on the reversed forced dynamics – the attacker bursts into pieces

2.2 Memes foregrounding the Russian army failures

The following group of memes are based on already existing templates unrelated to the current war. This specific recycling of pictures is a common procedure since successful memes are often modified and repackaged into new creative scenarios.

The first meme (Figure 5) is a two-panel story meant to expose the Russian defence deficiency. The top picture shows the upper body of a mediaeval knight wearing full armour (a breastplate, pauldrons, a helmet) and holding a sword. An upright body posture together with the gesture of lifting the sword up and resting part of its blade on the knight’s shoulder may conventionally (via the metaphor GOOD IS UP) be interpreted as representing self-reassurance and confidence. The picture is labelled as “RUSSIAN MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE”. The lower part of the meme shows the same knight being struck by an arrow that was shot



Figure 5



Figure 6




Figure 7

into a slit in the visor, a vulnerable point in a fully armoured knight. This time, however, the perspective is focused on the knight's head and the arrow, which can be seen as an instance of zooming in (Langacker, 2019) that relies on specifying location within a viewing arrangement. This change is meant to shift our focus onto the arrow, which gets centralised and is given focal prominence (Langacker, 2008). The arrow is labelled as "HIMARS", which is an acronym for M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, a rocket launcher designed for the US army that is now used by the Ukrainians during the war. HIMARS are incredibly effective for attacking stationary targets and have played a pivotal role in liberating Ukrainian territories (Mansoor, 2023). The meme can be interpreted as exposing Russian failures in military infrastructure and glorifying Ukrainian effectiveness and precision in using the advanced launcher. It also foregrounds the role of allies in the Ukrainian defence: HIMARS launchers were provided by the US army.

The humorous potential of the meme is realised through similarity cued between 1) the mediaeval knight and the Russian military infrastructure and 2) the arrow and the launcher HIMARS used by the Ukrainian army; thus, the meme can be analysed as an instance of conceptual blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). The elements from the original picture (the visual layer) and those from its re-interpretation (the verbal layer) constitute two input spaces triggering associations. The visual introduces a mediaeval knight wearing full armour that is meant to make him invincible: the plates were designed to be thick enough to withstand mediaeval weapon attacks; however, he gets hit by an arrow right in the visor. The presence of an arrow implies also that there must be an archer who targeted the knight from a distance. Attacking unprotected slits such as those for eyes or around armpits was one of the easiest ways to defeat a knight back in the Middle Ages. Taking into consideration that an eye slit measured less than 1 cm, it required a rather skilful and precise attacker. Thus, input space 1 comprises such elements as the Middle Ages, war, a knight, armour, a sword, an arrow, defeat of the knight, and victory of the archer. The verbal level makes us reconceptualise the picture by introducing such elements as the 2022 war, Russian military infrastructure, HIMARS, and the Ukrainian defence.

The elements from one input space trigger associations with the elements from the other input space, so we can perceive the relation between them according to the created metaphors *RUSSIAN ARMY IS A MEDIAEVAL KNIGHT* and *HIMARS IS A PRECISE ARROW/BLOW*. At the generic level, certain similarities can be noticed: war, battle, weapon, defence, offence, defeat, and victory. The emergent structure, the meme, arises on the basis of three steps: selective projection from both inputs (in the process of composition), putting the elements into a wider context understood here as the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine (completion) and finally running the blend (elaboration) (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). In this case, the blend is run for the amusement effect, praising the rocket launcher and its operators, and boosting Ukrainian morale. Thanks to the metaphors employed, we can extend the interpretation of the meme into describing the Russian military infrastructure as being solid only at first glance and having weak spots. Similarly, the rocket launcher HIMARS can be seen as an exceptionally precise weapon.

In a similar vein, the meme presented in Figure 6 also highlights the advantage of the Ukrainian army in terms of armament. We can see a snapshot showing a cat seemingly hiding behind a corner from two Doberman dogs. The cat is dubbed with a caption stating, “*RUSSIAN AMMO DEPOT*”, while the dogs with “*UKRAINIAN HIMARS*”. We can assume that the meme refers to multiple attacks on Russian ammunition depots with HIMARS rocket systems, which are highly effective in precise targeting. In July 2022 Ukraine is reported to have destroyed 50 such depots (Zinets, 2022).

