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Abstract: Mediatization scholars promised to connect mediatization research with social theory, describe its interplay with other meta-processes, and create a “common theoretically based roof”. Hepp and Couldry state that the concept of logic is unable to do that, yet do not provide for the alternative. The paper argues there is a wide misunderstanding what the concept of logic actually is and what it is bringing to the table. Hepp considers logic in terms of “narrow and reductionist thinking”. Media logic is questioned in terms of its universal validity compared to mathematical or philosophical logic. There are at least two significant problems with this attitude towards logic. First, there is sociological logic. Even the theorists that provide the conceptual background of cultural or constructivist approach to mediatization use the concept of logic: Bourdieu and Elias. While they use the concept of logic to describe the organizing principle of *habitus* or figuration formations, it is cultural mediatization theorists that reject that. Second, even if media logic is too static or rigid, in times of digitalization and datafication the concept of logic is not institutionalist at all – it is mathematical and philosophical, embodied by digital technology itself, artificial intelligence (logical reasoning), algorithms (logic in software), social bots and automation. The paper argues media logic can help mediatization to become a roof term for media studies.

Keywords: media logic; deep mediatization; Pierre Bourdieu; Norbert Elias; media studies

Introduction

Why is media logic a contested subject in mediatization research? Mediatization needs a way to communicate research results in a clear way, interact with other disciplines, such as sociology or AI research, and incorporate their findings as well. To this day, we do not have a concept that can do that, other than media logic. If mediatization has to become a roof term for media studies (Krotz, 2014), even a key theoretical concept (Couldry & Hepp, 2013), a key and a roof need a door and a house. The door has to be open, and a house needs a clear architecture. Culturalist mediatization scholars

are fully opposed to media logic, with some exceptions within the realm of political communication. Media logic is seen as rigid, linear, and static concept (Hepp, 2013), and at the same time a term that cannot hold universal validity, like philosophical and mathematical logic (Krotz, 2014). These statements do not provide an alternative. We still need a concept that is communicable, clear and critical.

If mediatization is a meta-process, then it has a relationship with other meta-processes, such as globalization or modernization. We need to describe this mutual dependency. So far, mediatization scholars did not focus on the question of the interplay between crucial meta-processes of our times. What if globalization and modernization have a logic? Second, if mediatization should be a key term for media studies, how can all the media research find its way to describe the whole metaprocess? It cannot be done with a specific theoretical approach, but all approaches have to find a roof term. All media scholars have to accept the key of their house. Media logic seems to be a fruitful way to do that. Paradoxically, a roof term has to be less specific (e.g. figuration), because it has to be open and communicable to social, computer, even natural sciences.

Media logic asks a straightforward question: how is social stock of knowledge transformed by media? If media is a social force, then people's worldviews and knowledge they implemented in everyday interactions has to be a product of media-communicative change. The form of communication has to shape the social knowledge, and subsequently condition socio-cultural change. Without this there is no mediatization. When David Altheide and Robert Snow called this form media logic they probably did not expect the definition will become so controversial: "Media logic becomes a way of 'seeing' and of interpreting social affairs" (1979, p. 7). How the information is transmitted, or how the ideas are presented, or what formats organize the material, these are the questions for both mass media content and for big data. For Altheide and Snow, it does not matter if it is a narrative or an algorithm, audiovisual of digital, it is a "social and technological procedure or device that is used for the selection, transmission, and reception of information" (1979, p. 11). Many decades later, media logic is still "a way of seeing and interpreting activities and social meanings" and what we should be concerned with is how technologies and formats "govern the structure, grammar, form, expectations, and meanings of messages" (Altheide, 2022, p. xiv).

Mediatization resides at this concept, and stands and falls with it. My goal is to show there are no fundamental arguments why we would be better without the concept of logic. It is useful at least as a "photograph" of the mediatization meta-process, in order to take a closer look at its breakthrough moments (Nowak-Teter & Pleszczyński, 2022, p. 89). The first section will present the media logic debate that started around the year 2013, primarily between Stig Hjarvard and Andreas Hepp. Then this paper will proceed to explain that social theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias use the notion of logic in specific ways, that are different than the institutional approach, but nevertheless are not opposed to it. The third section will focus on deep mediatization and its

need of even deeper logic in the times of datafication and automation. The paper will conclude with the finding that the concept of media logic is more necessary than ever. We cannot really make mediatization a roof or key term for media studies without it.

