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The media system in Ukraine. Political science approach

Introduction

The oligarchic system established in the half of 1990s took the control over the political system of the Ukrainian state. In a way it became its builder and driving mechanism. The state was treated as the resource base that had to be maximally exploited to implement the interests of particular interests. The political system, and especially political parties in a newly-created Ukrainian state were treated as a tool by means of which this aim could be achieved. Most of them fell and emerged only to satisfy the interests of their principals. The media became a hostage of that game. To gain election support for the forming countries, they constituted the element guaranteeing political legitimization of the interests of the oligarchic groups.

The attempt of reforms which were made and still are undertaken both after the Orange Revolution and the protests at the turn of 2013–2014, called in the Ukrainian discourse The Revolution of Dignity, were not able to change the Ukrainian policy substantially. It still looks like the system of the oligarchic relationships. However, we are the witnesses of the emergence of a new quality, perhaps more regulated one, shifted more from the political Surface towards the economy. Conditionality of this assumption may be justified by the dynamics of the process and the existence of the whole series of variables that affect it. In this particular case we are not going to discuss them but we will merely focus on the element that enables the legitimization of the political interests of the mentioned interest groups. The mass media are this kind of element. Consequently, we will try to give account of the media system. Similarly to the political system, the media are under control of the businessmen who are pretty strongly engaged in the political life of the state: the Puńczuk Family, Ihor Kolomojczyk, Renat Achmetow, Drymro Firtasz or Serhij Kurczenko. The press titles, TV and radio stations, in the majority of cases, are not treated as the business projects but more as the tools necessary for the political game and a chance to influence the political decisions in the country. We shall not forget about the Russian media which also carry on their own game mainly cooked up at the Kremlin.

1. Political conditionings

The presentation of the general condition of the media system shall begin with the showing of political procedures that are responsible for that state. The so-far existing patterns of functioning of an individual in the public life and planned economy with its all infrastructure heritage entered the declared democratic system in Ukraine creating the political system dedicated to the interests of industrial and capital/oligarch groups¹. The said system, due to the two great social protests referred to as the Orange Revolution and the Dignity Revolution, underwent transformations but in its principle, did not eliminate the influence of oligarchs. It is particularly visible in the case of the already formed political system in which political parties created by the oligarchic groups are more political projects than the organizations with clearly specified ideology that is perceived as the tool to achieve some goals, rather than its substantial element². As a result they become, as Yuri Szwed, Ukrainian specialist of the political system in Ukraine, notices *The machines to cast a vote and virtual project*³.

In December 2015 there were 200 political parties registered in Ukraine⁴, and in 2017 the state registers contained as many as 352 political parties⁵. However, the sociological study points out to the fact that for the last 15 years only from 2% to 5% of the citizens belonged to political parties with the permanent activation of membership in the period of elections, which is explained by the willingness to achieve some material benefits rather than the ideological support of their activity⁶.

Szwed explains this dynamics by the phenomenon of the so-called rebranding – in order to take part in the next elections, new parties are not formed but the old ones undergo reconstruction based on the already existing structure, frequently by the mere change of name, leadership and in the most cases, of their owner. After lost elections, in the clash with other formations, also representing their sponsors' (oligarchs') interests, these parties simply disappear from the political life leaving space for others⁷.

¹ See.: А. Окара, *Власть и бизнес в Украине как сиамские близнецы*, Журнал „Бизнес”, 2003, no. 31; А. Колодій, „Олігархи” й „олігархія”: Зміст понять та українська політична дійсність, „Наукові записки НаУКМА. Політичні науки” 2001, вип. 19; О.І. Пасхавер, Л.Т. Верховодова, Л.З.Суплін, *Формування великого приватного капіталу в Україні*, Київ 2004, p. 81–85.

² Ю. Шведа, *Политические партии Украины: на службе демократии или олигархии*, [w:] *Перед выбором. будущее Украины в условиях системной дестабилизации*, red. А. Гиль, Т. Стемпневски, Люблин-Львов-Київ 2013, p. 271.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 271–274.

⁴ Cit: Фонд Демократичні ініціативи Ілька Кучеріва http://dif.org.ua/uploads/pdf/1401884574_3067.pdf, Л. Гонюкова, „Політичні партії України: сучасність та перспективи розвитку, Аналітичні записки, травень 2014”, inf. of 10 III 2017. Zob. Державна реєстраційна служба. Політичні партії, <http://www.drsgov.ua/party>, inf. of 10 III 2017.