The bimodal semiosis of this meme is similar to that of the previous meme: it involves two levels of description that intertwine and define one another. In order to interpret it, we need extra-contextual knowledge that cats are afraid of dogs and to avoid being captured, cats hide in places unreachable by dogs, e.g., tree branches or the top of fences. The meme integrates two input spaces, the verbal and the visual, each space introducing different elements. Input space 1 (the visual) comprises Doberman dogs (big in size, having stamina, loyal, trainable, intimidating), a cat (smaller in size, believed to be afraid of dogs), antagonism/hostility between the species, the scenario of dogs chasing the cat and the cat hiding from the dogs, the cat being afraid of the dogs. Input space 2 includes the 2022 war, Russian ammunition depots (that may metonymically represent the Russian army, Russia), Ukrainian HIMARS (metonymically standing for Ukrainian army/offence, Ukraine), HIMARS (representing Ukrainian allies, in particular, the USA). The verbal elements have to be filled out by the extra-memetic context: “Russian ammunition depot” and “Ukrainian HIMARS” trigger the frame of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and require the recipient to acknowledge the effectiveness of HIMARS in destroying Russian ammunition depot targets; we also have to know what HIMARS itself is and know some of its characteristics. Hence, the verbal elements can be seen as metonymies triggered by the relation of association, *THE CONTROLLED*

FOR THE CONTROLLER. The inputs seem to share certain similarities between the depicted situation and the one introduced verbally, which finds its way into the generic space: conflict, hostility, advantage/superiority of one part in the given situation. In the process of conceptual integration, the relation of conflict in which one part is superior to the other in given terms gets instantiated within the frame of the 2022 war and focuses on the effective power of HIMARS rocket launchers, their technological advancement, and Ukraine's superiority in this respect.

The same picture served as a visual template for the last meme (Figure 7) referring to multiple cases of Ukrainian farmers capturing Russian tanks in the spring of 2022 (Suciu, 2022). Again, the meme can be seen as an example of conceptual integration, which arises in a network of mental spaces: the visual input space stays the same as in the previous example, while the verbal input space comprises such elements as a Russian tank (metonymically, CONTROLLED FOR CONTROLLER, representing Russian soldiers), Ukrainian farmers, towing tanks away by farmers using tractors, the opposition farmer vs soldier, and the humorous potential of the situation. At the generic level there is also the idea of conflict, opposition, and dominance of one part. The blended space contains the structure encapsulated in the generic spaces plus it fuses chosen elements from input spaces. The meme is obviously meant to be amusing as the very situation topicalised in it is humorous in nature, since there is a perceivable discrepancy between farmers and soldiers as well as between a military tank and a tractor.

The capturing of Russian tanks went viral, which galvanised Ukrainians and their supporters, spurring a number of memes that employed creative means of expression. For example, a cartoon-like picture (Figure 8) shows a tractor pulling a tank against a yellow-blue background representing figuratively this situation or a picture (Figure 9) featuring a tractor towing away a submarine, which visually employs hyperbolisation for an amusing effect.



3. Conclusion

The presented memes fall into two groups based on the medium of the depiction of the 2022 war. Memes referring visually to the subject matter could be decoded instantly since visual metaphor and metonymy (PUTIN IS RUSSIA, YELLOW/BLUE COLOUR IS UKRAINE) features “perceptual immediacy”, which means that the similarity between domains is instantly perceived (Forceville, 2008, p. 463). It could be observed that in the presentation of Vladimir Putin metonymies FACE FOR PERSON and CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED dominated. The memes also fostered a stronger emotional load in comparison to the group with verbal topical reference. The memes from the second group required more mental effort and contextual knowledge for conceptualization since the reader needs to work out the relationship of similarity between what is depicted and what is written. This non-obvious mapping (taking place at the generic level) could be captured with a reference to conceptual blending theory.

Mememes are powerful tools of communication; they can help the reader gain a new perspective on reality and see the connection between apparently unrelated domains. For the purpose of concept elucidation, the analysed memes generated novel metaphors (farmers are superheroes, balloons are effective destroyers, etc.) and new ideas through the process of conceptual blending which in turn endowed the memes with their generation capacity. In this respect, memes can be seen as small puzzles which our minds love to solve, and which gain much appreciation when the effort is rewarded by the pleasure of understanding the humour of the riddle.