In search of the lost logic

In the year 2013, media logic was one of the disputed themes. Hjarvard and Hepp approached it with a peculiar disagreement. They both recall Knut Lundby's attitude towards media logic but describe Lundby's view differently. Hepp sees Lundby as a critic of Hjarvard. Media logic assumes autonomous and unitary diffusion and media influence (Hepp, 2013, p. 45). Hjarvard repeats the same argument, but sees Lundby's work primarily as a critique of Altheide and Snow, and not of his own position. Hjarvard thinks his approach is complementary to Georg Simmel's forms, rather than reduced to media formats (2013, p. 17).

How is it possible that Hepp sees media logic as a very monolithic concept, but Hjarvard sees it as a very adaptable to any social or cultural domain, even though both Hepp and Hjarvard state their positions based on the same author – Knut Lundby? They disagree on the basic assumptions about media logic. While Hepp and Coul-dry state the concept of logic suggests a linear development of social change, and a singular logic behind media operations, Hjarvard thinks those that propose such a narrow understanding of media logic are hard to find. This is not the best way to debate the concept of logic, but nevertheless it is a controversy at the heart of medi-atization research.

Hjarvard maintains media logic is a shorthand for institutional, aesthetic, and technological *modus operandi* of the media. It embodies the ways in which media distribute material and symbolic resources, and operate with the help of formal and informal rules. Social interaction and communication are shaped by the media. Hjarvard's position is that we cannot explain mediatization meta-process without grasping the characteristics of the media, its properties and dynamics. If we ignore these specificities and dissolve them into situated social practice, "we are left with an enigma, and not an answer to the problem" (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 18). Hjarvard states the need for further theoretical work, rather than relying on a postmodern framework.

Media logic as a mass media concept is already established, but Hjarvard and Altheide think there are no obstacles for using it in the 21st century, as "digital media logic" (Altheide, 2022, p. 16). For Hjarvard, it is still all about material and symbolic resources, and formal and informal rules, that can be defined in the case of digital media. "The service of new media is not least to produce social relations between people, and users are increasingly prompted to generate the content by themselves" (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 26). The new media logic is two-sided, embodied by media professionalism and audience/user involvement. Mediatization scholars should describe

the rules and resources related to media professionals and users. The perspective is general enough that it does not have to be merely institutional.

On the other hand, Hepp thinks this logic does not focus on the subjects and meanings they produce, but assumes institutions have something called a logic, which is actually a reflection more than an essential quality of the institutions (2013, p. 46). Hepp states the social reality is more complex than that, and one logic cannot explain it. Hjarvard would ask how then we can describe the interaction between media, culture and society? Media co-structure the way people act in a society. Hjarvard maintains logic is not that determinating. It is an analytical concept, that helps us to grasp the complex dynamics between the institutions, the “inter-institutional configuration” (2018, p. 64) that encompasses mass, interpersonal and social media.

Media logic(s) would, therefore, embody journalism logic, genre forms and network logic. It is the *modus operandi* behind the production of news, entertainment, or a constitution of a social network. While Hepp (2020) thinks digital media are in constant beta stage, Hjarvard sees platforms like YouTube as a mix of TV and network logic, that is the *modus operandi* of both mass and social media. Google for Hjarvard (2018, p. 74) is involved in classical activities like the library management, individual interpersonal communication like e-mail, some experiments with social networks and, of course – search engine. With this idea of “conjunction of media logics”, one could “isolate certain (sub)logics that explain how media organizations and media content change depending on the development of external forces” (Nowak-Teter, 2024).

Hepp (2020, p. 58) insists we are dealing with liquid modernity of Zygmunt Bauman, and all we have is liquid media process. This is a fundamental question because it is a question of change. If everything is in constant flux, if it is liquid, where is the change? Elias has an interesting take on this. If we observe clouds, and we have even digital clouds nowadays, “now they look like this, now like that” (2000, p. 452). These are not structural changes with particular direction. They do not relate to the structure of society. Therefore, they are not social change but “beta”, which is actually not change. Structural change needs an “instrument of research”, and adequate tool for inquiry (Elias, 2000, p. 452).