⁵ Департамент державної реєстрації і нотаріату, <http://ddr.minjust.gov.ua>, „Відомості щодо зареєстрованих у встановленому законом порядку політичних партій станом на 18 січня 2017 року, inf. of 10 III 2017.

⁶ Фонд Демократичні ініціативи Ількф Кучеріва, *op.cit.*

⁷ Ю. Шведа, *op.cit.*, p. 272.

Another important feature of the Ukrainian political system is the fact that the Ukrainian political parties do not pay much attention to their ideological sense of belonging. It is frequently easy to observe an obvious inconsistency between their activities and the values they proclaim. The significant trait, that in fact distinguishes them one from another, is their preferable course of the foreign policy- deeper integration with Russia or Europe. It is often caused by economic interests of the party sponsors and may constitute one of the key reasons for which ideological coalitions between various political parties are concluded. The example of the above is the coalition of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Party of Regions.

Low ideologization manifests itself also in the phenomenon of the mass transfer of representatives from one party to another with the totally different postulates than the ones under which a representative had been chosen to the parliament. The example is the transfer of a great part of the representatives from the Batkiwshchyna Party to the Party of Regions accompanied by the accusations of the change of the party caused by the obtaining of the financial profits from the Party of Regions.

The attempt of de-oligarchisation of politics after 2013 calling for the exclusion of oligarchs from the political decision-making process turned out to be inefficient. The existing policy-makers (oligarchs) supporting the Party of Regions, losing their political backup after its collapse, withdrew from more or less visible interference with the decision-making process. Nevertheless, some oligarchs, such as for example, Ihor Kolomojsky, who set up a political project called the Ukrainian association of Patriots ("Ukrop"); oligarchic groups of Firtasz and Liowoczkin – oligarchs originating in the Party of Regions who established the Opposition Block, still show the tendency to take the monopolistic control over the parliamentarian groups.

The media equipped with a greater freedom of speech and addressing the society's expectations connected with the elimination of oligarchs from the political scene, started to look for the sources of financing of the political parties. However, these attempts seem to be very fragmented and do not lead to the transparency in the functioning of the parties themselves. The reasons for this are as follows: social and political discourse, because of the control by financial and capital groups over the majority of the media, is implemented to the benefit of their interest⁸; there is a lack of explicit legal regulations that would introduce a transparent mechanism of financing of the political parties. On the other hand, the advantage is that the parliamentary parties, at this stage, do not have the so-called „sponsor-monopolist”⁹.

⁸ See: Ю. Гайдук, *Потенциаты политической власти в Украине*, [in:] *Перед выбором*, red. А. Пиль, Т. Стемпневски, Люблин, Львов, Киев 2013, p. 218–225; Українська правда, <http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/12/16/7092693>, „Більшість українців дізнаються новини з каналів Коломойського й Фірташа”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

⁹ See: Центр Разумкова, http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/1442416518_file.pdf, „Партійна система України до і після майдану: зміни, тенденції розвитку, суспільні запити”. Інформаційно-аналітичні матеріали Міжнародного круглого столу „Партійна система України на сучасному

2. Historic outline of the development of mass media

In order to present the shape of the modern media, it would be reasonable to look at the history of their development. It can be said that only after Ukraine won its independence, the years 1991–1992 were the period when the awareness of the need to create the independent media was born. Until 1995 the phenomenon of liberalization of the information space and emergence of the independent centers of the means of mass media could be observed. More or less in the half of Leonid Kuchma's office as the president, freedom of speech was considerably limited, and this process lasted till January, 2005. During that period, there were thousands of nationwide and local media functioning that remained the property of the State Treasury. It mainly concerned the national TV and radio which had their centers in every single oblast. This was also the time when the private media were established and whose owners were the financial and industrial groups, the oligarchs. Their goal was to become the active players on the Ukrainian political scene and they needed the media to achieve this. The country witnessed the fierce competition between the oligarch groups that had already been established and those which were being formed (e.g. Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk clans). The mass media became the natural element of that game.

Additionally, it should be remembered that there was a problem of the lack of qualified staff able to function in the conditions of the market, on which there was a constant fight for the receivers' attention that involved the free use of freedom of speech. The post-Soviet universities did not manage to educate the journalists who would be able to do their job in a skillful way and switch to a completely different way of the media operation, which was not based on the service of the single political party whose activities were assumed as the only appropriate and legitimate. That is why the government under Kuchma was so successful in controlling the Ukrainian media. The so-called *internal censorship* assisted by numerous pressures of the government and individual owners affiliated to the ruling elites, efficiently interfered with the honest work of journalists and proper fulfillment of their professional duties. Lots of young editors, reporters and columnists eager to benefit from the promised freedom of speech, were fired from work, and those who were particularly unsubmitive, were simply removed by means of the state security services or criminal groups.