Whereas humorous examples often involved very non-obvious mappings (a cat hiding from the dogs was mapped to a tank ‘hiding’ from the farmers), the reader could understand the obvious connection between the literal terror that the cat was feeling when seeing the Doberman dogs which was mapped to the dread that the tanks (which metonymically stood for the soldiers in the tanks) must have “felt” when seeing the Ukrainian farmers. Snatching the lectern and invading another country at first seemed like two disparate domains that were superficially unrelated until the reader saw the connection in the blended cognitive models and resolved the incongruity. The smug face of the lectern snatcher and the satisfaction or even pride he feels from his action is mapped to the satisfaction he takes from the act of ruthlessly seizing another country.

Understanding a meme is both an individual mental act which requires extensive background knowledge and a collaborative social achievement including complex inferential processes. Internet users strategically blend culturally meaningful objects in a way that both promotes their own target domain construals and reinforces associated generic models.

Memes cannot effectively combat what is happening on the ground, but humour can grab people's attention, spread information, and communicate Ukraine's need for help from the rest of the world. However, it is worth pointing out that overuse of memes in the context of serious matters can lead to desensitisation and trivialisation of events.

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Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland

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The Effect of Highlighting and Hiding in a Multimodal Message: A Conceptual Blending Analysis of a TV Commercial for *Momester®Nasal*

ABSTRACT

The objective of the proposed paper is twofold. Firstly, by adopting the claim that the ultimate meaning of each multimodal message is more than the sum of modes used in the process of its creation, the author strives to offer a thorough analysis of the TV commercial for *Momester®Nasal*, using the tools as proposed in the Fauconnier and Turner Conceptual Blending Theory (2002). Secondly, assuming that a successful multimodal message “is achieved through all modes interacting both separately and simultaneously” (Pinar Sanz, 2015, p. 1), as well as pointing to the fact that multimodal approach to communication does not favour any of the modes applied in a message, but may, sometimes, highlight one of them (Winiarska & Załazińska, 2017, p. 7), the author poses a daring question to what extent the integration of distinct modes which occur in a multimodal message can be interpreted as the result of two cognitive operations, i.e. the effect of highlighting and hiding in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

The object in question is a TV commercial for *Momester®Nasal* where three modes: visual, linguistic and aural, are put under scrutiny. The analysis is to prove that alternate highlighting and hiding of elements belonging to three disparate modes also contributes to greater cross-resonance among the modes, which in turn strengthens the creative potential of the message (El Refaie, 2015).

Keywords: multimodality, conceptual blending, mode, highlighting, hiding, TV commercial

1. Introduction

Despite the growing popularity of recent technologies that enable us to relish in HbbTV advertising or streaming TV advertising (*aka* OTT advertising), it is still television that remains a predominant medium while attracting a potential customer’s attention, due to “its unparalleled reach and staying power” (Steggerda, 2021, p. 1). Since the digital era offers unlimited possibilities to make use of such modes of communication as music, sound, speech, text, or image to promote

Agnieszka Mierzwińska-Hajnos, Katedra Lingwistyki Stosowanej, Instytut Językoznawstwa i Literaturoznawstwa, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, ul. Sowińskiego 17, 20-040 Lublin, agahaj@interia.pl, <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9798-5878>

goods and services, TV commercials have become one of the most powerful tools in the hands of copywriters, simultaneously catching the interest of researchers in the field of both multimodal as well as linguistic studies.

To become attractive and successful, a contemporary TV commercial has to “mesmerize” a potential customer with its ingenuity and creativity while being intelligible at the same time. As pointed out by Vogel, “nothing is more efficient than creative advertising; creative advertising is more memorable, longer lasting, works with less media spending, and builds a fan community... faster” (Vogel, as cited in Pérez Sobrino, 2017, p. 1)¹. This creativity is, many a time, achieved by implementing various modes of communication that are at the disposal of a copywriter, be it sound, voice, language (written or spoken), or image. The use of diverse modes is not accidental here, but rather stems from the fact that human beings, in their process of communication, have a natural capacity to create messages and communicate various ideas with a plethora of available modes, thus making any type of communication more successful (Winiarska & Załazińska, 2018, p. 7; also Iedema, 2013)².