Why do culturalist mediatization scholars contest the concept of media logic? First, it is seen as a form of communication that social interaction is adapting to. Content is organized in a specific style and format, so that media genres and aesthetics contribute to the change of interactive order (Hepp, 2020, p. 62). Hepp’s argument is that this is more a question of people’s perception, and that media characteristics that we call logic are attributed and even imagined expectations rather than real description of how media function. However, this does not really change what media logic is about: *modus operandi* of both professionals and audience/users, related to the distribution of symbolic and material resources, with the help of formal and informal rules, implemented by both professionals and audience/users (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 26). Whether

it is perception or an essential quality of the medium is not really the fundamental question when it comes to media logic. What users or media professionals imagine, perceive and expect is *modus operandi* of the media.

The idea that media logic is too static, and reifies the dynamics of media's processual character, has led Hepp (2020, p. 58) to the postmodern idea of liquid media process. However, like Elias argues, eventually change is structural and has to be described, and at that point the description of the process has to be "static", but it is nevertheless the only instrument to register a structural change. Because even processes have a structure. Unlike postmodern view of liquidity, even liquids have a structure. Saying that this structure is only perceived does not change the fact that it is a structure.

Mediatization without social theory or Pierre Bourdieu?

For Pierre Bourdieu, logic consists of "a few generative principles" that organize all thoughts and actions through practice (1990, p. 86). It is a fundamental organizing principle of the social world (Hepp, 2020, p. 60). Hepp maintains this search for an underlying structure or a pattern is not what media logic is all about. Hepp does not really explain why Bourdieu's practical logic is nothing like media logic, even though Nick Couldry (2003) maintained long ago media's meta-capital is providing the media with the power to define social affairs.

Bourdieu explicitly defines *habitus* as *modus operandi* and argues different social fields have a "specific logic", so that structured products are produced by "structuring structures" through "retranslations" according to the field's specific logic (1996, p. 172). Media logic is a shorthand for media's *modus operandi*, and *habitus* is the *modus operandi* of the social realm. "The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 170). While media logic is defined as a way of seeing and interpreting the social world, *habitus* that organizes the perception of the social world does not really resonate with the notion of media logic, according to culturalists.

Bourdieu himself talks about the production of "reality effects" by television. Television makes people believe in what it shows, it gives life to ideas and images, and all this "implies a social construction of reality that can mobilize (or demobilize) individuals and groups" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 21). The social world is primarily described and prescribed by the media to an extent that social actors in the TV universe are "the puppets of a necessity that we must understand, of a structure that we must unearth and bring to light" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 38). Bourdieu implements his concept of *habitus* into the media sphere analysis without any problem. Culturalists, on the other hand, claim this misses many nuances and complex relationships that media logic concept cannot tackle.

For Bourdieu, this is a question of “conditions of knowledge” (1990, p. 1). Without the knowledge of the conditions we cannot grasp the progress of knowledge. Couldry and Hepp (2017, p. 122) directly relate deep mediatization meta-process with “how we acquire social knowledge”, and state that “datafication changes the way we produce knowledge” (p. 52). If, as Couldry and Hepp (2017, p. 196) argue, “dataism is directly opposed to a phenomenological approach to knowledge, including social knowledge”, we have to understand the new “knowledge production” (p. 204). Bourdieu relies on the notion of logic to provide an academic explanation of the progress of knowledge. “In order to meet the most practical requirements of scientific practice, that we must make an analysis of the specific logic and the social conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge in the social sciences” (1990, p. 29).

Bourdieu (1996, p. 14) can examine the connections between listening to radio broadcasts or records, owning a record-player, and visiting art galleries, see strong correlations of those media and cultural practices, and state that all of them “obey the same logic”. There is a “logic of supply” (form of competition between producers) and “logic of demand and tastes” (form of competition between the consumers), a logic of the whole economy of cultural goods (Bourdieu, 1996, pp. 1, 99–100). Also, there is a logic in the field of both production and consumption (p. 232), “logic of goods production” and “logic of taste production” (p. 241).