After the Orange Revolution, which, as it is assumed today, led to the liquidation of censorship, the media in Ukraine started to function in the conditions close to democratic ones. Freedom of speech was the main priority, the political institutions stopped to influence the implemented editorial policy – the process of selection of information to be passed to a receiver. As a consequence, the level of citizens' trust in the media considerably increased¹⁰. Unfortunately, that situation did not last long. After successful

етапі: виклики, проблеми, суспільні очікування” 16 вересня 2015 р. Київ 2015, s. 28–29, inf. of 10 III 2017.

¹⁰ See: О.М. Балакірева, Д.А. Дмитрук, *Громадська думка на межі 2006–2007 рр.: оцінка року що минає, та погляд у майбутнє*, „Український соціум” 2007, no. 1, p. 133.

election, the Party of Regions representing the interests of the great capital and the old political elite still present on the political scene from the times of Kuchma's presidency, revived the control over the content of information communicated by the media. For example, The Security Service of Ukraine under the leadership of one of the shareholders of a commercial program and a recognizable businessman, told the journalists to present the information about the Party of Regions and their activities in positive light. It may be even said that the media, in spite of the postulates and ideas spread in the period of the Orange Revolution, did not become the dedicated advocates and guards of democracy, but instead, started to act as "factories" manufacturing «performances» [...]”¹¹ frequently directed by their owners.

3. Legal regulations and ownership issues

The proposed history and modern condition of the media system finds its reflection in the actual legal state of the media functioning. At the introductory stage it should be noted that already in the first half of 1990s, the legal norms were established that regulated the activities of the mass media. They assumed the democratic values based on the respect of the fundamental human and citizen rights, one of which is the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 34 of the Ukrainian Constitution, concerning freedom of thought and expression¹², being one of the most basic values of the Ukrainian state is developed in over 200 legal acts sanctioning legal norms necessary for the implementation of that law by the freedom of disposal and dissemination of information by the institutions designated for this purpose, that is, the mass media. It is worth emphasizing that one of the first acts adopted by the Ukrainian parliament was the Act on Information after which the subsequent laws were formulated including: the Act on printed mass media; the Act on the state support of the mass media and ensuring of the social security of journalists, etc.¹³.

The binding law, which stresses out by the specialists dealing with the legal regulations of the media in Ukraine is imperfect and thus, it is very prone to all sorts of abuse. The journalistic environment and specialists signaled and still do the need of developing of the mechanisms that would enhance their functioning¹⁴. For example, there was a long debate among the journalists about the need of regulation of the

¹¹ Y. Hayduk, *Українська сфера публічна*, [in:] *Dylematy rozwoju Ukrainy*, edit. L. Hurska-Kowalczyk, Szczecin 2011, p. 104.

¹² Biblioteka Sejmowa, <http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/konst/ukraina.html>, „Konstytucja Ukrainy”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

¹³ See: I. P. Боднар, *Напрямки державного регулювання національного інформаційного простору*, „Scientific Journal ScienceRise” 2015, no. 3/3(8), p. 28–29.

¹⁴ Ранімаційний пакет реформ, <http://rpr.org.ua/groups-rpr/11media-reforma/>, „Медіа реформа”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

access to the public information. Finally, in 2011 the Act on the access to the public information was adopted¹⁵.

Another very current issue, which is a sort of the litmus test for the Ukrainian media is the problem of the open information about the owners of individual mass media. This knowledge has the potential of reduction of influence on politics, that is exerted by frequently disguised interest groups controlling the emission of information materials. It could force the owners of specific mass media, under the threat of suing them for bias and the application of censorship, not to perform the actions aimed at influencing the program (information) offer of the mass media related to them. That would lead to the actual use of the right of freedom of speech by the journalists who would no longer represent the interest of not really recognizable owners in the public discussion. At this point, it should be added that the issue of the need of safety of information space is of crucial importance. The limitation of the possibility to affect this space by other countries is indispensable, particularly from the perspective of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.