Being “equipped with” a full range of modes (e.g. visual, aural, linguistic, gestural, etc.) which co-deploy in an ingenious way and co-construct a mini-narrative (cf. Forceville, 2008) to achieve a pivotal aim, i.e. “to evoke positive feelings toward the product, service, or brand promoted” (Forceville, 1996, p. 104; also Forceville, 2008), a TV commercial becomes the genre which offers enormous possibilities when it comes to the way the message about a given product or service is presented, and, more importantly, received by a potential customer. Still, much as a multimodal character of communication used in commercials sounds convincing since it virtually touches every sense of a potential recipient of the information, it remains a challenge for scholars dealing with both multimodality and linguistic studies. This seems to be caused by two determining factors. First, as pointed out by Rossi and Sindoni (2017), “no definitive analytical framework can be provided when any complex multimodal fact is involved” (p. 65), which main-

¹ Vogel’s observation is very much in line with an earlier and more general observation on the phenomenon of advertising made by Forceville (2008, pp. 1–2): Advertisers’ perennial task is to make positive claims for brands, products, and services, in the hope that these will induce prospective consumers to consider, buy, and use them. These claims must always be pitched in a limited space or time slot. Moreover, the message should attract attention, and ideally stick in people’s memories, for instance by being humorous, or beautiful, or intriguing. This latter requirement is particularly important given that competition for audience attention, via an ever broadening variety of media, is fierce.

² Despite an enthusiastic approach to creativity while referring to TV commercials as well as other forms of advertising, it is also important to remember how to avoid potential misinterpretations and misunderstandings, especially when it comes to the reception of a given ad by people lacking shared background knowledge. A thorough research on this issue is provided in Pérez Sobrino, Littlemore and Ford (2021).

ly stems from the fact that each mode has to be examined individually, allowing for the factors which render its nature in an exhaustive and objective way. What is more, such a mixture of modalities is “neither static nor predictable and may vary considerably across time and space according to context” (p. 60). Another reason for which a multimodal commercial proves to be a complex issue is the fact that various resources (or modes) used in such a TV commercial have both “distinct potentialities and limitations” (Jewitt, Bezemer, & O’Halloran, 2016, p. 3), which is confirmed in the observation made by Kress (2000, p. 157):

Semiotic modes have different potentials, so that they afford different kinds of possibilities of human expression and engagement with the world, and through this differential engagement with the world they facilitate differential possibilities of development.

The arrangement of modes, as well as other elements which support those modes (e.g. the visual mode supported with facial expression of an actor, objects presented, or activities performed, colour and lighting used, or the aural mode strengthened by sound effects, choice of instruments used, or even phonological measures such as assonances, alliterations, or repetitions; cf. Etienne and Vanbaelen, 2006, p. 91; also Periasamy, Gruba and Subramaniam, 2015), form the so-called *description grid*, i.e. a framework which “takes into account multiple modes and elements found in the medium of television and the genre of television commercials” (Periasamy et al., 2015, p. 153). Of vital importance here is however the fact that various modes used in a given TV commercial have specific roles and tasks in the meaning making process (cf. Kress, 2010, pp. 28–29) and are usually responsible for only a part of the message they convey in multimodal communication. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that, while being activated, they intertwine, criss-cross and overlap with one another to boost the final effect of a message. From a cognitive standpoint, such “multimodal dynamicity”, where in one scene some modes are in the foreground while others remain in the background to swap their positions in another shot, allows us to recall Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of *highlighting and hiding*, first put forward in the research on conceptual metaphor, according to which focusing on selected aspects of a particular concept simultaneously “keep[s] us from focusing on other aspects of the concept (...) inconsistent with that metaphor” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 10)³. Lakoff and Johnson’s observations on highlighting and hiding also echo in theoretical considerations dedicated to the phenomenon of conceptual blending (Fauconnier

³ Lakoff and Johnson (1980) provide an interesting study of ARGUMENT IS BATTLE, an abridged version of ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor where “highlighting”, or focusing too much on the battling aspects of argument, such as attacking our opponent or defending our position, leads to outshining (or “hiding”) other aspects of the same concept, such as, e.g. the cooperative aspects of arguing (pp. 10–11).

&Turner, 2002; also Fauconnier, 1985/1994), although they are rendered in a more dynamic way. According to Fauconnier and Turner, the essence of conceptual blending understood as a dynamic basic mental operation inheres in selective projection (emphasis mine) of elements taken from input spaces onto “a novel blended space, which then dynamically develops emergent structure” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003, p. 57). This means that within virtually each stage of human thinking and processing we activate mental spaces, i.e. “very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2003, p. 58). Obviously, in the dynamic creation of the blend not each and every element of a mental space (known as the input space in the Fauconnier and Turner parlance) will be required to contribute to the ultimate meaning, but only those required for the “here and now” of the blending process.