Are media the markets of cultural goods? Is there a possibility to analyse the production of content and consumption of content on digital platforms, and find its Bourdieuan logic? If *habitus* is “the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the social world” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 170), then this principle can be examined in the case of algorithms, that create logical classes and organize the perception of big data. Bourdieu would try to find the logic of datafication and automation. Moreover, “the correspondence which is thereby objectively established between the classes of products and the classes of consumers is realized in acts of consumption only through the mediation of that sense of the homology between goods and groups which defines tastes” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 232). Bourdieu’s social theory maintains there is a logical correspondence between products, social practices, classes and social tastes. Digital platforms’ business models cannot function if the platforms cannot directly relate consumers’ tastes with their social group identities and databases. This is the logic of the economy of cultural goods, at the basis of Bourdieu’s social theory (1996, p. 1).

Mediatization without meta-process or Norbert Elias?

Elias wants to steer a course between Scylla of “staticism” and Charybdis of “historical relativism” and find “the order underlying this transformation” called the meta-process of civilization, that is “the order underlying historical changes, their mechanics and their concrete mechanisms” (Elias, 2000, p. xiii). It seem there is nothing

liquid about this order and that civilization meta-process has a specific mechanics. Can we call this mechanics logic? Elias maintains logic was never related to “eternal forms of thought” or based on immutable rules, and that this view of logical patterns is indeed “theological” (Elias, 1978, p. 42). Aristotelian heritage never associated the idea of logic to eternal laws of thought. This is how “people use the word »logical« nowadays” (Elias, 1978, p. 42) There is nothing static about this, and it can always be turned into a dynamic concept of a power relationship (p. 116).

Elias thinks this is what figuration conceptually represents. He proposes an example of dance. Functionalists would see dance as a system based on rules that isolated individuals follow. Elias (2000, p. 482) thinks dance is something larger than two participants. It is a structure that has no rigid rules, but is not a chaotic anarchy either. Elias (1978, p. 123) also gives an example of a football game, which is not a system of abstract individuals that play specific positions in a team hierarchy, but a constantly changing figuration, where the players are in a very dynamic relationship. I will leave to the reader whether football game has a certain logic, but we can at least say there is nothing static about counterattack, yet it can be explained with the help of football rules and its “chains of interdependence” (p. 131).

The same applies to the civilization meta-process. True transformation has to be evident in both personal and social structures of the society. Elias calls it psychogenesis and sociogenesis. Civilization embodies two types of fundamental changes, one in the structure of individual personalities, and the other in the structure of the state and the economy. There is a structured order underlying these changes, and can be described posteriori. For Elias meta-processes are dynamic but ordered. “Beneath many differences of historical detail between the various countries, there was a structural parallelism in their overall development as societies” (Elias, 1978, p. 63).

Culturalists seem to disagree about these parallels in development, as well as the necessity to analyse the sociogenetic phase of mediatization meta-process, because Elias (1978, p. 64) insists on “the common direction” in such an “all-pervading transformation”. “Explore, expand, exploit and exterminate (...) fair summary of the formula applied by the European colonisers”, this is four X’s of data colonialism (Mejias & Couldry, 2024, p. 4). The four X’s formula does imply a certain unity of influence and direction. Elias acknowledges we cannot examine just one sphere of development (media or economy) but the whole transformation, and we have to register structural parallelism and “fundamental common features in the development of most European countries” (1978, p. 64). Within Elias’ framework, mediatization scholars would have to examine industrialization, democratization and mediatization together, not as isolated phenomena. We cannot do that without “easily communicable concepts to facilitate the study of such overall social changes” (Elias, 1978, p. 64). Here we are just one step from the complete concept of logic.

When it comes to meta-process analysis, we would have to explain the triad of basic controls in different stages of development. First, long-term social development

has to be considered “by the extent of its control-chances over non-human complexes of events”, or technological control of nature (Elias, 1978, p. 156). This is a question of industrialism, but is also related to datafication and automation. The second aspect is related to control-chances over interpersonal relationships. It is closer to mediatization because it opens questions of social bonds and social organization. The third aspect is civilization meta-process itself. It is about the development of self-control of human passions, the development of rationality (logic?). These triad of basic controls are “directly interdependent” among themselves (Elias, 1978, p. 157). Today, digital data are important for the whole triad, and should be examined if we want to talk about the complete meta-process of mediatization.