As a result of an extensive discussion, especially in the mass media, which was initiated by the experts, journalists and also public officers, in 2015, The Supreme Council adopted the Act on ensuring of information transparency concerning the ownership of the mass media and the implementation of the rules of the state policy in the area of TV and radio¹⁶. However, the experts point out to a loophole in the adopted Act – the procedures and requirements concerning providing of information about the structure of ownership, ultimate beneficiaries and shareholders were not developed. In spite of the later adopted relevant orders regulating the procedure of entering of the information on the websites of the National Council of Television and Radio of Ukraine, one cannot find the transparent information which, according to the Act, has to be put there¹⁷. In consequence, the possibility of evasion from the obligation under the Act, makes it almost ineffective¹⁸. The example of the above is TV 112 which, at the request of the National Council of TV and Radio to submit the information on its owners, sent the answer saying that the TV is owned by the team of its employees, which in view of the Ukrainian market specificity, is highly improbable.

¹⁵ „Відомості Верховної Ради України” 2011, no. 32, „Закон України Про доступ до публічної інформації of 13 I 2011 roku”, p. 314.

¹⁶ „Відомості Верховної Ради України” 2015, no. 45, „Закон України Про внесення змін до деяких законів України щодо забезпечення прозорості власності засобів масової інформації та реалізації принципів державної політики у сфері телебачення і радіомовлення з 3 IX 2015 року”, p. 409.

¹⁷ Національна рада України з питань телебачення і радіомовлення, <http://www.nrada.gov.ua/ua/28604/28608.html>, "Інформація щодо подання даних про структуру власності", inf. of 10 III 2017.

¹⁸ Media Sapiens, http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/media_law/government/mediareforma_rezultati_2015go_ta_plani_na_2016y/, „Медіареформа: результати 2015-го та плани на 2016-й”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

4. The key players on the media market

The effort of showing the real ownership status of the media is made by the non-governmental organizations. With the support of international foundations, the Internet portals are created dedicated to this area exclusively, which contain the information on the owners of individual media groups and media themselves¹⁹. Basing on this information, we will present the general outlook of the Ukrainian media system, which, as it should be emphasized, is controlled by the oligarchic groups and oligarchs themselves. In order do this, we will use the research placed on the website of Media Ownership Monitor Ukraine entitled "Risk indexes for media pluralism".

The TV and radio market is characterized by a high concentration of shares of the oligarchic and business groups. Let us start with the TV market. The authors of the research point out to the fact that almost 76,25% of the TV viewers receive the information broadcast by the media belonging to the four groups of media tycoons: StarLight Media, 1+1 media, Inter Media and Media Group Ukraine.

Table 1. Shares of oligarchic groups in the TV market (in %)




Source: Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikatori/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, „Концентрація аудиторії ЗМІ”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

The market of radio broadcasters is monopolized by the four media groups: TAWR Media, Ukrainian Media Holding, Business Radio Group and TRK Luks. The total number of listeners reaches 92,23%.

¹⁹ Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikatori/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, "Концентрація аудиторії ЗМІ", inf. of 10 III 2017.

Table 2. Shares of oligarchic groups in the radio market (in %)



Source: Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikatori/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, „Концентрація аудиторії ЗМІ”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

The press market indicates considerably lower level of the concentration of shares of the oligarchic and business groups equal 18,6% according to the cited research.

Table 3. Shares of the oligarchic groups in the press market (in %)



Source: Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikatori/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, „Концентрація аудиторії ЗМІ”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

The information is worth emphasizing that the ownership status of UMH and Media Holding Vesti is not clear. It should be also stressed out that the owners of these capital groups are pro-Russia oriented and all titles controlled by them are in the Russian language.

The Internet media in the Ukrainian law, as emphasized by the report authors, are not treated as the mass media and are not submitted to the obligation of registration. The analysis of the information content will allow to distinguish the four owners (media groups) who control about 17,56% of the Internet media²⁰.

²⁰ Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikatori/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, "Індикатори ризиків плюралізму медіа", inf. of 10 III 2017.

5. Potential of the influence of media groups and their owners on receivers

In order to show the condition of the Ukrainian media system (market), the account of the potential of the influence of the Ukrainian media groups together with the names of concrete owners of TV and radio stations and press titles will be presented underneath. Also in this case we will use the research of the risk indexes for media pluralism in order to present the actual number of receivers of the media broadcasts emitted by the individual media. The already invoked source²¹ will be supplemented by the information obtained in the research called „Information-weapon: who do the Ukrainian media belong to. The owners of the biggest TV and radio stations, press titles and the Internet media²². Like in the case of the previous analysis, we would like to start with the discussion of the TV market and then move on the radio market, and finally, focus on the press and Internet media.