The cognitive observations made above correspond with what we find while approaching a multimodal message, especially a complex one, operating on many modes and their affordances. To discover to what extent cognitive tools as elaborated within cognitive linguistics might prove useful and successful in the analysis of multimodal messages, let us now proceed to an in-depth analysis of a chosen TV commercial.

2. The Analysis

The object in question here is a commercial for *Momester®Nasal*, an OTC drug produced by the pharmaceutical company Polpharma in Poland⁴. The analyzed commercial belongs to the category of drug advertising and, as such, has to be compliant with pharmaceutical advertising laws imposed by European and/or national authorities. For instance, it cannot relate to prescription-only medicines or OTC medicines which have names identical to prescription medicines, medicines containing intoxicating or psychotropic substances, nor may it be presented or recommended by scientists, persons publicly known or persons who either have a medical or pharmaceutical education or imply that they have such an education (cf. Baker McKenzie, 2018, pp. 14–16; also Zimmermann, Pawłowski, & Zimmermann, 2009). This obviously imposes certain limitations on such commercials, but, still, it does not belittle their creativity and persuasive power which is to produce measurable results for both the product as well as pharmaceutical company. The TV commercial for *Momester®Nasal*, released in 2019, corresponds with the schema as proposed for the so-called problem-solution advertising, where four stages can be enumerated, i.e. 1) exposing the problem; 2) searching for advice; 3) finding a solution to the problem, and, finally; 4) joy at eliminating the problem (cf. Habrajska, 2017, p.126). To become effective, such a commercial should fulfill two demands: first, it has to

⁴ The analyzed TV commercial is available under the following link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cu5Rv8YZYuE> (retrieved on July 23, 2021).

be addressed to those consumers who “readily identify with a problem” and, second, it is to convince a potential customer that the problem might be “easily solved by purchasing the product” (Imber & Toffler, 2008, p. 34).

The form of the commercial itself is also vital here since it resembles a short film which portrays a fragment of the main protagonist’s life: the man struggles with allergy, which impedes normal life and daily activities such as relishing in nature or spending free time with his friends outside. In this sense, the commercial can be referred to as a “mini-drama” in the sense of Esslin (1979), since, as aptly pointed by the scholar, “of all the art forms only drama can communicate such an immense amount of information on so many levels simultaneously within the span of a few seconds” (p. 99; see also Berger, 1996; Forceville, 2009)⁵. A multimodal message of the commercial is co-constructed by employing three modes, i.e. a) the visual mode, b) the linguistic mode, and c) the aural mode. The visual mode offers the presentation of the man wearing a spacesuit that protects him from pollen (metonymically represented here by the dandelion clock). In the consecutive scene the man takes off a helmet and reaches for *Momester®Nasal*, a nasal spray that relieves the symptoms of seasonal allergic rhinitis. Next, the protagonist, wearing casual clothes, enjoys the picnic while being in the park with friends and, in the final scene, recommends the spray to a woman in a spacesuit - another allergy sufferer.

The linguistic mode as depicted in the commercial manifests itself via both written or spoken words. The spoken message, presented here in the form of a voice-over, is an example of an extradiegetic narrating situation, where the objective narrator plays the role of “the authority of a rational purchase” (Moraru, 2011, p. 60). The message goes as follows: “Alergia to kosmiczny problem” [allergy is a cosmic problem] / “Zrób wielki krok w blokowaniu jej objawów” [make a giant step in blocking allergy symptoms] / “Przełom–*Momester®Nasal*–pierwszy dostępny bez recepty steryd najnowszej generacji” [a real breakthrough–*Momester®Nasal*–the first new generation OTC steroid] / “Stosuj raz dziennie, by blokować objawy alergii na długo” [apply once daily to block allergy symptoms for a long time]⁶. Apart from the message delivered by the narrator, a potential customer is also confronted with the written text which plays the role of a slogan here. This reads as follows: Wielki krok w blokowaniu objawów alergii [a giant step in blocking allergy symptoms], and is presented at the end of the commercial. Looking at the function the linguistic mode plays in the realm of advertising, we incline to the statement made by Kress (1998) which holds that “language is no longer the central semiotic mode” (p. 186). However, allowing for a cognitive perspective, language does play an important role since people tend to remember

⁵ Forceville (2009) adopts the notion of mini-narrative for such contexts.