Moreover, Elias offers an explanation of civilizing meta-process in the last 500 years, while Couldry and Hepp (2017) provided their view of waves of mediatization in the same time period without any reference to Elias. We should not talk extensively about feudalism and absolutist monarchy as types of historical figurations, but figurations and the mechanics Elias uncovers are the result of this historical development. For example, the sociogenetic aspect of civilization meta-process brought the development of public administration, and subsequently democracy, which is a form of hegemony, or public monopoly. It is a concentration of power due to elimination of competition. Monopoly is something that media studies are familiar with, and we should discuss this when it comes to mediatization, especially because Elias maintains “the mechanism leading to hegemony is always the same” (2000, p. 268).

If monopoly construction is always the same, from private feudal lands to public democracies, then we have to expect something interesting for contemporary media studies. Monopolized resources are at first private, like private media corporations, but eventually they become a public monopoly or under public control (Elias, 2000, p. 276). No mediatization scholar really questioned this elephant in the room (Murdock, 2017). If the change of media figurations towards possible public monopoly has its structural regularities and dynamics, that civilization meta-process already has (Elias, 2000, p. 316), then why not discuss this? Hepp (2020, p. 18) believes the focus mainly on political economy would give us a one-dimensional view, but this is not what Elias’ sociogenetic analysis is. Elias thinks we cannot examine changes in personal structures without examining changes in social structures.

This is all a framework that examines the totality of civilization meta-process. Elias also offers a middle-range approach where he uncovers patterns of rationality. It is related to the “drive economy” or affect control, as well as changes in conduct and patterns of “intelligence” (Elias, 2000, p. 404). This “intelligence” is really the *modus operandi* of different social or ethnic groups. People in different cultures experienced different moulding of rationality, but there are some universal aspects. There is court-rationality of absolutist monarchy, as well as urban-commercial rationality of trade networks, that supported another project of clear logic – Enlightenment (Elias,

2000, p. 406). All this bares close resemblance to the idea of the *modus operandi* of media professionals, because it is a matter of conduct, intelligence and rules.

There are many other interesting phenomena in Elias' work that could be considered. For example, aggressive affects, that were transformed by the civilization meta-process, were transferred from direct action to spectating. It is a question of the rules and resources of human conduct, related to the media. Instead of real expression of aggression, the pleasure was now found in passive and more ordered action of watching sport matches or listening to radio commentary (Elias, 2000, p. 170). Even combatants themselves are regulated and conditioned, so there can be no bad consequences. Books, theatre and cinema provided a civilized way to moderate and humanize aggressive instincts of humanity. "The visual satisfaction of the urge to cruelty, the joy in watching pain inflicted, emerges in a particular pure form" (Elias, 2000, p. 171). Based on this insight, mediatization scholars could examine today's media expression of aggressive behaviour and emotions and whether the civilization of the affects changed its course, considering the different attitude toward the images of violence today, from television to TikTok screens.

On the other hand, there was also a change in personality structures, that is related to the phenomena of romantic love, which for Elias is a modern form of relationship. In his book *Civilizing Process*, Elias showed this structural change from feudal patriarchal society, where the knights did not come from fairy tales but subordinated woman harshly, to a change of figuration that was influenced by artists such as court troubadours. They approached court ladies with Minnesang songs in a more emotional and refined setting, that warrior aristocrats had to adjust to. It was not just a more sentimental change in male and female relationships, but Elias maintains it was also a "first form of emancipation" for women (2000, p. 252). Relationships between men and women today are at the centre of many digital platforms. The form and development of their emotional connections could be examined within Elias' framework. What we have to accept is that we need a defined and structured *modus operandi* in all those specific cases.

Deep mediatization without deep logic?

Culturalists consider media logic in terms of narrow and reductionist thinking. Unlike the "universal validity" of mathematical and philosophical logic, media logic is seen as not universal (Krotz, 2014). The problem with that is twofold. First, the assumption of universal validity of logic is not really that valid. I have already mentioned that for Elias (1978, p. 42) there was nothing eternal about forms of thought, and so-called immutable rules of Aristotelian logic. John von Neumann, a computer scientist, would also add there is nothing absolute about mathematical method and the "prestige of logic" (1995, p. 642). Second, even if media logic is too static or rigid, in times of digitalization and datafication the concept of logic is not institutionalist

at all – it is mathematical and philosophical, embodied by digital technology itself, artificial intelligence (logical reasoning), algorithms (logic in software), social bots and automation. Logic is even more omnipresent in the digital sphere, that we may need a techno-semiotic dimension of media logic in order to understand it (Bolin, 2024).