5.1. Television market

It is considered that 77,9% of the receivers of the TV stations operating in Ukraine are the ones who view the stations belonging to politicians or people politically engaged²³.

<i>StarLight Media</i> <i>The Pinczuk Family</i>	The greatest number of programs with the biggest number of viewers (21,68%) belong to the Pinczuk Family. They include the stations such as: STB – 8,5%, ICTV – 6,36%, Nowyj Nakal – 4,88%, M1 – 1,06, M2 – 0,12%, QTV – 0,76%. All these stations are the part of the capital group whose name appears on the below diagrams – StarLight Media. Victor Punczuk managing the Group privately is the son-in-law of the ex-president Leonid Kuchma. He also controls the financial and industrial group called Intertajp (metallurgy, steel industry, manufacture of railway wagons).
<i>Inter Media Group</i> <i>Dmitry Firtash</i>	The second position in the ranking, with 21,42% of receivers is held by Inter Media Group which is the property of another Ukrainian oligarch – Dmitry Firtash, once supporting ex-president Victor Yanukovych. The group consists of: Inter (10,62%), NTN (4,53%), Meha (1,11%), K1 (1,6%), K2 (0,46%), Zoom (0,35%), Enter-film (1,27) and Pikel (1,48%).

²¹ Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikator/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, "(Політичний) Контроль над ЗМІ і розподільними мережами", inf. of 10 III 2017.

²² Insider, http://www.theinsider.ua/infographics/2014/2015_smi/vlasnyky.html#rec3231492, "Д. Король, Ю. Віннічук, Д. Косенко, Інформація – зброя: кому належать українські ЗМІ. Власники найбільших телеканалів, радіостанцій, газет, журналів та онлайн-видань. 7 грудня 2015", inf. of 10 III 2017.

²³ Media Ownership Monitor Україна, <http://ukraine.mom-rsf.org/ua/ukrajina/znakhidki/indikator/#!0b8b5e0d6c5da7f670e908ac65258a18>, (Політичний), *op. cit.*

<i>Group 1+1 Ihor Kolomoyskyi</i>	The third position is held by Group 1+1 with 20,49%. The group consists of: 1+1 – 11%, 2+2 – 2,44%, TET – 3,52%, Bihudi – 0,7%, Plus Plus – 2,67%, Unian – 0,16% of receivers. It belongs to Ihor Kolomoyskyi (so far representing the banking sector, steel industry and oil refining industry) and Henadiju Boholiubowu (oil refining industry, ferro-alloys industry) (as a result of purchasing of the Austrian company called Consolidated Minerals controls 30% of the ferro-alloy market).
<i>Media Group Ukraine Renat Agcmetov</i>	Another significant group with 12,66% receivers is Media Group Ukraine, the owner of which is one of perhaps best-known Ukrainian oligarchs, the main sponsor of the Party of Regions – Renat Agcmetov. The group has the following TV stations: Ukraine (11,03%), NLO TV (1,3%) and Indigo (0,33%).
Eugene Marajev	In the research, its authors also mention the TV station News One with 0,58% receivers, which belongs to the MP from the Opposition Block, Eugene Marajev, famous for his pro-Russian sympathy.
Nikola Kniażytskyj	Espresso TV with 0,3% receivers belonging to the MP of the National Front Party Nikola Kniażytskyj.
Petro Poroshenko	Program 5 with 0,6% receivers, the owner of which is the incumbent president Petro Poroshenko.
Alexander Klymenko	UBR with 0,6% receivers, associated with the ex-minister of Taxation and Congregations, Alexander Klymenko.

5.2. Radio market

The number of radio stations owned by the oligarchic capital groups is even more impressive – 83,76%²⁴. For example:

<i>StarLight Media Wiktor and Olena Pinczuk</i>	The stations belonging to Victor and Olena Pinczuk (StarLight Media) broadcast to 39,72% receivers. Ruskoje Radio – 7,9%, Chit FM – 11,73%, Radio Roks – 5,39%, Kiss FM – 7,04%, Melodia – 5,25%, Relaks – 2,41%.
<i>Holding UMH Serhij Kurczenko</i>	30,73% of listeners are the receivers of the station being the part of Holding UMH (Auto Radio – 7,46%, Retro FM – 7,98%, Our Radio – 7,03%, NRJ (Europa Plus) – 2,4%, Radio Piatnytsia – 5,86%, Lounge FM ra Holos Stolytsi). It is thought that the owner of this Holding is Serhij Kurczenko (planted persons act on his behalf) – associated with the family of ex-president Yanukovych.
Kateryna Kit-Sadowa	Mayor's of Lviv and leader of the Samopomicz Party wife Kateryna Kit-Sadowa is the owner of the following radio stations: Luks FM (8,56%) ra Radio 24 (1,65%), which in total gives 10,21% receivers.
Andrij Derkacz	Radio Era with 3,1% listeners belongs to Anton Simonenko but the actual owner is Andrij Derkacz- a close friend of Kuchma, an MP of the seventh and eighth term.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