⁶ All subsequent translations are delivered by the author of this paper.

advertising words easily, especially when compared to images. As observed by Fang (2019):

When it comes to an image, even though the image is reproduced and depicted in the brain, it cannot be called out as clear and fast as language does when the memory output is needed. [...] The image is easy to attract attention, but it is difficult to be clearly remembered. Language just makes up for this defect of image. Therefore, the combination of images and language can achieve the best publicity. (p. 326)

The third mode that is used within the analyzed commercial is the aural mode, where, as for the linguistic mode, two elements intertwine. These include: a) off-stage voices – noises that resemble the conversation between astronauts during the first landing on the moon and b) audible classical music: the opening section of Richard Strauss' tone poem *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, more recognizable as a self-contained piece of music used in Stanley Kubrick's film *2001: A Space Odyssey* (1968), the leitmotif also used in popular culture as "a signifier of impending glories" (Cheal, 2020, p.1). Strauss' music used in the analyzed TV commercial begins with the opening fanfare, where low-humming organ pedal, cellos and double basses create "a sense of potentiality" (p. 2). When the fanfare is joined by the rest of the orchestra, the listener experiences the burst of ecstasy. Another important issue about the musical theme used here are strong bonds with crucial scenes in Kubrick's film which are to symbolize the progress of mankind (see the scene with an ape and a bone). The choice of appropriate music for a commercial is not incidental, either. As pointed out by Polarny (2019), music in advertising is important for at least three reasons. First, it serves as an excellent tool for persuasion: when a potential customer hears a recognizable motif, little time is left for a rational data analysis: in such situations, a customer is more likely to buy a given product without any hesitation. Second, music creates positive mood among potential customers: the more recognizable a piece of music, the greater chance for purchasing the product. Finally, music chosen for a given ad has to be compatible with the product it is to "illustrate". As pointed out by Suggs (2017),

[M]usic is important in advertising, but selecting the right music is even more important. Marketers need to understand their message and select music that conveys the same or similar message. [...] The shots in the advertisement and the beat of the song should be parallel to enable a certain flow. (p. 1)

Let us now proceed to the analysis of selected scenes from a TV commercial for *Momester®Nasal* to illustrate the phenomenon of highlighting and hiding and the way it influences the ultimate meaning conveyed in the commercial. To do this, three factors have to be taken into consideration, i.e. i) the meaning results from the interplay of various modes which are "co-present in a communicational ensemble" (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2001, p. 111), ii) diverse modes reinforce and

complement each other, and iii) multimodal approach to communication does not favour any of the modes applied in a message, but may, sometimes, highlight one of them (cf. Winiarska & Załazińska, 2017, p. 7). The above statements hold true for the interplay we observe between the linguistic, visual, and aural mode in one of the initial scenes of the commercial for *Momester®Nasal*. When the narrator utters a sentence “Zrób wielki krok w blokowaniu jej objawów” [make a giant step in blocking allergy symptoms], the phrase “wielki krok” [a giant step] is distinguished from the rest of the phrase by a raising voice and simultaneously accompanied by the visual layer, in which a viewer experiences zooming into the action of trampling plants that are the source of pollen allergy. Thus, two elements are highlighted: i) the phrase “wielki krok” [a giant step], extrapolated from a longer sentence “Zrób wielki krok w blokowaniu jej objawów” [make a giant step in blocking allergy symptoms] and ii) the shot of trampling plants with a boot, taken from a longer scene depicting the man walking in the park in a space suit.

The choice of highlighted elements is not coincidental, but points to a deliberate action of copywriters since the phrase “wielki krok” [a giant step] as depicted in the linguistic mode is, in fact, a paraphrase of the astronaut Neil Armstrong’s famous sentence uttered as he stepped off the Apollo Lunar Module in 1969⁷. The aural mode, represented by a merely heard sound of Strauss’ motif, instantaneously associated with Kubrick’s *Space Odyssey*, is a hidden modality here, though it also supports the meaning of the linguistic-visual-aural ensemble which guides the recipient of the message towards the notion of power, progress and success, all three features also desirable for the advertised product, *Momester®Nasal*.