Deep mediatization is a term that resonates with various concepts, such as deep learning, the “automated learning processes based on algorithmic processes” (Hepp, 2020, p. 7); deep analytics and data mining. It is definitely a stage of mediatization where the analysis of algorithms and AI becomes crucial. Hepp maintains this has nothing to do with logic, even though it meets the criteria. It transforms the “social stock of knowledge” (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 7), it is a “social or technological procedure” for processing information (p. 11); also it distributes material and symbolic resources, with the help of rules (Hjarvard, 2013). AI is some kind of intelligence afterall, while algorithms have obvious connection to mathematical logic. If media logic is *modus operandi* that characterize the workings of the media, digital media are characterized by AI, algorithms and datafication, which brought new procedures for the transformation of the social stock of knowledge.

Algorithms are defined as “process amplifiers”, “a set of steps to accomplish a task”, “a recipe that specifies the exact sequence of steps required to solve a problem” (Hepp, 2020, pp. 74–75). Hepp does not explain how is this not a *modus operandi*, the distribution of symbolic and material resources with the help of formal and informal rules. Algorithms are also defined as “encoded procedures for transforming input data” (Hepp, 2020, p. 75), which means they are procedures for processing information. There is an older and very precise definition, and that is “Algorithm = Logic + Control” (Kowalski, 1979). If the algorithms “model idealized forms of social practice and new institutionalized forms of social organization” (Hepp, 2020, p. 76), it means they are a way of seeing and interpreting the social world. Hepp maintains algorithms are fast-changing black boxes, that we cannot sufficiently conceptualize due to the pace of change. Algorithm changes on Facebook and Twitter (now X) clearly demonstrate processual character of digital media, Hepp believes, so that they are forever in beta stage and constant flux, because coded algorithms can be changed easily and instantly (Hepp, 2020, p. 77). There is a contradiction in the argument that argues everything can be functionally automatic, but there is no description of the automated process.

Communicative bots or automated orientation aids, like recommendation and aggregation systems, are not unknowable and unreachable, and we can describe their *modus operandi*. For example, in the case of searching and selecting music, Hepp talks about “the accompanying automated processing and taste classification” (2020, p. 80) but does not mention neither Bourdieu, nor that this is a form of designed communication, calculation and classification, and definitely datafication. Furthermore, if social bots “operate as if real people were doing the communicating” (Hepp, 2020), then we have a description of real people’s *modus operandi*. One can simulate it because it is possible to describe it. Also, if bots are “scripts imitating Twitter users”, that means

the behaviour of bots can be described as their distribution of symbolic and material resources. Every script is programmed.

If “users are represented in a highly structured manner” in their interactions on the digital platforms, “the representation and communication of humans is pre-structured to such an extent that their replication by machines is comparatively simple” (Hepp, 2020, p. 80). It means *modus operandi*, the procedure for processing information and distributing material and symbolic resources, is pre-structured, so that technologies can replicate social norms and behaviours (Natale & Depounti, 2024). Natale and Depounti even mention models of the social dynamics that are produced by algorithmic structures and automation of communication. These abstract models transform the “social stock of knowledge” as media logic does (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 7).

When it comes to workbots or robot journalism, Hepp argues they are a form of text generation, whether it is an article or automated reporting. “Journalists have to preprogram their stories’ script into an appropriate descriptive language”, and these scripts use a certain “compositional form” that rely on the “data model” (Hepp, 2020, p. 81). The symbolic and material resources of robot journalism have even stricter rules of production and distribution than in the case of mass media logic. It is automated to an extent that we have the drive towards functionality and applicability of the technological systems (Kopecka-Piech & Bolin, 2023). We have the logic of operationalism in automated media (Kaun, 2023).