5.3. Press market

It is also emphasized in the research that due to a small number of press readers, the influence of politicians on this market is relatively small – 15,9%. Nevertheless, both TV, radio and press markets are in their majority controlled by the politicians or people connected with them²⁵.

Rinat Achmetov	Gazeta Siehodnia can boast the greatest number of receivers/readers – 3,6%.its owner is already mentioned Rinat Achmetov.
Alexander Klymenko	The second position is held by Gazeta Wiesti – 3,2% readers, associated with the ex-Minister of Taxation and Congregations, Alexander Klymenko.
<i>Holding UMH Serhij Kurczenko</i>	Holding UMH controls 8,2% readers of the press titles such as: Kom-somolskaja Prawda in Ukraine – 1,7%, Arguments and Facts – 2,9%, Tielenedialia 2,3%, Korrespondient – 1,1%, Diengi magazine – 0,2%, and Football and Forbes Ukraine. The owner of the Holding is already mentioned Serhij Kurczenko (planted people act on his behalf).
Ihor Vasiunyk	Gazeta Po ukraiński with 0,9% readers is associated with ex-MP Ihor Vasiunyk.

5.4. The Internet media market

Practically one-fourth (21,24%) of the information emitted by the Internet media is controlled by the companies belonging to the oligarchic and industrial groups. As can be seen, also this market is to a large extent monopolized by the circles which treat the media as the tool to implement their own business and political interests²⁶.

Ihor Kolomoskyj	Oligarch Ihor Kolomoskyj, for example, influences the broadcasting aimed at 4,25% users. He operates via the following information services: UNIAN – 1,63% users, TSN.ua – 2,62% users and Glavred ra Telekrytyka.
<i>Holding UMH Serhij Kurczenko</i>	Serhij Kurczenko and his Holding UMH controls the information directed to 7,49% users and does it by means of: korrespondent.net (1,68%), bigmir.net (1,7%), i.ua, tochka.net (1,11%), football.ua (0,59%), kp.ua (1,16%), vgorode.ua (1,25%), Forbes.net.ua.
Mychajlo Brotskyj	Ex-businessman and politician Mychajlo Brotskyj directs his broadcast via the information service Obozrwiewatel to 2,7% users.
Rinat Achmetov	Rinat Achmetov via: Segodnya.ua (2,64%) and gorod.dp.ua (0,51%) controls the transmission to 3,15% users.
Andrij Sadowyj	Andrij Sadowyj emits the information to 2,15% users via 24tv.ua.
Ihor Vasiunyk	Ihor Vasiunyk associated with the information service Gazeta.ua has 1,5% users.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

The above presented analysis of the TV, radio, press and Internet media confirms the thesis on the high degree of monopolization of the Ukrainian media market by the oligarchic groups and individual politicians. It may be further supported by another study, which focuses on the example of censorship on one of the most strongly monopolized media market – television. The study points out to the practice of infringing of professional standards by the most powerful TV stations which frequently use the subliminal advertising (*dżynse*). This group comprises the two nationwide TV stations – Inter and Ukraine, the operation of which is mainly aimed at the promoting of the political activity of the political party Opposition Block (the successor of the Party of Regions), the founders of which were previously mentioned Serhij Liovoczkin i Rinat Achmietov. Also program 5 belonging to president Petra Poroshenko and The First National controlled by the government resort to the subliminal advertising (the so-called *dżynse*).

Table 4. The amount of information emitted with the infringement of the professional standards (censorship) (in %)



Source: О. Гоян, Д. Дуцик, В. Иванов, В. Мороз, В. Хоменюк, *Український медіа-ландшафт 2015: аналітичний звіт*, Київ 2015, p. 31.