Another interesting moment in the commercial where the three modes overlap and criss-cross is seen for the scene with the man reaching for *Momester®Nasal* to relieve allergic rhinitis. For the visual plane of the commercial, the mini-drama ceases to be a significant factor. Instead, the viewer is confronted with a schematic image of a nose and a bottle of spray containing the advertised drug which is applied to the nose. In this sense, one element of the visual mode (i.e. the story of the man) is replaced with another, more technical one (the board depicting a nose, coupled with enumerated symptoms of allergy), which might also be read as the process of highlighting and hiding within one mode. In the foreground stand the linguistic mode and the aural mode which intertwine for a couple of seconds. First, the linguistic mode is highlighted in order to inform a potential customer about the advantages as well as offer him/her basic information about the drug (“Przełom–*Momester®Nasal*–pierwszy dostępny bez recepty steryd najnowszej

⁷ The original Armstrong’s sentence in English goes as follows: ‘That’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.’ Polish translation offers a plausible and faithful version here: „to mały krok dla człowieka, ale wielki (krok) dla ludzkości”. Thus, the phrase “wielki krok” [a giant step] as used in the analyzed commercial is a slight modification of the original phrase.

generacji” [a real breakthrough—*Momester®Nasal*— the first new generation OTC steroid] / “Stosuj raz dziennie, by blokować objawy alergii na długo” [apply once daily to block allergy symptoms for a long time]. Next, the aural mode comes in the foreground as it dominates over two elements of the linguistic mode, i.e. “Przełom” [a real breakthrough] and *Momester®Nasal*. The aural mode unfolds and intensifies in the final scene where we again come back to the mini-narrative, in which we see the man offering a nasal spray to a woman wearing a space suit. Here, other modes make way for the sound, or, more precisely, “the burst of ecstasy” represented by all orchestra (Cheal, 2020, p. 2), the pivotal aim of which is to strengthen delight over the effectiveness and novelty in treating allergy by the advertised product.

It is also interesting to notice that the effect of highlighting and hiding is not only seen while dealing with distinct modes, but also within the same mode. Apart from the already mentioned overlapping of dynamic mini-drama with a static board depicting the advertised product within the visual mode, a good example can be recalled for the linguistic mode as represented in the very first sentence “Alergia to kosmiczny problem” [allergy is a cosmic problem]. Here, the first meaning of the word “cosmic” in the sense of “relating to the universe and the natural processes that happen in it” (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/>) is relegated to a secondary position, thus becoming the element hidden, while “cosmic” interpreted as “very great” (<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/>), becomes the element highlighted, since it corresponds with a huge problem allergy is.

The phenomenon of highlighting and hiding may also be successfully rendered by means of the Fauconnier and Turner four-space model of conceptual integration (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002) to illustrate how dynamic cognitive processes process information expressed by the three modes, as well as show how much information comprised in these modes is further projected onto the ultimate meaning of the commercial in question. Let us now deconstruct the commercial for *Momester®Nasal* allowing for the tools of Fauconnier and Turner’s theory (2002).

Conceptual integration (also known as conceptual blending, cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; also Libura 2007, 2010) is a higher cognitive operation, according to which meaning construction involves selective integration of conceptual elements belonging to two (or more) distinct mental spaces, known as input spaces, and being the basis for a novel meaning which dynamically emerges in a given context. The result of this operation is the so-called conceptual blend which “does not obliterate the inputs” but “provides a human-scale integrated scenario that serves as a conceptual anchor for the conceptual integration network” (Turner, 2008, pp. 13–14; also Zawisławska, 2011). The decoding of blend, the ultimate meaning being the result of the conceptual integration, is possible owing to four spaces involved in the process, i.e. i) two input spaces, which play the role of repositories created to recall elements associated with a particular concept; ii) the generic space in which shared

characteristics of the two inputs are found, and iii) the blended space being a combination of selected elements taken from input spaces as well as having “emergent structure of its own” (Oakley & Coulson, 2000, p. 178).