If we recall the critique of media logic, it is considered too rigid and reductionist, the proposal of an idea of the “unity of influence” of the media (Hepp, 2013, p. 44), and a linear nature or narrative of media related change (Couldry, 2008, p. 377). On the other hand, the change brought by data colonialism is straightforward:

We will see ever more areas of daily life transformed into impenetrable spaces we don't understand and have no control over, yet which are able to shape our chances of accessing crucial life resources (loans, education, healthcare, welfare and jobs). If data always discriminates, then weaving data and algorithms into the web of social decisionmaking will generate a biased system of unprecedented power. (Mejias & Couldry, 2024, p. 244)

There are the four X's of colonialism that propose the unity of influence: “Explore, expand, exploit and exterminate (...) fair summary of the formula applied by the European colonisers” (Mejias & Couldry, 2024, p. 4).

Data colonialism has a “fundamental mode of appropriation” (Couldry & Mejias, 2019, p. xxi). The basic features of data colonialism are: “the processing of ever more personal data, the universalization of logistics as a mode of management, the datafication of most aspects of labor, and the creation of data relations” (p. 188). We know it capitalizes the human life, and we can expect the “new social and economic order that installs capitalist management as the privileged mode for governing every aspect of life” (p. 189). Data colonialism is defined as mode of appropriation, mode

of management and mode of governing. It is based on the method of “propensity and probability spectrum” by the “social quantification sector” (pp. 214–215). We need to describe its operational logic, as well as automation and datafication that drive the process of deep mediatization.

Conclusions

The concept of media logic is perceived as a thing of the past, unable to grasp the digital dynamics with its rigid framework. This paper argued culturalist mediatization scholars did not provide a sufficient argument why we would be better without the concept of logic. Fundamentally, mediatization examines the transformation of the social stock of knowledge (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 7), the changes in our “knowledge production” (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 204). Media logic is concerned with how we interpret social affairs and how media govern the structure and meanings of messages (Altheide, 2022, p. xiv). The concept is open enough to be able to communicate the findings of social, computer, even natural sciences, because it is defined as a social and technological procedure for processing information and knowledge production.

Culturalist mediatization paradigm is, beyond doubt, giving us the most fruitful insights of the deep mediatization process. However, Hepp and Couldry see media logic as a linear and rigid term. Hepp (2013, p. 46) asserts media logic concept does not focus on the subjects and meanings they produce and the social reality that results from it. This leads Hepp to maintain even social logic as an “underlying »structure« or »pattern«” (2020, p. 60) is problematic. When it comes to automated communication, Hepp (2020, p. 72) states logic ascribes fixed characteristics to the media, that neglect its processual character. Media logics, both mass or digital, focuses on static descriptions of a dynamic phenomena.

The paper argued that social theories of Bourdieu and Elias do not oppose the notion of logic, nor they state it is not applicable to the media. *Habitus* is defined as *modus operandi* that organizes practices and perception of practices, as well as correspondence of classes of products and classes of consumers and their preferences (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 172). All social fields embody a specific logic, including the media sphere. Bourdieu’s theory interconnects the media and social structures, and proposes there is a logic as a “fundamental organizing principle of the social world” (Hepp, 2020, p. 60).

Moreover, Elias demonstrated that we have the order underlying structural changes of the civilization meta-process (2000, p. xiii). Elias proposed the “common direction” and “structural parallelism” in the overall development of civilizing meta-process (1978, pp. 63–64). Elias offers the triad of basic controls of the development and insists there is a “uniform direction” that we can trace within the meta-process (p. 63). There is a social and media logic related to the development of interpersonal relationships and rational human conduct.

Finally, the emergence of digital media has opened the question of many logics that coexist with the mass media logic, such as audience, professional, or techno-logic. It is based on the perspective of the reciprocal relationship between mass media formats and a new set of rules, that include algorithmization, datafication, and programmability, called “social media logic”, that is defined as “a certain rationality built into social networks” (Nowak-Teter, 2024). When it comes to deep mediatization, the social and technological procedure for processing information, and the *modus operandi* of media’s distribution of material and symbolic resources, is closest it can get to the embodiment of mathematical and philosophical logic related to digital technology, AI, algorithms and automation.

Therefore, the idea of media logic, and the conjunction of different logics, is still the most acceptable and communicable concept to facilitate the study of mediatization. There is a need for the paradigm that will encompass the totality of media research findings. We do not need specific theories without all-inclusive concepts. We need a roof for the house of complete media studies. For the time being it is media logic. It is well connected to both computer and social sciences, it is communicable and clear. It has its flows but it has no alternative. Mediatization, therefore, resides @Logic today.

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