Another example of the influence of the owners on the TV and radio stations as well as on press titles controlled by them may be the conflict between Ihor Kolomojsky and the coalition of Serhia Liovoczkin, Rinat Achmietov and Victor Pinczuk after the so-called Revolution of Dignity (in the period from 2014 to 2015)²⁷. Television 1+1, Inter, ICTV, STB and Ukraine conducted the campaign discrediting their opponents, which subsequently led to the phenomenon of the so-called oligarchic censorship plu-

²⁷ Reason- the changes on the political scene as a result of which the Party of Regions supported by the latter lost its influence which naturally weakened the position of Achmetov and partly that of Pinczuk's. This obviously resulted in the reconstruction of the influence of oligarchs on the processes occurring on the political scene.

ralism, as described by the authors of the report called the Ukrainian media landscape of 2015. It mainly involved the creation of the manipulated vision of the world by each of the stations to the advantage of their owners²⁸.

6. Russian information product on the Ukrainian media market

The characteristic feature of the Ukrainian media system is the presence of the information content of the Russian origin and the Russian media themselves. That phenomenon had been fully accepted until the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine by both the state and its most important players.

All industrial and capital groups controlling the Ukrainian media market by means of economic bonds and political interests resulting from them, aiming at the reduction of production costs of the so-called information products (feature films, documentaries, entertainment programs, etc.), extensively borrowed the information content from the Russian information space. This phenomenon, as emphasized by Joanna Szostek, the author of the article in which she researches the influence of the Russian media on the information transmitted by the Ukrainian media in 2010, is strictly connected with the interests of their owners. In order to show this phenomenon, she uses the already mentioned example of Inter TV, which frequently broadcasts materials referring to the Soviet past and presents the information on the political and social life in Russia in the way which is very loyal to the government at the Kremlin. Additionally, she points out to the tendency of showing Russia and its leaders in the positive light in the press. Here, she gives the example of Komsomolska Prawda and Izwiestia as well as Arguments and Facts in Ukraine²⁹. The carried out analyses indicate that the level of transmitted content, for example in 2014, was very high – 40,6%³⁰.

The greatest issuers of the Russian information production are the most powerful Ukrainian TV stations: Inter, ICTV, NTN or Ukraine, the owners of which, as is concluded from the above presented analysis are the influential Ukrainian oligarchs whose interests are frequently located on the Russian market.

²⁸ О. Гоян, Д. Дуцик, В. Иванов, В. Мороз, В. Хоменюк, *Український медіа-ланшафт 2015: аналітичний звіт*, Київ 2015, p. 31.

²⁹ J. Szostek, *Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of "Soft Power"?*, "East European Politics & Societies" 2014, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 463–486.

³⁰ Тексти org.ua, http://texty.org.ua/pg/blog/krystofer/read/56126/Infografika_Obsagy_rosijskogo_kontentu_na_TV_neb „Інфографіка: Обсяги російського контенту на ТВ не тільки не зменшуються, а навіть зростають”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

Diagram 5. The biggest Ukrainian TV stations with the greatest amount of information of the Russian origin




Source: Тексти org.ua, http://texty.org.ua/pg/blog/krystofer/read/56126/Infografika_Obsagy_rosijskogo_kontentu_na_TV_neb „Інфографіка: Обсяги російського контенту на ТВ не тільки не зменшуються, а навіть зростають”s, inf. of 10 III 2017.

Another reason for those substantially long-term practices was the lack of awareness of domestic information production which, as was confirmed by practitioners in their numerous interviews, was consolidated by the so-called fifth column³¹.

As we mentioned in the introduction, the Russian media play a very important role on the Ukrainian media market. The research indicates that practically 38% of respondents watch the Russian TV, of whom 9% do it on regular basis.

Diagram 6. Preferences in viewing of Russian or Ukrainian TV (October 2014).



* the survey does not include the opinion of the residents of the so-called occupied territories

Source: Пакурс, <http://ua.racurs.ua/news/37911-blyzko-20-ukrayinciv-dyvylyatsya-novyny-na-r-osyiskomu-telebachenni>, „Близько 20% українців дивляться новини на російському телебаченні”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

³¹ The thesis is put forward by Olha Herasymczuk, vice-President of the National Board of Radio and Television of Ukraine in her interview given to the Radio Swoboda (Радіо Свобода, <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26757002.html>), “Телеканали України й дали масово закуповують російські серіали – Ольга Герасим’юк”, inf. of 10 III 2017.

The most impressive number of the receivers of the Russian programs constitutes the population living in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. In 2015, the situation changed due to the actions of the Ukrainian government, which fighting with the Russian propaganda machinery being the key part of the hybrid war of Russia with Ukraine, required the exclusion of the Russian TV programs undermining the social and political order and integrity of the Ukrainian state from the offer of the cable TV operators³². In eastern and southern oblasts, the possibility of receiving of the Russian TV stations was reduced to 30%, as confirmed by the sociological studies³³. However, the number of the receivers of information programs was not decreased as both in 2014 and 2015 about 10% of receivers still rely on the information transmitted by the Russian television. The audience of 10% viewing ORT 1 is an example of this³⁴.