When adjusted to the needs of multimodal analysis proposed for the commercial in question, a four space integration offers two input spaces, i.e. the input for SPACE (input space 1) and the input for ALLERGY (input space 2), both allowing for the modes which operate within each input. Judging from the analysis for *Momester@Nasal*, it seems that input space 1 involves three modes: visual, linguistic and aural, while input space 2 works upon visual and linguistic modes only. Elements that constitute input space 1 include, i.a.: **the universe**, space exploration, space experts, **spacesuit visor**, progress, **astronaut protection**, health problems, isolation, achievements, limitations, **NASA logo**, *2001: Space Odyssey*, the utterance “that’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind”, *Strauss’ music, fanfare, orchestra*, the word “cosmic” (in the sense of “very giant”), or the word cosmic (in the sense of “connected with the universe), *off-stage voices*, to enumerate a few⁸. In input space 2 such elements, as, e.g. **NASAL logo**, **medicine** (*Momester@Nasal*), **allergy sufferer**, health problem, suffering, **pollen**, doctors and pharmacists, expectations, research in medicine and pharmacy, efficiency, **flowers and trees**, a giant step, **grass**, **dandelion clock**, protection, carefree life, **friends**, **picnics**, entertainment, limitations, alleviating symptoms of allergy, or **the world** are found. Concepts such as success, progress or mankind belong to the generic space, since they constitute the background composed of characteristics shared by the inputs and rendered in various modes. No less important here is a network of vital relations that occur between input spaces is: we do observe various relations within the same mode (e.g. the relation of analogy between **NASA logo** and **NASAL logo**, or a part–whole relation for **the universe–the world** juxtaposition, where **the universe** remains a hidden element of the visual mode, while **the world** remains a highlighted element to portray life free from allergies, also in the visual mode), as well as and across modes, e.g. the relation of similarity between step (as rendered in the verbal mode in input space 1) and **step** as presented in the visual mode in input space 2. The most interesting issue here is the emergent meaning of the analyzed ad which guides us towards the product’s reliability, efficiency and best quality when it comes to combating allergy. The meaning here is conveyed by means of projection of selected elements which come from two input spaces, are rendered in various modes and intertwine throughout the commercial. For instance, a highlighted element giant as proposed for the linguistic mode (input space 1) mingles with the ele-

⁸ The notation as proposed herein allows the reader to distinguish elements belonging to the modes. Thus, elements belonging to the visual mode are indicated with bold, elements belonging to the linguistic mode are underlined, while elements belonging to the aural mode are italicized. Elements illustrating overlapping modes adopt double notation.

ment **step** from the visual mode (input space 2). We also experience a selective projection such elements as: problem (from input space 2), *2001: Space Odyssey* (input space 1), or *fanfare* (input space 1). Other projections, including elements which, so far, remain hidden till the very final moment finally contribute to the ultimate message of the commercial. These include, e.g. cosmic (connected with the universe), or **achievements** (a putative element that corresponds with the visual mode). When combined altogether, selected highlighted elements found in three analyzed modes successfully illustrate the general message of the commercial: *Momester®Nasal* is a revolutionary medicine product which combats allergy, a “cosmic” problem in contemporary society in an efficient way. The efficiency of the medicine is additionally strengthened by the fanfare heralding the ultimate success of the drug, as well as by means of a paraphrased line “Wielki krok w blokowaniu objawów alergii” (a giant step in blocking allergy symptoms). The schema of selected elements belonging to distinct modes and taking part in the integration is presented in Figure 1:




Figure 1: The integration of modes for *Momester®Nasal* commercial (based on the Fauconnier and Turner (2002) four-space integration network model)

3. Conclusions

The present paper is a modest proposal how to deal with various modalities used in a TV commercial adopting selected aspects of cognitive linguistics. As emphasised by Fabiszak (2017),

tools [...] developed within cognitive linguistics for the analysis of language, can be applied to other forms of non-verbal communication with the aim of elucidating the meaning-making processes in multimodal communication. (p. 267)

For this reason, cognitive operations such as the effect of highlighting and hiding, or the phenomenon of conceptual blending, are fully justified to be taken into account while analyzing *Momester®Nasal* commercial presented herein.

Undoubtedly, a plethora of modes applied in the commercial as well as the way they overlap and criss-cross thus forming a “multimodal grid” also contributes both to the dynamicity and creativity of the commercial. This dynamicity and creativity of the commercial is additionally boosted by what El Refaie (2015) calls the “cross-modal resonance”, i.e. the result of “exploiting the distinct characteristics and meaning potential of the various modes and their combinations” (El Refaie, 2015, pp. 14–15). Such resonances give the possibility to fill in the gap for one modality with the other, especially when the former is insufficient to provide the information required for a given commercial. On the other hand, for purely practical reasons, cross-modal resonances also give a copywriter the possibility to manoeuvre between such factors as time limitations or legal regulations imposed on the commercial that have to be taken into account as far as drug commercials are concerned.

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