It should be noted that in the majority of cases, the Russian TV is viewed by the Ukrainians on the satellite TV platform and a considerable number of viewers can also access it via the platform of cable TV.

Diagram 7. Technical means with the help of which the Russian TV is viewed in Ukraine (eastern and southern) (2015).



* The following oblasts were included in the survey: Kharkiv, Odessa, Chernihiv, Donetsk and Luhansk.

Source: Соціологічне дослідження [w:] *Протидія російській інформаційній агресії: спільні зусилля задля захисту демократії, Аналітичний звіт*, Київ 2015, p. 44.

This means that in spite of the measures introduced by the Ukrainian authorities aimed at the eliminating of the Russian TV from the Ukrainian media space, the de-

³² See: J. Hajduk, T. Stępniewski, *Wojna hybrydowa Rosji z Ukrainą: uwarunkowania i instrumenty*, „Studia Europejskie” 2015, vol. 4, no. 76, p. 135–153.

³³ Соціологічне дослідження [w:] *Протидія російській інформаційній агресії: спільні зусилля задля захисту демократії, Аналітичний звіт*, Київ 2015, p. 42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

sired goal was not achieved. There are not any technical and legal means that would facilitate that process, in the same way as the activity of most operators is not the subject of the Ukrainian jurisdiction. Every person who buys an appropriate technical device may receive the Russian TV programs on generally accessible, free platform.

Summary

The media system in Ukraine is one of the significant elements of the whole structure of public relations, particularly in the political sphere. The political system is riddled with the interests of the oligarchic clans, which in order to implement their interests, support and create political parties that do not possess any distinctive ideological identity. Realizing the importance of the media in politics, they take the control over the media system which is considerably subordinated to their owners' interest. Editorial policy of many of them, especially the one concerning the fundamental issues, is strictly supervised. Broadcast materials are frequently biased and serve the interests of their principals. The characteristic feature of the media system, which also in this case seems to be a natural consequence of the social and political relationships, is the presence of the Russian media and Russian information products. The attempt to limit their influence, due to their biased information attitude aimed at promoting of the Putin vision of the social and political relationships, does not always bring the expected results. Initiatives of rearrangement of the functioning of the domestic media also frequently fail. The act on transparency and openness of information on the owners is not fully executed and does not eliminate the oligarchs' influence on the media system. It seems that the only reasonable solution would be to establish public media permanently financed from the state budget, totally independent from politicians, that would dictate new rules of the game based on the honest and independent journalism. However, the initiatives of creating of such a media group do not find the actual support of any of the teams exercising the authority.



Abstract: The media system in Ukraine is one of the most significant elements of the whole structure of the public relations, especially in the political sphere. In spite of the two great social uprisings in Ukraine, the influence of oligarchs on the policy was not successfully optimized. They exploit the media as the tool of their political game. Main hypothesis of the article: the media system is dominated by the interests of oligarchs who practically control the whole of it.

Key words: political system, party system, media system, media, political parties, oligarchy.

System medialny Ukrainy. Ujęcie politologiczne

Streszczenie: System medialny Ukrainy jest jednym z istotnych elementów całego układu relacji publicznych, szczególnie w sferze politycznej. Pomimo dwóch wielkich zrywów społecznych na Ukrainie nie udało się zoptymalizować wpływu oligarchów na politykę. Wykorzystują oni media jako narzędzie

prowadzonej przez nich gry politycznej. Hipoteza główna artykułu brzmi: system mediów jest zdominowany przez interesy oligarchów, którzy praktycznie w całości kontrolują system medialny.

Słowa kluczowe: system polityczny, system partyjny, system medialny, media, partie polityczne, oligarchia

Медіасистема України. Політологічний аспект

Анотація: Медіасистема України являється одним из важнейших элементов всей системы общественных отношений, особенно в политической сфере. Несмотря на два больших выступления общества, в Украине не удалось оптимизировать влияния олигархов на политику. Они используют СМИ как инструмент своей политической игры. Основная гипотеза статьи: в медиасистеме преобладают интересы олигархов, которые практически полностью контролируют медиасистему.

Ключевые слова: политическая система, партийная система, медиасистема, СМИ, политические партии, олигархия.

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